According to need? The implementation of discretionary payments within social assistance schemes in Britain and the Netherlands by Davidson, Jacqueline
According to need? The implementation of discretionary 
payments within social assistance schemes in Britain and the 
Netherlands 
Jacqueline Davidson 
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
Department of Applied Social Science 
University of Stirling 
2004 
Declaration 
I declare that none of the work contained within this thesis has been 
submitted for any other degree at any other university. The contents found 
herein have been composed by the candidate, Jacqueline Davidson. 
Acknowledgements 
Sincere thanks to Jochen Clasen and Angus Erskine for their excellent 
supervision of this thesis. It has been a privilege to work with such fine 
scholars. Their support, guidance and advice have enriched my work and my 
understanding of a critical social science. 
This thesis would not have taken the particular form that it did without the 
participation of the discretionary decision-makers in both countries. I would 
like to thank them for sharing their thoughts, time and detailed knowledge of 
their respective systems with me. 
A number of people in the Netherlands made this cross-national enterprise 
both logistically easier than it would have been and extremely enjoyable. 
Thanks to Wim van Oorschot for all his help and hospitality. Thanks also to 
Tamara for her assistance with translating the vignette scenarios into Dutch. 
Special thanks go to Richard, Dirk and Gideon. Their kindness and friendship 
has been, and is, much valued. 
Thanks also to all those in the Department who offered their support and 
encouragement at just the right times, especially Sharon, Rhoda, Ruth, and 
Nic, also Mary, Sam, lan, Gill, Petra and all post-graduate students. 
Thanks also to family and friends for all manner of support for, and distraction 
from, this undertaking over the years. 
Abstract 
This in-depth cross-national case study questions broad assertions made to 
date regarding the general similarities that can be found in exceptional need 
systems within social assistance schemes in Britain (the Social Fund) and the 
Netherlands (Bijzondere Bijstand). Based on qualitative documentary 
analysis and in-depth interviews with those who administer discretionary 
payments in both countries the research highlights that these nominally 
similar schemes serve diverse goals and aims in their national contexts. 
Reflecting the different traditions of cash and care and the administrative 
structure of the state in the implementation of policy in this area, the first part 
of the thesis demonstrates that Bijzondere Bijstand in the Netherlands is firmly 
situated in an 'activity fare' context whilst the Social Fund remains largely 
separate from the administration of 'welfare to work' in Britain. The second 
part of the thesis highlights the empirically observed diversity that follows from 
these configurations of social assistance. Those who administer these 
payments have quite different educational and occupational backgrounds that 
inform the ways they think about poverty and the poor and are related to what 
they try to do for clients and customers with discretionary payments. The 
Dutch 'paternalistic' administrator attempts to facilitate paths out of social 
assistance for clients whilst Social Fund Officers are concerned with 
'managerially' processing a large number of applicants in the context of 
targets and budgets. Organisational contexts are shown to affect the 
administration of discretionary payments to the 'deserving and undeserving 
poor', but not the meanings that administrators imbue the forms of payment at 
their disposal, grants and loans. Configurations of social assistance 
essentially set the context for the degree to which administrators can award 
payments in accordance with absolute and relative notions of poverty and 
human need and the interpretation and construction of needs and wants. In 
practice, need is a dynamic social construct that is informed by the 
professionalism of the workers, the ideology of the programme they 
implement and the structure and constraints of the bureaucracy in which they 
work. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Ignatieff (1984:34) writes that 'the claim of need' philosophically has 'nothing to 
do with deserving; it rests on peoples necessity, not on their merit' and thus 
confers entitlements to the resources of the welfare state. In practise however it 
is recognised that the idea of need may be used and constructed in different 
ways by different sets of welfare state workers situated in different contexts 
(Smith 1980:1). This research is concerned with exploring the notions of need 
that underpin the decisions of those who implement discretionary payments 
within social assistance schemes in Britain (the Social Fund) and the 
Netherlands (Bijzondere Bijstand).1 Given the lack of comparative in-depth 
knowledge in this area of income maintenance such an exploration might 
essentially tell us something not only about the principles, nature and aims of the 
exceptional need schemes in question, but also those of the wider social 
assistance schemes in which exceptional need is situated in the two countries. 
To date, provision to meet exceptional need 'in already poor families' (Ditch 
1995:337) in Britain and the Netherlands has, from a general viewpoint, been 
described as 'bearing much resemblance' (van Oorschot and Smolenaars 
1993:11) and similarly broad contentions have been made regarding the 
'workfare' social assistance schemes in which they are situated (Ledemel and 
Trickey 2001), and from where they must be understood. 
1 Often translated into English as 'Special Assistance'. 
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Findings to date from the large-scale cross-national research that has been 
carried out would indeed tend to suggest similarities in this form of provision in 
the two countries. For example, universal trends identified in the factors (rising 
and long-term unemployment, changes in family formations) affecting the growth 
of means tested social assistance (van Oorschot and Schell 1991; Ditch 1999; 
Gough 1998) and increased conditionality and compulsion for beneficiaries 
(L0demel & Trickey 2001) might well serve as evidence of convergence in this 
area of provision. 
Yet, as Goodin et al (1999:4) point out, in a comparative perspective, subtle 
differences in welfare policies and programmes in different countries can, upon 
closer inspection, effectively be seen to serve diverse goals and objectives. 
Taking benefits 'simply by their names', may thus be misleading, and suggests 
the need to look at 'the functions of different benefits' (Eardley et al 1996b:1) in 
what are argued to be distinct welfare state regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990; 
1999) imbued with different sets of social and political values (Pollit 1997:369). 
That the similar policy responses noted above will have embedded themselves in 
different structures and traditions of social assistance in Britain and the 
Netherlands, is evidenced but not explored, by the assertion that 'workfare' 
strengthens an already established tradition of cash-care provision in the 
Netherlands, while in the UK it re-introduces a social work role to systems where 
cash and care have previously been separated' (L0demel and Trickey 2001 :29). 
Pressures for convergence in exceptional need provision within the two countries 
2 
therefore, must essentially have taken account of the rather 'diverse structures of 
state schemes' (Craig 1992:53) which might have exerted a powerful influence 
on the development of policy (Mabbett & Bolderson 1999:50). Hence subtle 
cross-national differences, as well as similarities, may have emerged as policies 
were carved out in their specific national contexts. 
In particular we might expect that differences in both the degree of centralisation 
and the tradition of cash/care provision in this area might have affected the 
dynamic between the implementation of exceptional need schemes and the 
'workfare' social assistance schemes in which they are situated in the two 
countries. Compared to the Netherlands (as chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate) the 
historical development of exceptional need provision in Britain can be seen to 
have affected the degree to which it was later incorporated (in both the 
administration and aims) of 'welfare to work'. 
Thus from a comparative perspective, we might expect to observe a degree of 
diversity in the administrative perceptions of need in the two schemes. As has 
been recognised (Emerson & Paley 1992:246) rather than being the outcome of 
unconstrained personal choice, discretionary decisions that administrators make 
daily in their jobs will be informed by a range of contextual factors: moral, 
symbolic, socio-political and organisational. Primarily, such provision is situated 
in welfare states that are argued to belong to distinct welfare regimes. These will 
essentially affect the politically defined human needs that benefit levels and 
exceptional payments are both adequate and able to meet. Further, any diversity 
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between the implementation of exceptional need payments and the 'workfare' 
social assistance schemes in which they are situated would be expected to 
inform the degree to which the administrator explicitly seeks to exercise social 
control (Dean 1991) over beneficiaries and alter the behaviour of clients or 
customers in return for a discretionary payment. Such organisational goals - to 
'change and/or process' (Hasenfeld and Weaver 1996) clients - will further inform 
the context of discretionary decision making by generating specific methods and 
constraints for those working within them. 
In sum then, it might be expected that specific configurations of social assistance 
will 'inform the discretionary decisions of those working within welfare 
organisations towards clients' (Hasenfeld & Weaver 1986:239) and thus in a 
comparative perspective influence the discretionary decisions that the workers 
make daily regarding whom might be thought to need what, and why (Van 
Oorschot 2000). 
As Hill (2000:516) argues, comparative studies in this area of social policy have 
essentially reached the stage at which it is necessary to supplement large multi-
country comparisons with smaller, largely qualitative ones. Employing a case-
study approach, the present research is concerned to root this form of social 
protection in its particular socio-political, historical and cultural setting (Hantrais & 
Mangen 1996:5) thereby bringing a 'historical awareness and sensitivity towards 
cross-national similarities and differences' (Clasen 1999:2). It thus seeks to 
identify and explain 'systematic patterns of similarities and differences' (Ragin 
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1994:108) in the development and implementation of policy in the area of 
exceptional need provision. 
The main aim of the research may be stated as being: 
To identify and explain systematic patterns of similarities and differences in the 
implementation of discretionary exceptional need payments within social 
assistance schemes in Britain and the Netherlands. 
This can be broken down into two sub-aims, the first being: 
1. To provide an understanding of the nature of exceptional need provision 
within social assistance schemes in Britain and the Netherlands by examining 
institutional and policy differences in systems of provision. 
The specific objectives that will be pursued to meet this aim are: 
1.i To provide an account of the historical development of policy in this area, 
identifying factors of convergence and divergence. How have similar pressures 
(changes in family formations and labour markets) impacted on this area of 
policy, considering the country specific configurations of social assistance 
provision? 
1.ii To document the current systems, and institutional configurations of social 
assistance and exceptional need provision in the two countries under study. 
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1.iii To assess where, and for what purposes or needs, exceptional payments 
can be accessed. 
The second aim of the research is: 
2. To compare the administrative techniques and practises employed in the 
implementation of exceptional need policies in both countries. 
The specific objectives that will be pursued to meet this aim are, to determine 
empirically: 
2.i What administrators are concerned to do with, for or to clients. Are they 
concerned to classify and dispose of applicants and/or to seek a change in the 
client's behaviour for the discretionary payment? 
2.ii To explore the conceptual framework which underlies the administrative 
allocation of resources. 
2.iii To illustrate the concepts and distinctions (i.e. administrative criteria of 
deservingness) which might be utilised by administrators to guide or inform 
discretionary decisions with regard to prioritising 'those in need' and thus eligible 
for assistance. 
Having outlined the rationale and aims of the study, the remainder of this chapter 
provides a brief overview of the structure of the thesis. Chapter 2 is concerned 
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with identifying and theorising the implications that differing configurations of 
social assistance might have for the factors informing the discretionary decisions 
of the two sets of administrators. It begins by reviewing the wider cross-national 
literature on welfare states and typologies of social assistance before identifying 
the more specific theoretical literature (people processing/changing, 
organisational theory) and analytical concepts (need, deserving and undeserving 
poor) that will be used for the analysis of discretionary decision making in the 
exceptional need schemes in the two countries. The chapter concludes with a 
number of theoretical hypotheses. 
The definition, origin, development and nature of exceptional need policy within 
social assistance provision in the two countries under study are the subject of 
chapter 3. Essentially, whilst a number of similarities and differences in the 
development of exceptional need and social assistance provision are highlighted, 
the chapter demonstrates that the origins of this form of social protection have 
led to quite different traditions and configurations in the two countries. Similar 
issues in policy development in the late 1980s and early 1990s embodied in the 
projects of 'Managed Liberalisation' in the Netherlands and 'New Managerialism' 
in Britain saw the emergence of budget limited exceptional need schemes and 
increased discretion to the locality. The degree of centralisation and cash and/or 
care previously established in this area of income maintenance however 
essentially affected whether such provision was incorporated into the 
administration of an activating social assistance or not. Bijzondere Bijstand was 
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firmly situated in an 'activity fare,2 context whilst the Social Fund remained largely 
separate from the administration of 'welfare to work,3 in Britain. 
Drawing on the theoretical propositions outlined in chapter 2, the chapter 
concludes by hypothesising that the Dutch administrators in their configuration of 
social assistance were expected to be concerned with paternalistically changing 
the behavior of social assistance beneficiaries, whilst the British administrators 
were expected to be more concerned with managerially people processing 
applicants for a discretionary payment. 
Chapter 4 outlines the methodological approach taken and highlights a number 
of issues that were faced in regards to accessing primary and secondary data 
sources for this cross-national case study. It highlights the benefits of the specific 
methods employed and justifies the researcher's analytical interpretations by 
noting the limitations on the data that arose from the challenges encountered in 
applying the qualitative methodology cross-nationally. 
Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 present the comparative findings and analysis. Chapter 5 
illustrates that, in line with the divergent cash/care traditions of social assistance 
in the two countries, the two sets of workers have essentially followed quite 
different paths to their respective occupations. Tracing the administrative routes 
2 Where education, training and voluntary work are seen as important in getting clients to the 
labour market. 
3 This term covers a relatively wide range of policies designed to encourage and facilitate labour 
market participation including the 'New Deals', changes to the tax and benefit systems, the 
National Minimum Wage and child care provisions (Millar 2000:iv). 
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to employment highlights that the workers were motivated to apply for their 
specific, and what they perceive to be stigmatised, positions of employment by 
quite different concerns. The chapter illustrates that the Dutch administrators 
actively sought out their 'helping professions' and had previously completed 
some course of study congruent with 'people changing' such as social work or 
teaching. Social Fund administrators in Britain in contrast were attracted more 
by the perception of the Civil Service as a 'steady career' and entered with a 
bureaucratic background rather than a professional one. The chapter argues that 
these different personal resources that they bring to their jobs will directly affect 
how they think about and perceive the poor and poverty. 
Notwithstanding these differences in the administrative backgrounds, chapter 6 
illustrates that both sets of workers clearly perceive themselves to be 'helping 
people' and have similar 'moral codes' (Knegt 1987) as to who should be helped, 
how much and under what conditions. The nature and degree to which they can 
administer provision in line with these values of personal responsibility is 
however, argued to be informed and constrained by their specific organisational 
goals, methods and constraints. The chapter illustrates that the Dutch 
administrators are concerned with meeting exceptional need whilst having to 
'activate' beneficiaries either socially or to the labour market. They thus use 
Bijzondere Bijstand as a tool of paternalistic implementation. Conversely, 
Britain's managerial officers are charged with meeting exceptional need in the 
context of tight directions, a limited budget and targets for clearing work. The 
9 
means of implementation to achieve these objectives, in a comparative context, 
become less important and their concern is with rationing very scarce resources 
over a large number of applicants. Rather than attempting to change the 
behaviour of applicants with a discretionary payment, they are more concerned 
with awarding to those beneficiaries who 'haven't had a payment before'. 
In further exploring the country specific criteria of deservingness to emerge from 
their institutional configurations of social assistance, chapter 7 illustrates the 
similar meanings with which both sets of administrators imbue the discretionary 
forms of payment at their disposal: loans and grants. It argues that in a 
comparative context the Dutch administrators are able to explicitly regulate 
behaviour with discretionary payments in accordance with the values of work and 
family responsibility. British officers on the other hand do not have the time, 
resources or methods at their disposal that would allow them to work on the 
'habits and economies of the poor' (Dean 1991 :57) in the same way. 
Chapter 8, the final analysis chapter, illustrates and discusses the constructions 
of human need that the workers employ. It illustrates that administrators in both 
countries do not consider the needs of an abstract humanity. Rather they 
consider the needs of social assistance beneficiaries and interpret these in 
accordance with the principle of personal responsibility. This shared principle 
however, had to work its way through the specific configurations of social 
assistance in which the administrators were situated. Comparatively speaking, 
such contexts were able to structure and inform the degree to which 
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administrators could administer payments according to absolute and relative 
notions of need. Notwithstanding this difference however, the chapter essentially 
argues that the workers operated with a mega conception of 'normative' need 
(Bradshaw 1972) rather than with a fixed and objective definition. In practice the 
social construction of need was dynamic, contingent and partly underpinned by a 
strong relationship between work and consumption. Both sets of workers 
perceived that social assistance beneficiaries, by definition 'inadequate 
producers' had a responsibility to 'live within their means, to manage on what 
they got', and to accept the status position of an 'inadequate consumer' (Bauman 
1998). Whether operating with more or less recourse to notions of absolute or 
relative conceptions of poverty, administrators in both exceptional need systems 
ultimately sought to constrain the 'choices' of social assistance beneficiaries in 
Sen's (1983:161) absolute sense. 
Chapter 9 concludes the thesis by summarising the main comparative findings 
before discussing the implications of the research. 
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Chapter 2 Contextualising discretion: welfare states, 
configurations of social assistance and perceptions of human 
need 
As the previous chapter argued, whilst Britain and the Netherlands have 
nominally similar discretionary payment systems within social assistance 
provision, empirical investigation might reveal that these serve subtly different 
goals and objectives in a national context (Goodin et al 1999:4). Thus, 
'assumptions that inform discretionary decisions have of necessity to be 
located within much broader social structural concerns' (Adler and Asquith 
1981 :11). 
This chapter is concerned with theorising the implications that differing 
configurations of social assistance might be expected to have for the (moral, 
symbolic, socio-political, economic and organisational) factors that might 
essentially inform the discretionary decisions concerning the needs of social 
assistance beneficiaries of the two sets of administrators. It thus begins by 
reviewing some of the wider cross-national literature on welfare states and 
social assistance before moving on to identify the more specific theoretical 
literature and analytical concepts that will be used for the analysis of the 
implementation of discretionary payments in the two countries. 
Comparative welfare state research 
Given the focus on discretionary decision-making within social assistance 
schemes in Britain and the Netherlands, the present research is essentially a 
qualitative cross-national case study (see chapter 4 for a full discussion) in the 
substantive area of social security. Whilst cross-national case studies of a 
single policy area in a small number of countries such as this are said to 
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constitute the latest generation of comparative studies (Abrahamson 
1999:409; Clasen 1999:3; Mabbett and Bolderson 1999:48) they are broadly 
related to a wider body of comparative research on welfare states, conducted 
from a multiplicity of theoretical viewpoints. 
Broadly speaking, much of the larger scale multi-country research in cross-
national welfare state research has been concerned with testing, so called 
'meta-narrative' - functionalist and conflict - theories of 'convergence'. The 
basic premise of the latter theories is that along with economic development 
'countries with contrasting cultural and political traditions will become more 
alike in their strategy for constructing the floor below which no-one falls' 
(quoted in Mabbett and Bolderson 1999:43) whether this refers to expansion 
or retrenchment. Formerly, this manifested itself in arguments that, for 
example, democratic states would increase their welfare spending. In recent 
times, the concern has been that global competitiveness will lead welfare 
states to embark on a 'race to the bottom' of social protection for citizens 
(Kvist 2004). 
It has been argued however, that the forms of explanation provided by such 
large scale projects concerned with broad trends and generalisations in a 
number of industrial societies do little to increase our understanding of 
phenomena in different social, political and cultural contexts (Hantrais and 
Mangen 1996:5). The logico-deductive structure of globalisation theory for 
example means that it is inherently 'universal' or applicable in any setting, 
rather than what some commentators would consider comparative: in the 
sense of gaining insights by highlighting differences (Mabbett and Bolderson 
13 
1999:48); or differences and similarities (Ragin 1997) between counties. 
Similarly, the point has been made that large-scale research that focuses on 
the single parameter of national social spending tells us little about the roles 
of, principles within or distributional impacts of different welfare arrangements 
across countries (Clasen 1999:2). 
At the other end of the methodological spectrum however, single country, or 
research on one case, has often been criticised for emphasising the 
uniqueness of individual countries' experience. From this perspective, each 
country's welfare institutions and national experiences are seen as 'sui 
generis- a case unto itself (Goodin et aI1999:12; Ebbinghaus 2003:14). 
Worlds of welfare capitalism 
Of particular relevance to the present research, is the attempt to steer a 
middle ground through the latter theoretical stances, by combining 
quantitative indicators with qualitative classifications (Ebbinghause 2003:24), 
provided by Esping-Andersen's (1990) thesis on worlds of welfare capitalism.1 
Unlike the multi-country studies discussed above, this approach does not 
narrowly associate the welfare state with public transfers, in cash or in kind. 
Rather, it recognises that welfare states of that narrower sort are all 
embedded in larger capitalist socio-economic orders which promote peoples' 
welfare or wellbeing more broadly construed, by various other means as well 
(Goodin et al 1999:5). Esping-Andersen therefore uses the term welfare 
regime to refer to a larger constellation of socio-economic institutions: the 
1 Esping-Andersen's identification of welfare regimes undoubtedly builds on, and takes 
further, the work of previous scholars' attempts to construct typologies of welfare states (for a 
fuller discussion see Abrahamson 1999). 
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state, market and family. Essentially, he argues that depending on the welfare 
mix (between the state, market and family), we will find qualitatively different 
arrangements in the provision of welfare in different countries (Esping-
Andersen 2000:161). Seen from this broader perspective then, welfare 
regimes are also worlds of welfare capitalism, which embody principles about 
how to provide welfare for citizens in a capitalist economy founded on the 
cash-nexus. 
Essentially, Esping-Andersen (1999:4) argues that, as post world war two 
European nations build divergent welfare regimes, differing cultural and 
political factors, or configurations of welfare will structure, or mediate the way 
that countries respond to international and global pressures: making 
adaptation 'institutionally path dependent'. While policies may appear to be 
converging on a broad level (for example cutbacks or retrenchment in the 
form of 'workfare'), it is argued that new divergences will emerge as these 
policies evolve in a particular national context. Existing policy programmes, 
labour markets and labour market polices, as well as the relationship between 
central and local government, are among the factors that contribute to 
substantial differences in the way that policies are chiselled out. In effect, 
what we may find is a situation of 'divergence in convergence' (L0demel 
1999). 
Within the diversity of what a number of European countries call their welfare 
state, Esping-Andersen identifies a few clear clusters, which he illustrates by 
the use of three welfare regime typologies: social democratic, liberal and 
conservative (discussed below). Depending on the welfare mix - between the 
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state, market and family in the provision of welfare - welfare regimes, with 
their particular programmes and polices, are argued to bunch together 
particular values, for example equality, status-maintenance or self-reliance 
(discussed below). In contrast to those who would seek 'universal theories' of 
welfare state development in industrial societies then, the implication of 
Esping-Andersen's work is that different types of welfare states can co-exist in 
a global economy (Mabbett and Bolderson 1999:48). 
Moving from the 'black box' of expenditure to the content of welfare states 
therefore illustrates differences between countries in targeted versus 
universalistic programmes; conditions of eligibility; quality of benefits and 
services and the extent to which employment and working life are 
encompassed in the states' extension of citizens rights (Esping-Andersen 
2000: 156). Such factors for Esping-Andersen constitute nothing less than the 
'theoretical substance of welfare states' (2000: 155). 
Esping-Andersen focuses on income maintenance programmes and uses the 
concepts of de-commodification and modes of stratification (Esping-Andersen 
1990:74) as the basis for his analysis and construction of regime typologies. 
The concept of de-commodification is meant to capture the degree to which 
welfare states weaken the cash nexus by granting entitlements independent 
of labour market participation. The particular focus is whether individuals or 
families can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of 
market participation (Esping-Andersen 1990:37). Intricately related perhaps 
to the welfare state values referred to above, modes of stratification refer to 
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the main divisions in society fostered by welfare regimes: between rich and 
poor or core and marginalised workers for example. 
Rather than considering regimes as interchangeable models that countries 
could effectively pick and choose from, Esping-Andersen explicates the 
institutional and ideological basis underpinning them and argues that what 
determines which model applies is not (a stage in historical) development, but 
ideology (Abrahamson 1999:396). As will be highlighted, these ideological 
underpinnings are to be found in the relative weight that regimes give to 
different types of (means-tested, social insurance, and universal) benefits. 
The regime labels that represent Esping-Andersen's clusters: liberal, 
conservative and social democratic, reflect the political and ideological thrust 
that was dominant in their historical evolution, climaxing with the mature 
welfare states in the 1970s and 1980s. These will be briefly outlined below, 
before considering the implications for the two countries under study. 
Liberal regime 
The liberal welfare regime emerged from 19th century political economy, which 
harboured an unbounded faith in market sovereignty. It is thus imbued with 
notions of 'self-help' and 'less-eligibility'. In their contemporary form, Esping-
Andersen (1999:74/75) maintains that such regimes reflect a political 
commitment to minimise the state, to individualise risks, and to promote 
market solutions. There are three core elements that characterise the liberal 
regime. It is firstly residual in the sense that social guarantees are typically 
restricted to 'bad risks': in other words state welfare is restricted to those who 
have been unable to provide for themselves through the market, or to those 
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for whom the market has failed. Such welfare regimes thus adopt a narrow 
definition of who should be eligible, and are reminiscent of 19th century poor 
relief, favouring tax financed means or income tested benefits so as to 
ascertain desert and need. Reflecting the principle of 'less-eligibility' benefit 
levels are usually low, beneath the wages of the lowest paid labourer, in order 
to discourage people from relying on the state. 
Liberal policy is further residual in that it adheres to a narrow conception of 
which risks should be considered 'social'. The third characteristic of a liberal 
system is its encouragement of the market, and thus the state may provide 
subsidies to encourage private and occupational welfare. Essentially, the 
residual approach might be said to narrow the social consciousness and 
cultivate a societal dualism: good risks are seen as being self-reliant in the 
market, the bad ones become 'welfare dependants'. 
Social democratic regime 
At the other extreme, the social democratic welfare regime is inevitably a 
state-dominated welfare nexus. Concomitantly, there is a strong accent on 
de-familialisation, universalism and the marginalisation of private welfare. The 
social democratic welfare state is committed to comprehensive risk coverage, 
generous benefit levels and egalitarianism. Rights are attached to individuals 
and are based on citizenship, rather than on an employment relation or 
demonstrated need. The social democratic regime is distinct for its active and 
explicit effort to de-commodify labour and to minimise market dependency 
(Esping-Andersen 1999:78). It thus fosters the value of equality and the 
egalitarian element is embodied in the practice of universalism. Everybody 
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enjoys the same rights and (tax financed) benefits whether rich or poor. The 
welfare state is thus concerned with redistribution, the active promotion of 
well-being and life chances for all and the elimination of poverty (Esping-
Andersen 1999:80). 
Conservative regime 
According to Esping-Andersen the essence of a conservative regime lies in its 
blend of status segmentation along the lines of occupational class2 and 
familialism (Esping-Andersen 1999:82). The accent in this regime, is not 
universalism or tests of need, but on social insurance, stressing the primacy 
of the employment relation. The stress on social insurance is therefore said to 
foster divisions between core and maginalised workers. The subsidiarity 
principle (that the state should step in only after the family has failed), rather 
than the liberal notion of 'self-help' (through the market) underlies the regimes' 
stress on familialism: hence a male-breadwinner bias of social protection and 
of the family as care giver and ultimately responsible for its members' welfare 
(Esping-Andersen 1999:83). 
Esping-Andersen's seminal (1990) work prompted much debate and empirical 
research. Critics maintained that the three worlds typology was too narrowly 
based on income maintenance programmes, too focused on only the state 
market nexus, and too one dimensionally built around the standard male 
production worker (Esping-Andersen 1999:73; Lewis 1992). The concept of 
de-commodification inherently presupposes that individuals are already 
commodified, therefore it is argued that it more adequately describes the 
2 Also referred to as the corporativist approach: it pools risks by status membership. 
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relationship between (full time) male earners and welfare states3 . 
Commentators have also challenged whether three regime typologies can 
adequately represent such a range of diverse welfare states (Kasza 
2002:271). However compelling the criticisms and refutations levied towards 
the three worlds thesis, Goodin et al (1999: 12) argue that Esping-Andersen's 
work has become a well-established landmark in relation to which subsequent 
research should situate itself. 
In relation to the present research on discretionary decision-making within 
social assistance in Britain and the Netherlands, Esping-Andersen's specific 
argument concerning the different institutional and ideological basis 
underpinning any given country's welfare state might be particularly relevant 
for what we might expect to find in the administration of discretionary 
payments. Primarily we might hypothesise that any given regime would be 
expected to influence not only the implementation structure of discretionary 
payments within social assistance policy vis a vis central and local 
government (outlined fully in chapter 3) but also the values and perceptions of 
need that administrators of discretionary payments would utilise in their daily 
jobs. In order to hypothesise what these influences might be, the chapter now 
moves on to consider how Britain and the Netherlands have been typified. In 
doing so, it confronts further criticisms of Esping-Andersen's typologising 
exercise: the appropriateness of his specific clustering of nation states into 
one of the regime types. 
3 For women, the concept of de-commodification may be inoperable unless welfare states to begin 
with, help them become commodified, a point later addressed by Esping-Andersen (1999:45). 
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Britain and the Netherlands: distinct regimes? 
Notably for the present research, Esping-Andersen concedes that, in their 
own way, both Britain and the Netherlands may be said to fit poorly into any of 
the three regime clusters (1999:86). 4 Nevertheless, he typifies the welfare 
states of the Netherlands and the UK as 'conservative' and 'liberal' 
respectively. 
In regards to the Netherlands, the recognised difficulty of fit into the 
conservative regime is illustrated in Goodin et ai's (1999:11) argument that 
whilst the Netherlands may be a less archetypal representation of the 'social 
democratic welfare regime', it does nevertheless sit squarely within that camp 
when defined in terms of the vigorous public pursuit of income redistribution 
and, through that, social equality. Similarly, Becker (2000:220) makes the 
point that only the Danish and Swedish welfare systems are more generous 
that the Dutch. Esping-Andersen (1999:79) however, whilst acknowledging 
that the Dutch de-commodification scores are hardly inferior to the generous 
income replacement provided by the Danish welfare state, maintains that in 
order to be uniquely social democratic, universalism must be fused both with 
generosity and a comprehensive socialisation of risks. As he points out, and 
Goodin et al (1999:11) also recognise, the Netherlands is not a 'servicing 
state' catering for family care needs like the Nordic ones are. 
According to van Kersbergen (1997:314) the development of the generous 
Dutch income maintenance system owes much to the pillorised nature of 
4 Given of course that countries can never represent 'ideal types' - a point Becker (2000:221) 
argues is often confused by those who would confuse the term 'classify' with 'typify'. 
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Dutch society. Social policy has effectively functioned as a central means to 
mediate social and political conflicts and 'the politics of social welfare in the 
Netherlands has been an indispensable constituent of the development of a 
stable democracy in a segmented society .. without the development of an 
extensive and generous system of social compensation, the consociational or 
consensus democracy of the Netherlands would never have prospered as it 
did' (van Kersbergen 1997:314). 
Dutch politics is therefore said to be a politics of accommodation, where four 
segments of society - catholic, protestant, socialist and liberal - compete and 
co-operate in a paradoxical situation of extremely segmented yet stable 
democracy. The influence of the Christian democrats on social policy is an 
expression of this (partly) religious pilorisation. What predominated was a 
paternalist Christian, in particular catholic, social doctrine of social policy. 
'Caring' for the weak, for the victims of unemployment or sickness therefore, 
was a central political and ideological issue and translated to generous and 
passive benefits (van Kersbergen and Becker 1988:494). 
However, on almost every index of his conservative typology Esping-
Andersen (1999:82) proceeds to point out that the Netherlands 'deviates 
markedly' from the corporatist mould in regards to having universal flat-rate 
(rather than status maintaining) pensions and 'pillared' service providers. 
Similarly, the Netherlands constitutes a 'notable exception' in that mandated 
company pension schemes play a 'non-trivial' role in the labour market 
(Esping-Andersen 1999:83). 
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Britain on the other hand has been characterised by Esping-Andersen 
(1999:77) as a 'liberal welfare regime', a typification which, as Abrahamson 
(1999:401) points out, has largely been accepted by most scholars in the field. 
That said, the UK does exhibit signs of 'universalism' e.g. the comprehensive 
National Health Service. However, it is the relative weight of needs-based 
assistance compared to rights based programmes that constitutes an 
indicator of liberalism, with international comparisons illustrating the 
dominance of means-testing in the UK (Esping-Andersen 1999:75). Further 
indicators include the narrow conception of what risks should be considered 
'social' (for example, until recently child-care costs were excluded) and the 
encouragement of the market exemplified by the Thatcher era in the UK 
(1999:76). 
Esping-Andersen's explanation concerning the particular lack of fit of the two 
countries under study centres on the fact that the typologies do not take into 
account mutation. Britain's regime shifting thus makes it appear increasingly 
liberal after the 1970s, due to labour market de-regulation and increased 
targeting and privatisation during the 1980s. Previously however, in the 
immediate post-war decades, Britain would have been placed alongside the 
Scandinavian countries with its universal flat-rate benefit programmes, 
national health care and vocal commitment to full employment. Thus, Castles 
and Mitchell (1993:94) make the point that the UK can not easily be classed 
as a liberal welfare state in the same way as the USA because of its status as 
the international exemplar of the comprehensive welfare state in the decades 
following World War 2, which place it firmly in the 'welfare state's roll of 
honour'. The authors further contend that the prevalence of means-testing in 
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any welfare state - which, in respect to de-commodification, Esping-Andersen 
(1990:48) scores low because entitlements are built around demonstrable 
need which does not properly extend citizen rights - can actually be seen as 
'radical' in the sense of the equalising principle of (vertical) redistribution. 
They further point out that means-tested benefits may offer relatively 
generous replacement ratios. As following parts of the chapter will highlight 
however, the latter point does not seem to be applicable to the UK in a 
comparative context. 
The Netherlands is ambiguous for a different reason: the typology's focus on 
income maintenance. Thus, as seen, the Netherlands appears 'social 
democratic' in the sense of strong universalism, comprehensive coverage, 
and generous 'de-commodifying' benefits. But when we include social service 
delivery, and when more generally we examine the role of the family, the 
Netherlands becomes squarely a member of the 'conservative' Continental 
European fold. It is in its sustained lack of attention to social services that the 
Netherlands emerges as a prototypical example of Catholic familialism. The 
generosity of the Dutch income maintenance system from this perspective is 
therefore chiefly the expression of a pervasive male breadwinner assumption 
(Le. that a man's replacement wage should be adequate for his family). 
Further, Esping-Andersen (1999:83) argues that if we limit the study of de-
commodification to standard income transfer maintenance programmes, the 
great regime divide is not social democracy versus the rest, but the uniquely 
modest benefits provided by the liberal regime in comparison to the rest. 
24 
These welfare regimes then effectively form the backdrop against which 
discretionary payments within social assistance are implemented in Britain 
and the Netherlands. Generally speaking we might expect some differences 
on a comparative level in the relative salience of means tested social 
assistance in the two countries and in the values and perceptions of need that 
employees of the respective welfare states would employ. However, whilst 
useful for such broad and initial hypothesis, a forceful argument concerns the 
point that regime theory is limited in trying to gain an in-depth comparative 
understanding of a particular policy area within or between countries (Kasza 
2002}.5 
In order to provide a more detailed lens with which to observe diversity in the 
two systems under study than is provided by regime theory, the chapter now 
moves on to consider the national social assistance schemes in which the 
discretionary payment schemes are embedded, and from where they must be 
understood (Ditch 1995; Craig 1992). In doing so it highlights that means 
tested social assistance differs in both scope and structure in the two 
countries under study. These country specific configurations of social 
assistance might further be expected to influence the implementation of 
discretionary payments. 
5 Esping-Andersen (1999:73174) refutes such criticism by ar~uing.th.at the latter critics. miss 
the point: the basis for his typology construction, and comparison, IS Indeed welfare regimes, 
the ways in which welfare production is allocated between state, market and households, not 
welfare states or individual social policies. 
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Social assistance: the last resort 
Social assistance has been characterised as that form of income maintenance 
designed for those citizens 'in need': without any other means of securing 
their subsistence (Ditch et al 1997:3; Millar 2003:2). Rather than being 
citizenship or contribution based, eligibility is determined by a test of means, 
which is Esping-Andersen's main objection to it (1990:48) since it does not 
constitute a 'right' for citizens. It can therefore be argued that this form of 
social protection bears most resemblance to the Poor Law of the 19th century, 
and constitutes the 'margin of the Welfare State' (Leibfried 2000:191). We 
might conceptualise exceptional need payments as being for costs which are 
not always expected to be met by way of general social assistance, therefore 
constituting the very line at which the margin is drawn. 
Much of the large-scale cross-national literature to date in this area has 
identified a number of 'common trends' in the provision of social assistance, 
which might be seen to lend credence to the argument for welfare state 
'convergence' outlined earlier. The most prevalent trend: towards an 
increased reliance on this form of income maintenance has been documented 
by many commentators (Van Oorschot and Schell 1991, Ditch 1999, Gough 
1998). The growth in the numbers reliant on social assistance in the 1980s is 
argued to constitute a reversal of an earlier twentieth century 'general pattern' 
in social security, which saw older forms of public assistance replaced with 
social insurance and in some countries universal benefits (Gough 1998:12). 
The 'pull' factors responsible for the growing reliance on social assistance 
have in part been identified as stemming from the emergence in this period of 
new 'risk' groups, for whom existing social insurance schemes were never 
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designed to cover. As van Oorschot and Schell (1991 :202) argue, social 
insurance schemes were not constructed with the societal processes of mass, 
and long term unemployment or lone parenthood in mind. We thus witness a 
remarkable growth in the demand for social assistance. Moreover, it has been 
argued that international institutions and agencies such as the World Bank 
and European Union currently constitute further 'push' factors by espousing, 
at least in the context of newly forming eastern and central European 
countries, a reliance on social assistance (Ditch 1999:120). As Eardley et al 
(1996a:21) note, the argument that levels of social security expenditure 
requiring relatively high taxation and employer costs can damage economic 
effort have become increasingly important in economic and political discourse. 
The consequences of such forms of targeting advocated by the World Bank 
and pursued in recent times by many European governments have been well 
documented: the mechanics of means-testing result in low take up, intrusive 
inquiries, stigma, poverty and unemployment traps (Ditch 1999: 121). 
However, while the latter literature might be said to highlight some of the 
universal issues and patterns in social assistance on a comparative level, 
there is currently a 'mis-match' between the salience of means tested social 
assistance and cross-national research (Gough 1998:3) particularly of an in-
depth character. Two recent contributions to the field that begin to address 
this gap do not include either the UK or the Netherlands in their comparative 
analysis (Heikkila and Keskitalo 2001; Saraceno 2002). We therefore have 
little comparative knowledge of the nature of such schemes, or for present 
purposes, of how they might be expected to inform the implementation of 
discretionary payments. 
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That said, a relatively detailed 'mapping' exercise of social assistance in 
OEeD countries has been provided by Eardley et al (1996a/b). While 
undoubtedly useful, it might be argued that this research endeavour falls short 
of in-depth analysis or understanding. In the relatively unexplored field of 
cross-national social assistance therefore, the longer-term challenge remains 
to 'theorise the development of social assistance in an international 
perspective' (Ditch 1999: 115). To this end, the following section of the chapter 
outlines typologies of social assistance and their implications for the present 
study. 
Typologies of social assistance 
Social assistance schemes have been classified by the use of key variables: 
localisation, funding and administration (L0demel cited in Eardley et al 1996a: 
24). As with any typologising exercise, we see that the UK does not fit easily 
into a social assistance regime as such, and has been posited as a distinct 
social assistance tradition: nationalised and with little social work involvement. 
The Netherlands is aligned with Austria, Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg. 
These continental social assistance regimes are decentralised, but to a lesser 
degree than the Nordic countries (in that the former are mostly financed by 
central government). However, as in the Nordic countries, the current 
provision of social assistance in the Netherlands contains links with social 
work and social care. 
The above typologies begin to intimate something of the differences in the two 
schemes under study and we are further assisted here by L0demel (1997) 
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who traces the development of social assistance and its inter-relationship with 
social insurance schemes in Britain and Norway from 1946 to 1966. In doing 
so he notes a 'paradox'. Although Norway is considered to have an 
institutionalised, or social democratic welfare state, Norwegian social 
assistance provision carries more resonance's of the Poor Law than does its 
British counterpart. Partly, this can be explained by the more cautious and 
incremental introduction of Norwegian social insurance schemes. The later 
establishment of Norwegian localised social assistance provision thus 
resulted in the integration of cash and care because the 'problems' of the 
'residual' target groups not yet included by some form of social insurance 
were seen to warrant more than just the provision of cash assistance by policy 
makers. Conversely, in Britain, cash and care were separated with the 
establishment of centralised social insurance and social assistance programs 
in a relatively short space if time (1946 and 1948 respectively). Ultimately, the 
two countries can be seen to have pursued very different means of breaking 
down their Poor Law. Thus, while Ditch (1999: 116) notes that throughout 
European countries social assistance is in all contexts the benefit of 'last 
resort'; L0demel leads us to ask, last resort for whom? 
Given the latter research, we might hypothesise that, as L0demel 
demonstrates for Norway, the earlier establishment of social insurance in the 
Netherlands (unemployment insurance and old age pensions were 
established in the 1950s (Muffels and Dirven (1999:1)) and the later 
establishment of nationally financed social assistance (1965) might have 
influenced the nature of Dutch social assistance provision, in that a 
relationship between cash and care was thought necessary for the 'residuum', 
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who were not already covered by some form of social insurance (see chapter 
3). 
In this vein, the Ministry for Social Affairs in the Netherlands explains that 
'during the processing of an application for assistance, attention must be paid 
to all other aspects of the problem. Help is often provided in this respect even 
if it has not been requested, including actively trying to find the psycho-social 
problem underlying the application for assistance .. and mapping out the 
course of action to be taken in rendering assistance' (Ministry for Social 
Affairs 1990:96). In comparison to the UK, where social assistance was 
explicitly separated from 'care', those who implement exceptional need 
payments in the Netherlands may perceive that applicants require more than 
financial help. 
Minimum income: relatively speaking 
In emphasising the residual nature of Norwegian social assistance L0demel 
seems to imply that it is somehow inferior in comparison to Britain's scheme. 
However, as Hill (2000:517/518) notes, benefit levels in Norway are twice as 
high as those provided by British social assistance. Thus extremely 
centralised social assistance schemes do not necessarily imply a more 
generous redistribution than extremely decentralised ones (Holsch and Kraus 
2004: 143). This point is of particular relevance for the present research. We 
might hypothesise that the relative levels of need met by social assistance 
benefit in Britain and the Netherlands will relate directly to the needs or costs 
that can be met by way of exceptional provision, and thereby inform the 
discretionary decisions of those who implement the two schemes. 
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In this respect, Veit-Wilson (1998:72) argues that blanket 'ideas of minimum 
subsistence needs or social assistance regimes are very misleading' 
especially when we compare how, or even if, governments conceptualise a 
'minimum income standard'. Thus while the benefit rates for social assistance 
are set by central government in both Britain and the Netherlands it is perhaps 
important to consider the respective criteria used. Presently, the national 
social assistance rates in the Netherlands are linked to the Dutch minimum 
wage. Statutory minimum wage rates, in their turn, were based on the idea 
that they should be adequate for social participation by families dependent on 
a single breadwinner (Veit-Wilson 1998:73), which can be seen to give some 
credence to Esping-Andersen's typologising of the Netherlands as a 
conservative regime: benefit rates are higher because they are based on the 
assumption of a 'male breadwinner'. The Dutch social assistance act refers 
explicitly to meeting 'essential needs' such as 'food and drink, clothing, 
housing, heating, furniture and recreation' which are considered necessary 'to 
enable the individual to live a life worthy of a human being' (Ministry for Social 
Affairs 1990:95). 
Conversely in the UK it is argued that the income support system has no 
principled relation to any minimum standard or conception of a minimum level 
of living. Thus, in contrast to the Dutch system, 'current rates are not the 
result of any single calculation or historic set of rules' (Eardley et al 
1996b:396). Rather, the benefit level is said to be determined by the principle 
of 'less-eligibility' (in that benefit levels should not exceed the rate of the 
lowest paid worker) and public expenditure considerations (Veit-Wilson 
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1998: 100). The inclusion of standard amounts in social assistance benefit 
rates in the Netherlands for holidays for example indicate that beneficiaries 
are thought to be entitled to a quality of life which is 'not distinct' from that of 
other citizens (Eardley et al 1996b: 288). Conceptions of the 'organic 
integrated community' in setting poverty levels for the Netherlands are 
contrasted with the British political concern with provision for 'the poor' (Veit-
Wilson 1998:97). In her comparison of social assistance schemes, 
Kuivalainen (1998) found that the Dutch and the Danish systems guaranteed 
the most generous level of benefit when compared to the UK, Sweden and 
Finland.6 It might be hypothesised therefore that while both social assistance 
and exceptional need schemes in the two countries under study are intended 
to meet the needs of those on benefit for long periods of time, there might be 
differences in the degrees to which they are concerned with alleviating, 
'curing' or preventing 'states of persistent dependency' (Muffels and Fouarge 
2000: 25/26). 
When comparing Western welfare states, Muffels et al (2000:4) argue that we 
are talking about relative rather than absolute conceptions of poverty. 
However, we can see from the above that there are different levels of 
provision in Britain and the Netherlands that might be seen to fit along a 
continuum of absolute/relative political definitions of poverty. These levels of 
provision might embody different conceptualisations of the needs of social 
assistance clients and inform the discretionary decisions of the workers 
accordingly. 
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A further critique of L0demel's (1997) study centres around the fact that the 
time period of his analysis (1944-1966) negates both the ensuing rise in the 
number of social assistance beneficiaries across Europe and a corresponding 
move away from 'rights' towards 'obligations' in the nature of provision. 
Evidence for the growth in cash social assistance spending as a proportion of 
GDP is forwarded by Eardley et al (1996a:37). In 1980 the figure for the 
Netherlands was 1.70/0 rising to 2.2% in 1992. In Britain the figure stood at 
1.40/0 in 1980, reaching 2.6% in 1992 (Eardley et al 1996a:37). Until the 1980s 
a tradition of full employment and/or universal welfare provision had relegated 
social assistance to the margins of social protection in the Nordic countries 
and the Netherlands (Gough 1998:26). Thus when we consider social 
assistance as a proportion of overall social security spending, we see that in 
Britain this rose from 21.9% in 1980 to 33.0% in 1992. In the Netherlands the 
respective figures were 8.30/0 and 10.9%: reflecting that social assistance has 
always played a bigger part in the British income maintenance system 
(Eardley 1996a:37). 
'Workfare' 
The rising number of claimants is said to underlie a further general trend 
identified in this last resort form of income maintenance across Europe: a 
concern with containing expenditure. This is exemplified by the increasing 
compulsion and/or conditionality for those in receipt of social assistance 
benefit (Ditch and Oldfield 1999:76; Heikkila and Keskitalo 2001; L0demel 
and Trickey 2001). Hill (2000:517) argues that the tide in the growth of rights 
6 Using model families and purchasing power parities (which take account of differences in 
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was turned back as assistance clientele came to be dominated by those often 
deemed to be the 'undeserving poorl. 'What to do about the able bodied poor 
who do not work' might be said to represent an enduring theme in social 
security provision (Heclo 1974:13; Shragge 1997:19). Similarly, Lodemel 
(1999) argues that the presence of able-bodied recipients of cash benefits has 
always raised political debates with strong moral undertones. The current 
debate on 'workfare'? for the able-bodied reliant on social assistance in 
Europe stems not just from concerns about the cost of maintaining their 
income, but also reflects assumptions that passive measures discourage 
initiative, undermine the work ethic and foster dependence, thus contributing 
to the incidence and duration of the problem they were intended to alleviate 
(Anderson 1991). 
Such arguments often carry paternalistic overtones in that the assumption is 
that the poor are being compelled to do what is good for them (Mead 1997). 
Social assistance beneficiaries deemed 'able to work' but assumed not to be 
actively looking for work are seen to need the 'tough love' of 'workfare' 
(Shragge 1997:19, Lively 1983). Mead (1997:1) argues that paternalistic 
social policies such as 'workfare' 'seek to supervise the lives of poor citizens' 
in return for support. As such, paternalism in social programmes and policies 
transforms the way that they are both conceived and implemented. Such 
welfare programmes essentially become more demanding for the recipient 
and instead of a philosophy of 'entitlements' they emphasise a 'social 
the prices of goods and services in each country). ... 
7 It is recognised that this is a contentious term that has been used In a vanety of different 
ways. Shragge's (1997: 18) defin~ti?n is .that the ~onditions of social assistance require the 
individual receiving support to participate In some kind of programme. 
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contract' which requires that beneficiaries satisfy behavioural requirements as 
well as income rules to receive aid (Mead 1997:3). 
Mead (1997: 1) contends that the 'defining feature' of a paternalistic policy is 
the 'administrative influences' they use to produce their results. Essentially, it 
is the administrators who must attempt to 'reduce poverty and other social 
problems by directive and supervisory means' (Mead 1997:2). According to 
Mead (1997:62) the paternalistic administrator should be concerned with 
helping recipients with their problems whilst pointing to the consequences if 
behavioural expectations are not met. The benefits on which clients depend 
are thus used as a 'lever to ensure compliance' (Mead 1997:5). At their best, 
'like good parenting', administrative techniques should combine 'help and 
hassle' in attempts to get 'even troubled recipients into the program and keep 
them there' (Mead 1997:61). 
Both the UK and the Netherlands have, in recent years, tightened 
conditionality in their social assistance provision for certain groups of 
beneficiaries, adopting 'welfare to work' and 'activity fare' policies 
respectively. Indeed, adding further weight to the convergence argument, 
L0demel and Trickey (2001 :278) argue that 'due to a fundamental change in 
the way that social assistance is provided' both countries can be considered 
to have centralised 'workfare's schemes based on case management and 
interested in human resource development. They argue that 'workfare' 
8 The authors recognise the lack of agreement as to the use of the term 'workfare'. For the 
purposes of comparison, they define it as an ideal policy form and explore how, why and for 
which out-of-work populations, work for benefit policies are used. 
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strengthens an already established tradition of cash-care provision in the 
Netherlands, while in the UK it re-introduces a social work role to a system in 
which cash and care - as we saw earlier - have previously been separated 
(L0demel and Trickey 2001 :29). 
The latter assertions however are made without a consideration of the 
structure, aims and resulting implementation of discretionary payments within 
social assistance. As the following chapter will illustrate, whether exceptional 
payments are fully integrated into a paternalistic 'workfare' programme is in 
part dependent on the administrative structure of the state. Relatively 
speaking, the Social Fund is not as integrated into the administration of 
'welfare to work' as Bijzondere Bijstand is to an 'activity fare' social assistance 
context (see chapter 3). As L0demel and Trickey (2001 :309) note 'similar 
workfare programs may exhort very different influences (in this case on the 
discretionary payment schemes within them) depending on the characteristics 
of the social assistance schemes to which they are attached'. We might 
therefore expect some important differences in the operation of policy or the 
way that it is implemented on the ground within different structures or 
configurations of social assistance in the two countries. From a comparative 
perspective such differences may directly affect the degree to which 
administrators are able to consider beneficiaries' exceptional needs for labour 
market integration in the context of similar 'workfare' social assistance 
schemes.9 
9 This is not to say that exceptional payments for labour market integration are not available in 
other parts of the system. 
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Theoretically moreover, in line with the different ideological underpinnings of 
welfare states outlined earlier, it is recognised that similar workfare policies, 
which focus on the characteristics of individual welfare recipients, can 
manifest themselves in different types of welfare states, or welfare states 
imbued with different values. As Trickey (2001 :255) argues, programmes that 
require compulsory activity from people in need of social assistance are being 
implemented and justified within a range of ideological settings. It is therefore 
recognised that there might be 'cross-national variation in the degree to which 
workfare is predicated on 'dependency' as opposed to social exclusion'. That 
said, it is also recognised that empirical research into the 'policy concepts of 
the crucial policy actors' (Aust and Arriba 2004:5) might illustrate that 
discursive reference is made to more than one of the distinct analytical 
paradigms (outlined below). 
While the introduction of an 'activity fare' in the Netherlands can in part be 
viewed as economically motivated (an attempt to make social security more 
efficient in the sense of stimulating outflow into employment), Spies and Van 
Berkel (2001 : 107) argue that one should also consider ideological 
developments, which are just as important. Such developments are said to 
focus around the argument that "dependency' on benefit in the Netherlands 
had been stimulated because social policy had previously focused too much 
on 'care' when it should have been offering opportunities for self-sufficiency' 
(Spies and Van Berkel 2001 :114). Central Government's call for 'work, work, 
work' however is not only concerned with combating dependency. An 
influential report from the Dutch scientific council for government policy drew 
on Durkheimian notions of work as the only institution in society that could 
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create solidarity and prevent societal disintegration, and emphasising the 
meaningful nature of work for individuals (Spies and Van Berkel 2001 :114).10 
In the UK, the rhetoric behind 'welfare to work' is said to 'oscillate between 
fighting a 'dependency culture' and even an 'underclass' on the one hand, and 
solving the problem of social exclusion on the other' (Trickey and Walker 
2001 :190). There is therefore a tension between a characterisation of a 
proportion of unemployed recipients as deserving of help (pensioners, 
children and those who face barriers to paid employment) and others 
characterised as undeserving or fraudulent (Cook 1989), who are thought to 
take money out of the system and away from genuine claimants (Trickey and 
Walker 2001 :191). 'Welfare to work' is further thought to have borrowed and 
adapted ideas from other 'liberal' English speaking nations, in particular the 
United States' use of 'workfare' schemes and in work benefits (Trickey and 
Walker 2001: 191). 
The existence of a 'dependency culture' in both Britain and the Netherlands is 
in part refuted by longitudinal data utilised to analyse the 'dynamics of poverty' 
(Leisering and Walker 1998). Longitudinal panel data illustrate that although 
the absolute numbers in poverty may remain constant (and high), in reality 
there is also a great deal of movement in those entering and leaving social 
assistance. The poverty dynamics for Britain and the Netherlands for the 
period 1990-199511 are provided by Muffels et al (2000:17). The 'transient 
10 Although the authors do argue that there is a Dutch debate about the :calculating 
unemployed' - and hence an increased perception of the unemployed as undeserving. 
11 Data for 1990- 1994 for the Netherlands and 1991-1995 for the UK. 
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poor' (those poor only once during the time period) were 9.7% in the 
Netherlands, and 13.4% in the UK. The recurrent poor (those people 
experiencing recurrent spells in poverty but not for longer than two years) 
4.4% in the Netherlands and 9.50/0 in the UK and the 'persistent poor' (those 
poor for three years or more) 4.0% in NL and 5.5% in the UK. The authors 
thus argue that the results highlight that the (British) liberal welfare state has 
more recurrent and persistent poor than the social democratic (The 
Netherlands) and corporatist (Germany) welfare state types (Muffels et al 
2000). Given these differences we might expect to find some (subtle) cross-
national differences in the perceptions of a dependency culture among 
administrators. 
Analysing poverty from a dynamic perspective further provides an opportunity 
to consider the processes or sequences of life events that lead people to 
enter or escape from poverty in both countries under study (Muffels et al 
2000:5). In this respect, Muffels et al (2000:23) illustrate that the persistent 
poor are more likely to have a weaker association with the labour market 
because of obsolete skills, low qualifications and 'low human capital' (due to 
age or caring duties). The authors also imply that the majority of persistent 
poor in both countries are 'able-bodied'. In the Netherlands and the UK 
approximately 800/0 of the persistent poor are unemployed (Muffels et al 
2000:23). 
In the light of this dynamic approach to poverty analysis, some commentators 
have argued that, since poverty is not (for most people at least) a 'long term 
permanent condition' it need not be addressed by way of 'long term social 
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assistance programmes' (Giddens 1999:26). Conversely, others argue that 
the persistent poor are of concern since they are unevenly spread across the 
population and are comprised of very vulnerable groups in society. Hence the 
goal of alleviating poverty can therefore be seen to matter a great deal more 
in the long term than the short (Muffels et al 2000:21). 
Whilst 'workfare' can partly be seen as a way of alleviating poverty in both 
countries, the degree to which discretionary social assistance payments are 
integrated into its administration would be expected to have implications for 
what the two sets of workers perceived they were there to do with, for or to 
their clients with discretionary payments. From a comparative perspective any 
such differences would be expected to structure the degree to which they 
regard 'changes in a client's behaviour (in a desired direction) important' 
(Lipsky 1980:59) and thus impact on their discretionary decisions. 
People processing or people changing? 
The roles that those employed to implement public policy adopt in dealing with 
clients are said to manifest themselves along a continuum of 'people 
processing and people changing' (Hasenfeld 1972; Hasenfeld and Weaver 
1996:240). 'People processing' organisations emphasise assessing and 
classifying clients and assigning them to various categories. Staff activities 
focus on collecting and processing information and on using that information 
in accordance with prescribed rules to determine the appropriate status of 
clients and how to route them to various service components (Hasenfeld and 
Weaver 1996:240). In this vein, research into the Social Fund in the UK has 
provided many examples of Social Fund Officers consulting the 'manual' 
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(provided as a guide to decision makers by central government) when 
considering an application for payment, or in trying to determine what 
'category' of payment the applicant might be able to receive (Berthoud and 
Dalley 1992; Davidson 2003; Walker et al 1991). When field officers need 
determine only into what prescribed category an application falls, decisions 
might be better described as 'performed' (Elmore 1978: 194). 
Conversely, a 'people changing' technology emphasises attitudinal and 
behavioural changes in clients. Staff activities centre on developing 
relationships with clients in order to modify their behaviour. Decisions 
regarding what services clients should receive are based on an assessment 
of their potential to change (Hasenfeld and Weaver 1996:240). The latter 
might be hypothesised to sit well with the emphasis on the Dutch 
implementers activating unemployed individuals into what Spies and Van 
Berkel (2001: 1 05) call an 'activity fare' (reinsertion to social participation and 
the labour market, discussed more fully in chapter 3) in the Netherlands and 
research has highlighted that administrators place a great value on clients that 
act in line with their reciprocal obligations for the receipt of social assistance 
(Knegt 1987). In comparison to 'people processing' organisations then, it 
might be hypothesised that tensions might arise in the form of 'role strain or 
confusion' (Young 1981 :36), between the social work and policing role of the 
Dutch administrators when they are charged with meeting exceptional need in 
the context of needing to activate beneficiaries. 
The organisational goals to 'people process' or 'people change' might also 
affect the relative procedures that administrators use to determine eligibility, 
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or make judgements about the discretionary needs of social assistance 
beneficiaries. We might hypothesise, for instance, that those charged with 
'people changing' will have more knowledge about their clients, and might 
have more opportunities to engage in face to face meetings with them. 
'People processing' modes of decision-making however, might be more 
'impersonal' (Sims et al 1993: 125) and the decision might be made from an 
application form. Given that such methods (along with the goals outlined 
above) are part of the organisational structures in which administrators work, 
the following section of the chapter will consider a range of theories on the 
processes by which social policies are translated into administrative action 
(Elmore 1997:241). The relevance of this body of literature for the present 
research is that, from a comparative perspective, the organisational goals and 
the subsequent contexts and constraints (outlined in the following chapter) 
which these generate might be expected to affect the degree of discretion that 
the workers can exercise. 
Organisational theory and the implementation of social policy 
Much of the literature on social policy and organisations is concerned with the 
best means to the end of implementation and the subsequent avoidance of 
policy failure. One of the main concerns of organisational theories is thus to 
provide prescriptions on how to get those on the ground, the administrators of 
any given policy, to do what higher level policy makers want them to: whether 
or not this accords with their personal values or opinions. 12 
12 It is recognised that some theorists (Lipsky 1980) argue that there can be no sharp 
distinction between policy making and policy implementation. 
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Alongside the ideal typical picture of 'bureaucratic organisations' given by 
Weber (1993: 110) which depicts impassioned bureaucrats selected on merit, 
rather than social status, pursuing rational objectives according to law and 
rules rather than personal preference, organisational studies in public policy 
have made a number of observations. It has been stressed, for example, that 
public policy is not so clear cut as to have incontestable objectives (Minogue 
1997: 15). Moreover, in reply to accusations that a specific policy has not 
worked to solve the social problem it was meant to tackle, it has been pointed 
out that social policies may in practice pursue conflicting or ambiguous 
objectives, or be based on an insufficient understanding of the problems they 
are meant to address (Elmore 1997:241). However, policy failure is often 
conveniently blamed on administrators subverting or recreating policy, without 
an examination of the constraints and contexts in which they have to work 
(Lipsky 1980; 1981). 
In attempting to identify and hypothesise the ways in which the organisational 
constraints, goals and incentive structures that the administrators work in 
might affect their discretionary decision making, the following section of the 
chapter draws on four theoretical models outlined by Elmore (1997) in relation 
to public policy and the problem of implementation. Essentially, the models 
differ in the degree to which they espouse reliance on hierarchical control and 
narrowing low level discretion. Such models however, are open to the claim 
that they give prominence to the organisation. Pollit (1997:333) makes the 
point that in reifying the organisation, less attention is paid to the values of the 
workers which provide fuel for the whole decision making process. In a bid to 
overcome this false separation of the public/private realm, Sims et al 
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(1993:209) argue for a shift from the notion of organisation to organising. 
Organising is something they consider as a social, meaning making process. 
They thus focus on the raw materials of organising: people, their beliefs, 
actions, feelings and shared meanings (Sims et al 1993:9). 
The first model outlined by Elmore (1997) is the 'systems management 
model'. Here, responsibility for policy making and overall performance is seen 
better to rest with top management, which in turn allocates specific tasks and 
performance objectives to subordinate units and monitors their performance 
(Elmore 1997: 248). In this view implementation consists of defining a detailed 
set of objectives that accurately reflect the intent of a given policy, and 
assigning responsibilities and standards of performance to sub-units 
consistent with these objectives. 'Bad management' is often given as a 
reason for implementation failure. The maximisation of outputs and efficiency 
is pursued through standard Taylorist recipes: fragmentation, standardisation 
and control, and is often thought to be suited to large bureaucratic 
organisations handling large amounts of routine information (Sims et al 1993: 
98). 
The major utility of the systems management model is that it directs our 
attention toward the mechanisms that policy makers and high level 
administrators have for structuring and controlling the behaviour of 
subordinates. Indeed Elmore (1997:246) argues that a great deal of behaviour 
in organisations can be explained by examining devises of control and 
compliance: strict rules, targets and budgetary constraints for example. The 
aim of strict rules is essentially to enable the control of the workers by the 
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organisation: rules are a means to enhance the ends of the organisation and 
employees follow them because they are rational. Furthermore, rules can be 
argued to be impartial, allowing the employee to hide behind them when 
giving a contentious decision that a client does not like (Sims et al 1993: 25). 
However, as Sims et al (1993:7) point out, tight mechanisms of control (rules, 
targets and capped budgets) in and of themselves need not secure the 
normative or moral acquiescence of the workers. Workers may experience 
control as oppressive, but resentfully do what is expected of them because 
they are unwilling to suffer the consequences. Given the opportunity, rules 
may be bent or broken by officials where they do not accord with their 
personal values, or in order to meet demand. Thus, rules do not blindly 
control our behaviour in organisations. They permit different interpretations 
and their enforcement becomes tied in with the culture of organisational life 
(Sims 1993: 33). 
The above 'systems management' model is therefore argued to be unrealistic 
as it conceives of too much of a mechanical 'top to bottom' view of policy 
implementation. The second model: the bureaucratic process model, in part 
takes account of the criticism levied at the first. This essentially represents 
the sociological view of organisations, and is exemplified by students of 
street-level bureaucracy. Here, the two essential features of organisations are 
said to be routine and discretion and the interaction between them. As well as 
the means by which high level administrators attempt to structure the 
behaviour of street level bureaucrats, in this view one of the major concerns of 
the front-line worker is learning to cope with the immediate pressures of the 
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job (Elmore 1997:250). Such pressures include inadequate resources, 
inadequate information, lack of time and ambiguous objectives. Research in 
this vein is interested in tracing the effect of lower-level discretion and 
routinised behaviour on the execution of policy and illustrates how the workers 
use their discretion to reinterpret policy in response to their constraints (Lipsky 
1980; 1981; Prottas 1979). 
This model highlights that whilst street-level bureaucrats occupy the most 
critical position in the policy delivery process, their working conditions are 
seldom conducive to the adequate performance of their jobs. More often than 
not they find themselves in situations where they lack the organisational and 
personal resources; where they are exposed to psychological or physical 
threat and where there are conflicting and ambiguous expectations about how 
they ought to perform their work (Lipsky 1980:197-8). Whilst they may be 
responsible for a large number of clients that they are supposed to deal with 
on an individual basis, learning to cope with the stresses of service delivery 
means learning to rely on simple, standardised sources of information about 
clients, and developing a facility for classifying and labelling people simply 
and quickly. The latter become coping mechanisms for having inadequate 
resources on the one hand and a high demand for services on the other. 
The prevailing theories of organisational behaviour represented by the 
systems management and bureaucratic process models are argued to 
encourage and perpetuate a tacit assumption that low-level administrators are 
incapable of making independent judgements and decisions. However, 
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Elmore (1997:255) argues that this view is becoming increasingly difficult to 
defend as the workforce becomes more professionalised and better-educated. 
One organisational model that does consider the administrator as capable of 
independent judgements and which is also said to recognise the needs of the 
individual within the demands of the organisation is a combination of 
sociological and psychological theory: implementation as organisational 
development. Essentially, from this perspective, organisations should 
function to satisfy the basic psychological and social needs of the individuals 
within them: for autonomy and control over their own work, for participation in 
decisions that affect them, and for commitment to the purposes of the 
organisation. Sims et al (1993:34) argue that management thinking about 
rules and procedures is changing and that flexibility and initiative - to respond 
in an enterprising way - are the current fashion to cope with a changing 
environment. The focus here then is on unleashing human potential and 
creativity rather than constraining it through rules and regulations: 
'empowerment' has replaced control as a management buzzword (Sims et al 
1993:34). 
From this viewpoint, the implementation process is necessarily one of 
consensus building and accommodation between policy makers and 
implementers. The central problem of implementation here is not whether 
implementers conform to prescribed policy but whether the implementation 
process results in consensus in goals, individual autonomy, and commitment 
to policy on the part of those who must carry it out. Ultimately however, the 
goal of control over staff is the same, but the ethos is that democratic 
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organisations are more efficient ones (Elmore 1997:259). Such organisations 
must essentially rely on training, trust and strong shared values to ensure co-
ordination and control. 
We might hypothesise then that control over administrators will be less 
contested where they feel 'empowered' to do something they perceive as 
meaningful and at the same time meet their specified organisational goals - or 
where the organisational goals and working practices accord with their values. 
Those who feel powerless, on the other hand, tightly controlled (by rules, 
targets and budgets) and forced to act against their wills might be more 
concerned to try and thwart the goals of the organisation, especially where 
such goals do not accord with their personal values (Sims et al 
1993:110/111). 
That said, it is further argued that organisational structures and constraints, 
especially perhaps where they are extremely tight, are able to affect the 
morals of people working within them. In other words there are processes in 
organisations that create their own particular brands of morality, dislocated 
from the principles by which, privately, organisational members try to live. In 
order to get their job done therefore, morally aware people can act in ways 
quite contrary to their expressed values, which can lead to feelings of disquiet 
or guilt from being party to a possible injustice or harm (Sims et al 1993: 58). 
Until recently feelings and emotions were relatively neglected in the literature 
on organisations. Bureaucracies - stereotypically staffed by Weber's 
impassioned officials - are no place for doubt or anxiety. Yet, jobs that deal 
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with human problems and distress are often emotionally demanding. Whilst 
people may be emotionally affected by their work, they are often expected to 
exercise emotional control and show a 'stiff upper lip' (Fincham and Rhodes 
1992:53) and routinise emotionally disturbing incidents. 
The need to express hidden emotions can however spur the growth of 
informal organisational processes (Fincham and Rhodes 1992:53) like stories 
and jokes that help to give an indirect voice to inner feelings. Humour and 
jokes, far from being inconsequential, are important features of organisational 
life. They break routine and enable people to cope with boring or alienating 
jobs. Furthermore, they permit the venting of unacceptable views and 
emotions by offering a moral amnesty that permits the breaking of taboos 
(Sims 1993:166). 
If the workers feel powerless, or a power imbalance, then the stories and 
jokes may put the 'other' (for example, their clients or superiors) in a bad light. 
When directed to 'outsiders', jokes strengthen the solidarity of a group and 
enable the group to score symbolic victories against their psychological 
adversaries. Where directed at the organisation itself, humour undermines 
the fagade of rationality and seriousness of the organisation (Sims et al 
1993:167). Derogatory humour then, can be a coping mechanism. It might be 
hypothesised however, that the use of such 'off stage' coping mechanisms 
might be influenced both by the educational and occupational background's of 
the workers on the one hand and the training they receive once recruited into 
the organisation on the other. 
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As Elmore (1997:246) notes, the way that people are socialised into 
organisations (the training they receive) can act as an important, though less 
obvious, ingredient of control. The difference is that instead of shaping 
decisions by the use of tight rules and budgets for example, it is the decision-
makers who are shaped by their training. Similarly, it might also be 
hypothesised that the pre-job socialisation (for example professional values 
and beliefs) that the administrators bring to the organisation will also be 
important (Feldman 1992:176; Pollit 1997:331) especially where this differs 
significantly in the two countries under study. 
Professionals or bureaucrats? 
Professional training (in some form of social welfare, for example social work), 
or indeed, the lack of it might be thought to have some influence both on 
decision making about need and how staff think about poverty and those who 
are poor. As Hill (1997:206) notes, 'the presence of professionals In 
bureaucracy can make some difference to the ways in which policy IS 
implemented'. Essentially the discretion wielded by a professional In 
comparison to a bureaucrat will be guided and informed more by their accrued 
knowledge and 'expertise' rather than bureaucratic rules. Thus, the training 
brought to (and received in) the job may essentially influence the 
administrative 'means of judgement' (Sims et al 1993:120). Of course, the 
latter points are inextricably related to whom the organisation seeks to recruit. 
Sims et al (1993:35) point out that less overt mechanisms of control, such as 
selection procedures (outlined in the following chapter) aimed at ensuring 
highly committed staff is currently one of the much-favoured mechanisms. 
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Everyone has personal idiosyncratic theories of personality: what we consider 
good and bad traits in people and how we make judgements about them. But, 
in organisations they often have to be more formal, more systemised and 
more 'objective'. Organisations are places where perceptions and the 
judgements that are based on them can have a crucial impact on people's 
lives (Sims et al 1993:122): in this case for those asking for an exceptional 
payment. In the latter respect, we might hypothesise that a lack of social 
welfare related training or a background in bureaucratic administration would 
leave more room for 'common sense' notions of poverty and its causes. 
Moreover, we may find that the professional might be more powerful than the 
non-professional (Adler and Asquith 1981: 13). For example, expertise can 
often legitimate the use of discretion: administrators of discretionary decisions 
are not political, but professional (Baldwin 1997:374). In comparison with a 
professional, who may have been socialised into a professional ideology 
through long periods of training, a bureaucrat is often an official who has been 
assigned to an administrative task. Thus, we might expect a professional to 
'have a considerably greater personal commitment to an ideology of welfare' 
than a bureaucrat (Adler and Asquith 1981 :15). 
We might also hypothesise that any differences in the latter respect in the two 
systems under study might have consequences for how rewarding or 
enjoyable administrators consider their jobs to be. The professional may view 
'difficult clients' with multiple problems as a 'challenge' for example, whereas 
bureaucrats, lacking a comparable professional training might consider such 
challenges as 'something to be put up with'. Any such differences might 
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manifest themselves in their intrinsic orientation to work, affecting whether the 
main motivation is the interest and variety of the work on the one hand or 
more instrumental (to earn money) on the other (Sims et al 1993: 213; Clarke 
and Wilson 1961; Tullock 1997). Increasingly, Sims et al (1993:96) argue, the 
meaning of work in a consumer culture is for money, and perhaps for fringe 
benefits like occupational pensions and flexible working hours. 
Rather than assuming therefore, as Lipsky (1980:xii) seems to, that those who 
work in public services seek out their occupations because they want to 
perform a worthwhile role in society, we should perhaps empirically explore 
administrative routes and motivations to employment (Peters 1985:89). Such 
motivations, along with their organisational goals and structures might be 
expected to affect staff attitudes, performance and dispositions towards those 
they make discretionary decisions about (Peters 1985:74; Prottas 
1979:116/117). 
Discretion 
Hawkins (1992:11) defines discretion as the means by which law - the most 
consequential normative system in a society - is translated into action. Given 
that the form such action takes may not necessarily be predictable from the 
scrutiny of legal rules, discretion is effectively best conceptualised as the 
space 'between legal rules in which legal actors may exercise choice' 
Hawkins (1992:11). 
Discretion in public policy has many uses (Hawkins 1992). In the case of 
exceptional payments, discretion has been argued to be a means of 
52 
responding flexibly to the unforeseen and individualised needs of those who 
are poor (Titmuss 1971). Rules, for Titmuss (1971) could never pre-empt the 
full range of human needs, and thus the key defect of rules in the field of 
welfare administration was their slowness to respond to rapidly changing 
human needs and circumstances. However, discretion in public policy is not 
without its critics. Whilst, as seen, some theorists argue that discretion is an 
inescapable feature of the street-level bureaucrat's job, discretionary 
payments to those who are poor have attracted special criticism when 
compared to those that are often considered to be granted on 'rights' criteria. 
Introducing or increasing discretion in the area of income maintenance can 
also be a way for central government to ration or cut back on expenditure 13 
(discussed further in chapter 3). Devolving financial responsibility to the field 
officer can be a means of deflecting attention away from those at the top, who 
then escape from dealing with contentious issues of detail, such as the 
determination of special needs payments (Mabbett and Bolderson 1998:7). 
Those who would conceptualise the implementation of public policy as akin to 
a 'transmission belt' would further argue that the 'rule of law' is threatened by 
vague, general or ambiguous statutes for discretion (Baldwin 1997:374). 
Discretionary decision making it is argued, can result in unfair and arbitrary 
decisions (Adler and Asquith 1981 :9) and are open to the biases and personal 
prejudices of officials 14, not least because of the different power relations 
13 It is recognised that increasing discretion can also increase expenditure. 
14 This argument stands from both the political right and left. The former feared that more 
administrative discretion would mean more 'socialistic ideals'; more benefits for the 
'undeserving', and the latter argued that rights to benefits were preferable to the discretionary 
choices of 'government moralisers and social controllers' (Titmuss 1971: 115). 
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inherent between those who make decisions and those who are affected by 
them. 
Whether professional or bureaucratic discretion is employed however, 
charges of 'arbitrary' discretionary decisions have been argued to be a myth. 
The exercise of discretion by legal officials is said to be far from 
unpredictable, rather it is argued to follow clear and specific principles and be 
remarkably patterned and consistent (Baumgartner 1992:129). Close 
investigation often reveals that a rational process is at work: aggregate 
patterns of discretionary behaviour are clear (Baldwin 1997:369). Again, in 
relation to the present research, discretionary patterns in the two countries 
might be expected to be influenced by the organisational goals and contexts 
in which workers operate: which will effectively present themselves as 
'horizons of possibilities' (Emerson and Paley 1992:246). 
The chapter now moves on to consider the specific theories and concepts that 
might be important in understanding and explaining the aggregate patterns of 
behaviour of those who implement discretionary payments in the two 
countries. In particular, the social characteristics of those they make 
decisions about are said to be particularly relevant (Baumgartner 1992:130). 
Hawkins (1992:43) argues that assessments of moral character made by legal 
decision-makers are one of the most pervasive and persistent features in 
shaping the exercise of discretion. Essentially any such assessments would 
perhaps be underpinned by their values and beliefs concerning poverty and 
poor people. 
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Perceptions of poverty 
Two opposing, dominant moral systems are commonly used or evoked to 
understand welfare recipients that are closely related to the earlier discussion 
on ideologies of 'workfare'. The first considers claimants as morally deficient, 
especially in lacking a work ethic. The second views recipients as suffering 
from 'human capital' and environmental deficits, such as lack of education and 
training, or lack of access to job opportunities (Hasenfeld and Weaver 1996: 
239). 
Several studies of local social security offices cited by Berthoud and Dalley 
(1992:95) have found a staff culture in the UK in which claims of hardship 
from claimants have been viewed with suspicion. Officials in the Single 
Payment scheme, as was in the UK, were anxious at their inability to apply 
discretionary judgements to each claim and were also concerned that 
claimants 'knew too much about the rules' and were thus in a position to 
abuse the scheme (Berthoud and Dalley 1992:7). 15 Howe (1985:50) reports 
similar observations from a local office that dealt with exceptional need 
payments. Many officers argued that claimants tried to 'get out of it as much 
as possible'. Comments such as 'you get to hear the same old sob stories 
over and over again .... You just get used to them' or 'that was a good story' 
were not infrequent (Howe 1985:60). Research into the Social Fund has 
replicated these findings - several Social Fund Officers thought that there was 
always a small group who took advantage of the Social Fund system. One 
15 Even though one of the Government's reasons for reform was that it was too complicated to 
understand. 
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officer talked of a 'jungle telephone' spreading news around local housing 
estates as to what could or could not be claimed (Berthoud and Dalley 
1992:67). 
Howe (1985:62) argues that he does not wish to imply that staff in the office 
he observed were any more ill-disposed to claimants than other sections of 
society. The culture he observed endorsed wider social values and attitudes 
concerning poor relief and distinctions were thus made between the 
'deserving and undeserving poor'. Hall and Taylor (1996: 949) argue in this 
respect that organisations may embrace specific practices because they are 
valued within a broader cultural environment, even if these practices are 
dysfunctional in meeting the formal aims or goals of the organisation. 
Administrators might thus be found to employ a 'logic of social 
appropriateness, rather that a logic of instrumentality' (Hall and Taylor 
1996:949). 
In this respect, comparative research on public opinion found that the causes 
of poverty in the UK are more readily attributable to 'laziness and a lack of 
willpower' (Alcock 1997:22). In the Netherlands conversely, it is argued that 
'the prevailing culture views dependency on benefits as a result of societal 
process rather than on personal failure or deviancy (Ditch et al 1997:39). 
Muffels and Fouarge (2000: 19) cite data on public perceptions of the causes 
of poverty in the Netherlands from the 1993 Eurobarometer. The top five 
perceptions of the causes of poverty given were 'long-term unemployment 
(47.2% ), drug abuse, alcoholism, social welfare cuts and lack of community 
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spirit. 'Free choice to be like this' (7.8% ) ranked at number 9 and 'lazy' (5.90/0) 
at number 10. 
Notwithstanding these differences in the perceptions of the causes of poverty 
across the two countries, it might further be hypothesised that discretionary 
decision making would in effect compel the respective administrators to 
distinguish, in some sense, between deserving and undeserving applicants for 
payment (Handler and Hollingsworth 1971 :36), especially in the context of a 
limited budget (Ham and Hill 1993:170). 
The deserving and the undeserving poor. 
Cash transfers via social security attract more controversy than any other 
area of welfare state provision. This is essentially because of the distinction 
that can be made between giving people 'cash' - which offers a degree of 
freedom for the beneficiary - and giving people services and goods in kind 
(Fitzpatrick 2003:330; Jones 1985: 1 03). Whilst in kind services, like health ad 
education for example, generate debate and disagreement, they are not 
subject to the same level of 'normative and prescriptive commentary' 
(Fitzpatrick 2003:330). The degree of freedom that cash benefits offer is said 
to demand a degree of self-responsibility (Fitzpatrick 2003:330) and it is 
argued that the administration of social security benefits has as much to do 
with controlling the behaviour of those who are poor, as it does with meeting 
need (Townsend 1979:823/4). Social security, whilst providing much needed 
resources to those without means, is inextricably linked with disciplining 
labour in capitalist western societies in which the wage relation plays a central 
57 
part. Several writers have therefore noted the way that social security acts as 
a form of regulation or social control (Piven and Cloward 1971; Dean 1991; 
Handler and Hasenfeld 1991; Higgins 1980). 
Such arguments in respect of social assistance often draw on historical links 
to the Poor Law, under which poverty was viewed as a 'crime', and the 
function of social welfare became very much a question of control and 
management (Abrahamson 1999:396). In the implementation of discretionary 
payments within social assistance, administrative attempts at social control 
could take many forms. We may hypothesise that administrators will imbue 
the forms of payment - loans and grants - at their disposal with particular 
meanings. For example, where their discretion allows, administrators may 
advocate that the applicant receives the 'less attractive' form of payment 
(Higgins 1980:4) or constructively deny the existence of need. 
Social security primarily separates those who do work from those who do not. 
Within the latter group however, distinctions are also made between the 
deserving and the undeserving poor. In relation to discretionary payments, 
where applicants must justify their exceptional request, such distinctions might 
be especially pertinent since, as Ignatieff (1894:34) argues, 'the demand that 
the poor give reasons' for their need 'is the demand that they show 
themselves deserving'. Handler and Hasenfeld (1991 :20) argue that the terms 
'deserving and undeserving poor' encompass many characteristics. However, 
the authors contend that the core concept is whether or not the applicant is 
morally excused from work. If the person is considered morally deviant in the 
latter respect, then the policy or administrative response will be one of social 
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control; the administrator will seek to modify what society considers to be 
inappropriate behaviour. On the other hand if the person is considered to be 
morally excused from paid labour participation then misery will be relieved 
(Handler and Hasenfeld 1991 :20). 
Cook (1979: 173) further suggests that the 'assumption is that the 'deserving 
poor' can be separated from the 'undeserving' according to whether or not the 
individual caused their own plight'. One of the most important questions then 
becomes 'what is the cause of the distress' for which the applicant seeks 
relief? Therefore the separation of the deserving and undeserving poor 
centres on whether or not the applicant is considered able to work. 
Accordingly, in theory, it is the 'impotent poor' who will be considered 
deserving. Aged, sick/infirm people and children constitute the categories 
morally excused from work and hence considered faultless of blame in their 
situation of distress. Conversely, the undeserving, or those that might have 
caused their own distress are able-bodied applicants of relief who are not 
morally excused from work: 'unemployed people, idle paupers and those 
capable of work' (Van Oorschot 2000:35; Golding and Middleton 1982:10). 
Related to this hypothesised focus on those perceived by administrators as 
capable, but unwilling to work, we should also consider the argument that in a 
'consumer society' those who are poor are argued to be defined not by their 
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production status, but by their status of inadequate consumers (Bauman 
1998). 16 However, in the realm of exceptional payment administration, social 
assistance beneficiaries might first and foremost be considered by the two 
sets of administrators as what we might call 'inadequate producers' whose 
consumption choices should therefore be regulated. There might thus be 
complex administrative links between what are argued to be two of the most 
important cultural goals of western societies, production and consumption 
(Engbersen 1989). 
Recently, van Oorschot (2000) has drawn on and amalgamated previous 
writings to construct a theoretical model of dimensions or criteria of 
deservingness. The usefulness of the model for the present research centres 
on its relatively comprehensive nature: outlining many of the hypothesised 
distinctions and concepts that might be used by administrators in their daily 
jobs. 
The first dimension is that of control. What is the applicants control over their 
neediness, or their responsibility for their plight? The less control they are 
seen to have over their situation the more deserving they will be of support 
(Van Oorschot 2000:36; Cook 1979: 37/38). The second criterion concerns 
the level of need: the greater intensity of a person's need seems to result in a 
16 Williams (2002:208) highlights that having to use second hand shops or t?e che~p~st stores is 
particularly painful for poo.r, or. socially excluded ~eople who. feel that they have n~ cholc~ but to use, 
what they perceived as inferior channels, outwlth the mainstream of consumptIon enjoyed by the 
majority. 
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greater probability that they will be helped (Cook 1979:37). The identity of the 
poor, or the closer to 'us' they are thought to be, constitutes the third criterion 
for judging those more deserving of support. The fourth dimension is 
concerned with the attitude of the poor towards support; their expressed 
docility or gratefulness: the more compliant the more deserving. Reciprocity, 
arguably one of the most pervasive societal norms (Goodin 2002; Gouldner 
1960) is the final criterion of deservingness offered by the theoretical model. 
Is the applicant thought to have 'earned' support; the more reciprocation the 
more deserving they will be of help (Van Oorschot 2000:36). Reciprocation 
can take the form of a smile, thanks or willingness to comply with a labour 
market reinsertion programme. Concomitantly a perceived lack of 
reciprocation may effectively exclude clients from being helped (Komter 
1996). 
Research has found that people of working age with no children are the group 
most likely to be refused a payment from the Social Fund (Ditch 1995:343). In 
the Netherlands conversely, it has been suggested that recent policy changes 
(the move from 'care' to self-sufficiency - and hence 'work' along with the 
introduction of capped budgets - discussed fully in chapter 3) may see those 
households with the best chances on the labour market win out over the long-
term unemployed (Van Oorschot and Smolenaars 1993). 
Comparatively speaking therefore, there might be variation in the 
discretionary payment schemes under study in regards both to the policy aims 
and administrative perceptions of deserving and undeserving beneficiaries. 
Given the different emphasis in the balance between cash and care in this 
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area of income maintenance in the two countries moreover, there may also be 
differences in the degree to which administrators are explicitly able to modify 
what they consider to be 'inappropriate behaviour'. Essentially, this would 
imply that the discretionary decisions, if not the value judgements, that the two 
sets of workers make regarding the needs of social assistance beneficiaries 
might be dependent on different configurations of social assistance outlined 
above. 
Need 
Given that staff are obliged to justify decisions, the administration of 
discretionary social assistance payments necessarily involves a determination 
of need. Despite, or perhaps because of, its obvious importance to social 
policy, there is no agreed political or academic definition about the nature of 
human need and the concept of need is not often explicated in empirical 
research in social policy (Smith 1980; but see Huby and Dix 1992 in relation 
to need and the Social Fund)). 
Scholars and philosophers have sought to clarify and separate needs from 
wants or desires, to find a universal concept of human need (Doyle and 
Gough 1991) and to argue for a new 'modern' language of need (Ignatieff 
1984). Essentially, discussion centres on what it is that makes us human, 
and therefore what we need, and what welfare should provide in order for us 
to avoid harm. In income maintenance, these debates are closely related to 
whether poverty is conceptualised in either absolute or relative terms and are 
said to influence the benefit levels in welfare states accordingly. 
62 
Absolute conceptualisations of poverty mostly concern defining human needs 
as needs for subsistence. Given that these are universal they are often 
argued to be the only 'objective' human needs that can be identified and 
spoken of. 'Wants' on the other hand are, from this viewpoint, seen as arising 
from individual or personal choice. 
Writers such as Townsend (1979) argue that poverty is relative to the time 
period and society in which someone lives and would stress that humans 
have needs for more than mere physical survival. They also need to feel part 
of the wider society in which they live. Therefore benefit levels should be 
adequate for social participation. Ignatieff (1990:34/35) argues for instance, 
that levels of assistance that meet the most basic needs of those on social 
assistance (for food, shelter and clothing) do not necessarily fulfil the 
individual's 'social needs' or their needs to flourish as human beings. 
Whilst, as Bradshaw (1972) implies, 'normative' definitions of need employed 
by administrators may in practice bear little relation to those constructed by 
scholars and philosophers, he does assert that they 'may be different 
according to the value orientation' (1972:641) of, in this case, the two sets of 
administrators. 
From the earlier discussion concerning the relative levels of social assistance 
in the two systems under study, a very obvious hypothesis would be that 
those working within the comparatively generous Dutch system would have 
more recourse to conceptions of relative need, whilst the UK workers would 
operate more along the lines of 'liberal' and absolute principles. We might 
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argue that, the Dutch level of assistance, which define a level of common 
need which includes amounts for holidays, can be distinguished in this 
respect from a level of need associated with deservingness or less eligibility in 
the UK. 
That said, administrative perceptions of relative need might in practice lead to 
conservative decisions by administrators (Ignatieff 1984). For example, 
Ignatieff (1984) points to the differences in the 'respect' that might be due to 
the social positions of the king and the beggar. Ultimately, administrators are 
essentially considering the needs of those who occupy the social position of 
being reliant on social assistance benefits, which might be the starting 
position for any discretionary judgement. 
In this vein, Sen (1983:153) argues that, while the relative view of poverty has 
its merits, ultimately, poverty is an absolute notion. There is an irreducible 
absolutist core in the idea of poverty (Sen 1983:159). The poor are deprived 
in an absolute sense in their capabilities, and this will then manifest itself in, 
and will relate to, their relative deprivation in terms of commodities, incomes 
and resources. Sen (1983: 159) illustrates his argument by quoting Adam 
Smith's discussion of 'necessaries': 'by necessaries I understand not only the 
commodities which are indispensably necessary for the support of life, but 
what ever the custom of the country renders it indecent for credible people, 
even the lowest order, to be without ... Custom .. has rendered leather shoes 
a necessary of life in England. The poorest creditable person of either sex 
would be ashamed to appear in public without them'. 
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The usefulness of Smiths' view for Sen is that Smith does not even pose the 
'relative' notion of poverty or need. The 'poorest credible person' does not 
'need' the leather shoes in order to feel (relatively) less ashamed than 
everyone else, they need them in order not to feel ashamed at all, which, as 
Sen (1983:159) points out, in its achievement is an absolute one. Sen (1983: 
161) argues that relative notions of poverty sit entirely within his definition. 
The commodities and resources needed for the absolute notion of capabilities 
will vary over time and across societies. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed literature relevant to identifying the factors that 
might affect the decision-making frameworks of those who implement 
discretionary payments in Britain and the Netherlands. Administrators were 
argued to be situated in differing welfare regimes with different ideological 
underpinnings. Concomitantly, it was hypothesised that the role of the state in 
income maintenance expressed in both the relative salience and generosity of 
means-tested benefits would affect not only the politically defined, but also the 
administratively perceived needs that can be met by exceptional payments. 
Social assistance provision is concerned with provision for 'the poor' in the UK 
whilst benefit levels were set at an amount that included holidays in the 
Netherlands. It was further argued however, that, whilst useful for general 
hypotheses, a more detailed lens was needed for hypothesising how the 
particular social assistance schemes might inform discretionary decision-
making on the exceptional needs of beneficiaries. 
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Typologies of social assistance highlighted that, whilst the historical origins 
and traditions of cash and/or care are quite distinct in the two countries under 
study, contentions have been forwarded for their recent convergence to what 
we might call paternalistic social assistance 'workfare' schemes. These are 
said to have strengthened the cash and care tradition in the Netherlands and 
reintroduced it in the UK. However, the chapter argued that such contentions 
have ignored the degree to which exceptional payments were integrated into 
such provision, and it was hypothesised that such differences would result in 
empirically observed cross-national diversity. 
Specifically, such social assistance contexts might be expected to structure 
the degree to which the two sets of administrators aim to change an 
applicant's behaviour in return for a discretionary payment. It was further 
hypothesised that the structure and constraints of their respective 'people 
changing/processing' organisations, as well as the personal resources that 
staff bring to their jobs would influence their respective constructions of 
deserving and undeserving beneficiaries. In sum, this empirical research is 
expected to demonstrate that 'need' is a dynamic social construct, the cross-
national construction of which is dependant on the professionalism of the 
workers, the ideology of the programme they implement and the 
organisational structure (and constraints) of the bureaucracy in which they 
operate (Smith 1980:55). 
In order to situate the two sets of workers in their particular local contexts, the 
following chapter considers policy origins, development and aims of 
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exceptional need provision within social assistance schemes in Britain and the 
Netherlands. 
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Chapter 3 Policy context 
As the previous chapter argued, the construction and perception of need 
utilised by administrators of discretionary payments will be influenced by the 
configuration of social assistance and the related organisational contexts, 
constraints and goals which these generate for those working within them. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an understanding of the origins, 
development and context of social assistance and exceptional need provision 
(as it was at the time of research) in Britain and the Netherlands. 
After providing a conceptual definition of exceptional need payments within 
social assistance, the first part of the chapter outlines the historical origins for 
meeting the one-off needs of social assistance beneficiaries in both countries 
under study. Following L0demel (1997), the chapter argues that the origins of 
L 
a national and comprehensive income maintenance system in both countries 
meant that initial social assistance provision retained more links with 'care' 
and social work in the Netherlands whilst Britain conversely, can be seen to 
have initiated a separation of 'cash and care'. 
The second part of the chapter illustrates that the subsequent development of 
policy has centred around the thematic concerns of standardisation, uniformity 
and the associated rigidity in provision on the one hand, and the exercise of 
discretion and claims of inequity on the other. Comparatively speaking 
however, there are significant differences regarding the actors involved in 
resolving such debates within social assistance depending on the role of the 
(local/central) state in provision. In the Netherlands the dialogue takes place 
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between central and local government, and can essentially be considered as 
a representation of a struggle for the definition of need between them. In the 
UK's more centralised governmental system on the other hand, the moves to 
and from standardisation and discretion in this area of provision is more about 
cost containment and equity amongst claimants. 
Differences and similarities are further illustrated in the period of development 
leading up to the exceptional need systems as they were at the time of 
research. Changing economic climates and government ideologies in the 
1980s can be seen to have initiated fundamental changes in both the 
administration and aims of social security and social assistance in both 
countries. Whilst, broadly speaking, this led to decentralised, budget limited 
and discretionary exceptional need schemes, differences in the state 
structures meant that at the level of administration, the Dutch exceptional 
need scheme Bijzondere Bijstand was firmly situated within an 'activity fare' 
social assistance whilst the British Social Fund primarily remained separated 
from the development of a wider 'welfare to work' policy. 
Drawing on theoretical propositions outlined in chapter 2, by situating the 
administrators of exceptional payments in their specific social assistance 
configurations and organisational contexts, part four of the chapter highlights 
that the Dutch administrators might be hypothesised to be paternalistic 
'people changers', and the British officers managerial 'people processors'. 
Such factors will be expected to inform frames of reference for the award of 
discretionary payments and inform the findings presented in chapters four to 
eight of the thesis. 
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Before moving on to address the origins of social assistance in Britain and the 
Netherlands, the chapter begins with a conceptual definition of exceptional 
payments that will be utilised for comparative purposes. 
Defining exceptional need payments 
Exceptional payments within social assistance schemes are defined as 'lump 
sums of money which are made available to some people in need to help 
them cope with exceptional and sometimes unexpected expenses' (Ditch 
1995:338). We might see this definition then, as referring to a need arising 
from a specific event, situation or life transition, in which people lack the 
financial resources necessary to meet it in a capitalist society based on the 
cash-nexus of exchange. Unforeseen events or significant transitions that 
result in material need arise in all families. 1 However where the individual or 
family in question lives on the social minimum of last resort social assistance, 
without friends or family in a position to assist them financially, such instances 
may be all the more stressful (Ditch 1995:338). 
The situations and circumstances in which these needs occur are as varied as 
the human condition, but may include expenses associated with the birth of a 
child; the death of an immediate family member; separating from a (violent) 
partner; the breakdown of a relatively expensive household item like a cooker 
or a washing machine; visiting sick relatives in hospital or looking for work. 
The existence of such provision within social assistance schemes recognises 
1 Hence the fact that those not on social assistance benefit may be eligible for such 
payments. For example, in times of fire or flood. 
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that there are certain needs which 'normal' social assistance rates will not be 
sufficient to meet. 
Whilst such schemes represent a relatively small fraction of government 
expenditure on social assistance the specific position which schemes of this 
nature occupy is of considerable importance, precisely because they do 
profess to offer help in situations of extreme financial hardship and personal 
stress. The extent to which such schemes do relieve need therefore - by 
providing safeguards for social assistance beneficiaries - may be said to far 
outweigh their financial cost (Buck and Smith 2003:xiii). 
Furthermore, by their inclusion in social assistance schemes, often taken as 
the de facto poverty line, provision is targeted at the most disadvantaged 
members of society. Such schemes therefore convey strong and significant 
messages about how that particular society believes the poor should be 
treated. From a comparative perspective then, such schemes demonstrate 
'what we think of the poor': conveyed in the manner in which help is, or is not, 
made available and the extent to which needs are met, or how generous 
provision is (Buck and Smith 2003: xiii). 
Exceptional needs can be met in kind, or (as in the case of the present 
research) cash payments can be paid to the beneficiary in the form of loans 
and grants. Payments given in the form of a loan do not actually represent the 
principle that such needs are exceptional, i.e. not expected to be met from 
general social assistance rates. Loans are an 'advance' of social assistance 
benefit rather than an addition to it. A grant however, is a one-off payment 
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that the recipient does not have to pay back. From a comparative perspective 
then, the costs and situations for which payments are made as either a loan 
or a grant might be particularly illuminating. Partly in recognition of the 
diverse and unforeseen circumstances in which human needs might arise 
provIsion is often - to differing degrees - administered on a discretionary 
basis. 2 
As the previous chapter argued, exceptional need provision must be 
understood in the context of the social assistance scheme in which it is 
situated. In order to contextualise both the development leading to, and the 
nature of, provision in Britain and the Netherlands as it was at the time of the 
research therefore, the following section of the chapter considers the origins 
of social assistance in both countries. It illustrates that the differences 
highlighted in each country's route to breaking down the Poor Law and on a 
more general level their establishment of national income maintenance 
programmes might well have influenced the nature of the social assistance 
schemes in Britain and the Netherlands (L0demel 1997). 
Origins: journeys to the last resort of social assistance 
Poor Law provision in many European countries was based on the principle 
that paupers could only call for help from the authorities if their families would 
not support them, and if they had been refused help by churches and charities 
(Eardley et al 1996: 274b). The British Poor Law of 1834 or the Dutch 
Armenwet (Poor Law) of 1854 moreover, further distinguished between those 
categories of poor people who were seen to be deserving of relief: the 
2 As stated in chapter 2, devolving discretion for such payments might also be seen as a way 
to contain expenditure. 
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'impotent poor', and those who were regarded as undeserving, essentially the 
unemployed, 'idle paupers' capable of work (Van Oorschot 2000:35). 
The emergence of compulsory, national and collective insurance systems 
against (many of) the major adversities confronting wage earners in a 
capitalist society which came to supersede Poor Law provision in the 20th 
Century were established throughout a number of European countries -
Britain and the Netherlands included - within a relatively short space of time. 
But that similarity does not mean that like effects were begotten by like 
causes, or that differences - in relation to time spans for our purposes - are 
unimportant (De Swaan 1988: 153) for their impact on the origins of social 
assistance provision. 
Points of historical divergence become significant essentially because they 
represent important variables according to which social assistance schemes 
currently differ between welfare states in general. As the last chapter 
highlighted, 'remembering that all assistance systems are descended from 
19th century poor relief arrangements, the obvious distinction to draw here is 
between those systems which have remained localised (and cash/care 
multifunctional) and those - like Britain, which have been centralised and 
divorced from anything other than a cash relief function' (Jones 1985:113/4). 
As seen in the previous chapter, L0demel (1997) argues that Norwegian 
social assistance belongs to a comprehensive and generous social 
democratic welfare state, but social assistance retains more links with the 
Poor Law than its British counterpart. He unravels this paradox by explaining 
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that Norway established comprehensive social insurance schemes covering 
workers for the major risk contingencies in a piecemeal fashion whilst 
maintaining and reforming the Poor Law 'from within' which continued with the 
tradition of a localised service combining cash and care. The later 
establishment of Norwegian social assistance is then influenced by the 
remaining 'problem' or 'residuum' client groups who are not covered by some 
form of insurance benefit. 
Britain, on the other hand, departed from this path, and indeed the path taken 
by all other western welfare states (L0demel 1997:208) by abolishing the Poor 
Law and replacing it with a strictly income-maintenance oriented national 
social insurance and social assistance scheme in the space of a few years 
(L0demel 1997:205) and handing over social work functions to the local 
authorities. Given this distinctive path taken by Britain in the abolition of its 
Poor Law from 'without', we would expect to find similarities between Norway 
and the Netherlands. Specifically, we may find that the Netherlands may also 
have established social insurance schemes covering most workers before 
they constructed a national social assistance scheme which will then be 
influenced by existing municipal provision for those whose risks are not 
already covered by some form of insurance benefit. 
From the Poor Law to social assistance: Britain 
Prior to 1934, supplementary help to those who were destitute had been the 
responsibility of local authorities broadly under the provisions of the 1834 
Poor Law Amendment Act - intended to limit the scope of 'parish' help and to 
make dependence on it as unattractive as possible - with the ultimate threat 
74 
of incarceration in the 'workhouse'. A major problem for the central state 
under this system was the variability with which local authorities interpreted 
their provisions. Some left leaning authorities for example provided relatively 
generous help to the poor (Craig 2003:3). 
The highly centralised nature of the UK state has influenced the development 
of a national system of social security3 (Eardley et al 1996b:388/89), and the 
history of exceptional need payments in the UK can be traced back to the first 
national scheme for social assistance, the Unemployment Assistance Board 
(UAB) which was established in 1934 (Walker 1993:99). This has been 
described as an 'arms length organisation supervised by government', 
concerned with rationalisation and disciplining labour (Craig 2003:4). In 1941, 
the Assistance Board (AB) replaced the UAB. Noticeably in this time period 
the ideology of desert was temporarily removed, attributed by Craig (2003:4), 
to the social context of the Second World War and the fact that it was not only 
those in 'obvious poverty' who turned to the state for assistance. 
Following the end of the war Britain established a nationalised and (whilst flat 
rate and low) comprehensive system of social insurance (1946), adopted from 
the Beveridge report. In 1948 further legislation established a national system 
of means tested National Assistance. The 1948 Act may have abolished the 
'hated and localised Poor Law' (Jones 1985:114) however the actual 
provisions and eligibility criteria for National Assistance were little different 
(Craig 2003:4). National Assistance was administered by the National 
3 Notwithstanding the recent devolved powers to governmental tiers in Wales and Scotland 
social security is still a reserved matter for the Westminster Parliament. 
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Assistance Board (NAB) which had some degree of control on how the 
system was administered and in policy formulation, for instance in what 
circumstances weekly or lump-sum payments could be made (Walker 
1993:7). 
In relation to means tested social assistance, the important point for our 
purposes is that Beveridge stressed the initial importance of such provision in 
'a considerable number of cases', during the build up towards subsistence 
level insurance based benefits (L0demel 1997:206). Having served this 
interim role, it was envisaged that social assistance would subsequently take 
on a limited role within social security, covering those with no access to 
insurance benefits, those with 'abnormal' (in respect of diet or care for 
example) needs and those (presumably women) who were in need due to 
desertion or separation (L0demel 1997:206) and for whom no form of 
insurance benefit existed. 
With the nationalisation of assistance in Britain in 1948 central government 
were entrusted with paying a weekly income: 'cash' to those people without 
means, and the provision of social services or 'care' was entrusted to local 
authorities (Stewart and Stewart 1993:408). Jones (1985:114) notes that 
divorcing cash relief payments from 'advice or assistance kind' meant that 
'those in need of money would not be interfered with on other accounts while 
those in need of advice or in kind assistance could seek this from local 
authorities without being made to feel that such was part of a 'poor relief' 
service'. The enactment of National Assistance therefore resulted in a 
separation of income maintenance services from other social services In 
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Britain. This entailed that the administrators of social assistance 'focused 
exclusively on material problems' in assessing claims for last-resort income 
maintenance (L0demel 1997:251). 
Throughout the existence of the above schemes, demand for exceptional 
payments grew significantly, raising one of the key structural issues facing 
them: the inadequacy of basic social assistance benefit levels (Craig 2003:5). 
For example, Walker (1993: 100) highlights that the number of claims for lump 
sum payments trebled between 1948 and 1965 from 100,000 to 345,000. In 
its final year of existence, the NAB thus argued for a reform of the system in 
order that basic scale rates be adequate to cover normal needs. Furthermore, 
despite the intention of constructing a national scheme that would reduce 
inconsistency in nation-wide provision, reliance on the discretionary 
judgement of the NAB and its officers meant that 'decisions might be made 
which were out of line with the government's dominant ideological goals' 
(Craig 2003:5). Notwithstanding the fact that national social assistance came 
to playa much wider role in the social security system than Beveridge had 
initially anticipated the National Assistance scheme established in 1948 ran 
relatively unchanged until 1966 (Walker 1993:9). These developments in the 
British system will be discussed further in the chapter, after a brief 
consideration of the Dutch route to a national and comprehensive social 
assistance scheme. 
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From the Poor Law to social assistance: the Netherlands 
From the beginning of the 19th Century, Dutch municipalities had gradually 
assumed responsibility for the care of the poor from private and church 
organisations as these failed to counter the effects of industrialisation (Van 
den Brande et al 1994: 12). However, local differences that had been much 
criticised under the old private system were not eliminated, and variability in 
municipal Poor Law provision remained well into the 1960s. 
In comparison to Britain, the Netherlands' history of the construction of a 
comprehensive and national income maintenance system is one of 
'fragmentary and halting legislation' (De Swaan 1988:210) and throughout the 
relatively piecemeal introduction of national social insurance benefits, the 
Dutch Poor Laws remain in place. 
Commentators on the evolution of the Dutch welfare, or 'caring state,4 have 
outlined the relatively slow and niggardly beginnings on the one hand, and the 
late but dramatic expansion of a national and comprehensive social security 
system in the Netherlands on the other (Becker 2000; De Swaan 1988:210; 
van Kersbergen and Becker 1988). Essentially, the Dutch welfare state is 
argued to have been a slow starter but a late 'bloomer' because of a conflict 
about the role and responsibilities of the different interested parties: the state, 
political parties, unions and employers' associations. This resulted in an 
impasse for some decades in discussions about the institutional 
arrangements of the social security system. In the 1950s the interested 
parties reached a twofold compromise: a corporatist organisation of the social 
4 To give Verzorgingsstaat its most literal translation. 
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security system and a state-controlled wage policy (Van der Veen and 
Trommel 1998:4). 
After this compromise the system expanded rapidly (Van der Veen and 
Trommel 1998:4) and a similar figuration of political forces that had made for 
such slow and incremental legislation before the Second World War 
engendered a remarkable expansion of social security (De Swaan 1998:214). 
In the 1950s and 1960s employment based social insurance and National 
Insurance were introduced to cover risks associated with unemployment 
(1952), disability (1967), old age (1957) and widowhood (1959) (Eardley et al 
1996b:272). Van der Veen and Trommel (1998:4) point out that that the 
relatively late extension of the Dutch social security system meant that it was 
developed in a period of unprecedented growth and prosperity and coverage 
was universal and the benefits were relatively high. As the previous chapter 
also highlighted, the introduction of generous, universal, and so called 
'passive' benefits can be seen as one way of mediating social and political 
conflicts which otherwise might result in (the then more) highly pillorised 
Dutch society (van Kersbergen 1997:314). 
During what has been described as a period of 'leftism' in the sixties (Van 
Kersbergen and Becker 1988:490) the much-criticised local differences in 
municipal Poor Law provision were considered unacceptable, and the 
situation that had emerged before and after the war was affirmed when, in 
1965, Dutch Poor Law provision was finally abolished with the introduction of 
the general assistance Algemene Bijstand Act. This required municipalities to 
'grant assistance to any Dutch national living in or in danger of living in such 
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circumstances that he (sic) does not have the means to support himself' 
(Eardley et al 1996:274b). This Act was not only an affirmation of public 
responsibility for the poor but was also an attempt to end the former local 
diversity in Poor Law provision. 
Thus the later establishment of social assistance in the Netherlands -
described as the 'crowning piece' topping off the Dutch social security system 
(Van den Brande et al 1994: 12) - and the fact that administration remained a 
municipal concern can be expected to have influenced the nature of this form 
of provision. Specifically, by 1965 we can expect that most Dutch workers 
would be covered by the (relatively generous) insurance benefits established 
previously. The remaining needs to be met by social assistance then might 
not have been thought to be purely monetary. This is partly borne out by Van 
den Brande et al (1994: 12) who argue that 'the enactment of the ABW has 
always been considered as a 'monument to decency' and commitment with 
the weakest in society'. The Christian Democratic ethos being that the strong 
should help the weak: the Municipal Social Services were very much 
orientated towards social work, and the 'culture of the Municipal Social 
Services and their street level bureaucrats was primarily directed at the well 
being of their clients' (Van den Brande et al 1994: 12). In comparison to 
Britain then, what we see in the origins of the Dutch social assistance scheme 
is an integration rather than separation of 'cash and care' in national social 
assistance provision. 
Van Oorschot (1998:3) argues that the establishment of a nationally financed 
Dutch safety net was an expression of the principles of collective 
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responsibility and solidarity. However, while this form of income maintenance 
replaced a Poor Law system characterised by diversity and regional 
differences, we should note that in effect, the implementation of a nationally 
financed social assistance scheme did not mark a radical departure from the 
diversity and regional differences that characterised the former Poor Law 
provision. Municipalities were effectively still free to apply their own means 
tests and set their own levels of assistance. Significantly, we should note that 
there was no actual legislative provision for exceptional payments in the 
Dutch system at this time. 
The establishment of national social assistance in Britain and the Netherlands 
can therefore be seen to differ in respect of whether central or local 
government administered such schemes and relatedly, whether such income 
maintenance schemes are separated from social work and 'care'. There are 
also similarities however (discussed below), in that the continuing discretion 
and local diversity in this nationally established provision leads policy 
development in both countries towards standardisation and increased 
centralisation. 
Development of schemes: from discretion to standardisation 
This section discusses the development of social assistance and (in the Dutch 
case the origins of) exceptional payment schemes in Britain and the 
Netherlands, stopping short of the reforms leading to the provision in place at 
the time of research: the Social Fund and Bijzondere Bijstand. Essentially, 
there are two major points of comparison in the development of the two 
systems of provision. The first relates to debates concerning what constitutes 
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'normal' and 'exceptional' needs. The second point concerns the issue of 
whether exceptional payments should be discretionary, flexible, but 
essentially inequitable, or whether they should be standardised, and thereby 
risk rigidity, effectively denying needs which arise but have not been 
anticipated or legislated for by policy makers. 
In an attempt to find a suitable balance between discretion and 
standardisation and, more so in the case of Britain, contain expenditure, 
exceptional need provision in both countries developed by moving from 
discretion to standardisation. However, the actors involved in the 
implementation of policy differs between countries and this can be seen to 
have influenced the paths taken. 
Britain: towards entitlement 
The development of policy in Britain can be seen as a period in which central 
governments' major aims were to establish legal rights to social assistance 
benefit and to reduce the scope of additional payments. As part of a broader 
reform of social security, in 1966 the NAB was replaced by the Supplementary 
Benefit Commission (SBC). Like its predecessor the SBC was able to 
influence both policy formulation and the administration of social assistance 
(Walker 1993:7). It is also at this time that the administration of social 
insurance and social assistance benefits was (as Beveridge had initially 
intended) merged in one government department (L0demel: 1997:207). The 
establishment of the SBC partly attempted to deal with those problems that 
have perpetually been associated with means tested benefits: stigma and low 
take up (Walker 1993:10). Moreover, Supplementary Benefit was intended to 
82 
respond to concerns arising from a growing reliance on discretion (Craig 
2003:5) in the NAB, inconsistent and thus inequitable decision making by 
officers and the administrative cost resulting from the growth in the system of 
extra payments (weekly and lump sum) (Walker 1993: 1 0). 
Craig (2003:5) notes that the 1966 Act stated that people whose resources 
did not meet their requirements would be entitled to benefit - a move in the 
direction of legal rights - and weekly benefit was clearly marked out as being 
for 'normal requirements'. Over and beyond this, the SBC was empowered to 
pay extra weekly additions for people with on-going needs (e.g. extra heating 
or a special diet), one-off payments (Exceptional Need Payments) for unusual 
one-off needs, and payments to people in urgent need (from the result of, for 
example, a fire or flood). The latter power overrode all others and eligibility 
was not restricted to those on weekly benefit. This partitioning of need 
however immediately raised arguments over what were to be regarded as 
normal requirements, on-going needs and unusual one-off needs (Craig 
2003:5). 
Between 1968 and 1976 the number of exceptional needs payments grew 
partly in response to the changing nature of the social assistance clientele. 
Increasing unemployment saw social assistance claimants below pension age 
come to outnumber those over pension age (Walker 1993:101). Craig 
(2003:6) highlights that although the numbers on Supplementary Benefit grew 
by 11 % between 1969 and 1976, the number of Exceptional Need awards 
grew by 137% for all claimant groups. In 1976 the number of Exceptional 
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Need Payments topped 1 million for the first time at a cost of £25 million. This 
growth continued, reaching £34 million in 1979 (Craig 2003:6). 
Investigations in the time period highlighted that expenditure primarily went on 
clothing for adults and children, bedding, removal expenses, furniture, 
household goods and fuel (Craig 2003:6), items which were in keeping with 
the SBC discretionary guidelines (Walker 1993: 101). However, Craig (2003:6) 
argues that this pattern of use provoked debate about the boundaries 
between normal, exceptional and urgent needs, again focusing attention on 
the adequacy of social assistance scale rates, and thus on the role of one off 
payments. Moreover, considerable disparity was found between regions, 
credited to differences not only in levels of deprivation but also to local 
(welfare rights orientated) organisations highlighting needs. Under-claiming by 
older people was further highlighted, thought to be because of their perception 
that the discretionary nature of the payments would lead to them being 
classed as undeserving. Figures also revealed that whilst most claimants 
received no more than one exceptional payment a year, a small proportion 
claimed and received more than one and they did so at a level that was 
appreciably higher than the average award (Craig 2003:6). 
Continuing reliance on discretionary power in the award of exceptional 
payments in the SBC provoked a 'lively debate' during the 1970s (Walker 
1993: 1 01) and also meant that variations in decision making were 
increasingly open to challenge. Thus Craig (2003:7) attributes the growth of 
what came to be known as the 'welfare rights industry' during the 1970s to the 
growing reliance on (and challenges to) discretionary ENPs. Further, the 
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development of the welfare rights movement at this time impacted on both the 
aggregate demand for exceptional payments as well as the number of 
appeals (Walker 1993:104). In 1973 the proportion of ENP appeals reached 
28% of the total of the 25,000 SS appeals. Moreover, there was found to be a 
500/0 chance of having the original ENP decision revised, although there were 
vast differences in the success rates between those appellants who were 
represented at tribunal and those who were not (Craig 2003:8). The operation 
of the tribunal system thus raised issues about discretion, fairness, bias and 
complexity (Craig 2003:8). Refusal of Exceptional Needs Payments were 
further said to be causing 'boundary disputes' between central and local 
government: with (local government) social services departments arguing 
that, in effect, they were providing cash grants for needs which were the 
responsibility of the SSC (Craig 2003:9). 
Throughout the 1970s, the Government became increasingly concerned 
about the growing costs of the exceptional payment scheme. In an attempt to 
cut administrative costs, claimants were encouraged to apply by post, staff 
were discouraged from making house visits and smaller offices were closed or 
absorbed into larger ones, but costs still grew (Craig 2003: 10). Walker 
(1993:11) argues that this time period also saw a 'growing antagonism 
towards the social security system and its claimants' by both the tabloid press 
and various members of parliament. Rhetoric revolved, notes Craig (2003:11), 
around 'fraud and abuse'. Whilst fraud was depicted as a criminal activity, 
abuse was couched in terms of 'excessive claiming' mostly as a result of the 
claimant's own failure to manage their weekly benefit and to spend it on items 
for which it was intended. Claimants were essentially 'portrayed as living 
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beyond their means' (Craig 2003:10). Later however, 'abusive claiming' 
became a phrase used by social security ministers to describe the frequent 
claiming of one-off payments by a relatively limited number of claimants5 
(Craig 2003:11). 
Largely however, debates about ENPs were conducted in terms of the 
tensions arising from the competing objectives of equity and entitlement on 
the one hand, and discretion and flexibility on the other, within the growing 
government concern to limit the rise in expenditure (Craig 2003:12; Walker 
1993:101). In a context of tight public expenditure and increasing demands of 
ENPs, Craig (2003:12) argues that two advantages of discretion, flexibility and 
innovation, were lost and discretion was instead effectively used as a means 
of rationing expenditure. Demand for ENPs continued to grow however, and 
they increasingly became perceived as, to all intents and purposes, increases 
in the scale rates of benefit rather than exceptional payments (Craig 2003: 12). 
The arrival of the Thatcher Government in 1979, and the subsequent Social 
Security Act of 1980 saw the abolition of the SBC6 and responsibility for the 
administration of Supplementary Benefit transferred to the Department for 
Health and Social Security (DHSS) (Walker 1993:7). Further, Exceptional 
Needs Payments were replaced by the Single Payment (SP) Scheme in 1980. 
5 Even though analysis of data suggest this was marginal through the 1970s a~d that from the point of 
view of equity between claimants, a much more significant problem was posed In terms of the low take 
up overall of ENPs, given that 4 out of 5 claimants were receiving no ENPs at all in an average year 
throughout the life of the ENP scheme (Craig 2003:11). 
6 Policy was now to be made by Ministers via Parliament rather ~han the SSC. At this time the 
Social Security Advisory Committee (SSAC) was created to adVise government on all aspects 
of social security but not to make policy. Walker (1993:7) notes that SSAC has always been 
particularly critical of government's social assistance policy. 
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The government argued that this new scheme would address the structural 
problems highlighted in earlier provision. The major aim was to reduce 
discretion in order to simplify the scheme and cut administration costs but in 
, 
line with their New Right agenda, not to increase expenditure. 
Regulations would set out the range of eligible expenses and the 
circumstances in which Single Payments would now be allowed. Significantly, 
Walker (1993:106) notes that the most common expenses for which lump sum 
payments had been made prior to 1980 were henceforth excluded. Craig 
(2003: 14) argues that the scope of entitlements, and the manner in which they 
had been drafted as regulations, were essentially intended to limit staff 
discretion and constrain demand. Eligibility for footwear and clothing - which 
had constituted more than half of all payments made by the SSC - were 
tightened and Single Payments would not be given where the need for such 
items had arisen from normal 'wear and tear' (Walker 1993:106). 
However, in practice the Single Payment Scheme still entailed complex 
regulations and 'disguised discretion' (Craig 2003: 17). Whilst payments were 
meant to be regulated, there was still room for moral judgements (as 
demonstrated by Howe (1985)). The narrowing eligibility Single Payments 
entailed once again caused boundary disputes to arise between central 
government on the one hand and local government and charitable 
organisations on the other to where demand was argued to have been 
deflected. As previously however, expenditure on such payments continued 
to grow reaching £308 million in the mid 1980s (Craig 2003:17). 
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The Netherlands: discretion within standardisation 
From 1965-1974 the Dutch municipalities effectively retained a significant 
amount of discretion in the provision of national social assistance, by applying 
their own means tests and deciding on their own levels of assistance. 
Consequently, large disparities existed in the extent to which Dutch citizens 
were protected from poverty. In order to combat in 1974 the 'local discretion in 
amounts paid and the unacceptable inequalities in the rights of Dutch citizens, 
social assistance became strongly centralised' (Van Oorschot 1998:3). It is 
only since 1974 therefore that there have been national rules, means tests 
and standard rates for social assistance, which are common to all 537 
municipalities. 
These standard rates for the national social minimum? moreover, were set in 
relation to the Dutch minimum wage (Van Oorschot and Smolenaars 
1993: 17). While such shifts in the responsibility for defining need and the level 
of provision to meet it can be couched in terms of a desire for 
'standardisation', such centralisation has had important implications for the 
existence, form and role of exceptional need payments in the Netherlands. In 
particular, while the 1974 Act effectively meant that municipalities lost their 
freedom to decide the level of social assistance, the legislation also 
introduced a distinction between general social assistance and 'special' social 
assistance: Bijzondere Bijstand. It is in 1974 then, almost 10 years after the 
introduction of a nationally financed but until this time, locally set social 
assistance scheme, that a legal framework for Bijzondere Bijstand is 
7 Again, this might perhaps provide an illustration of, not so much 'how' governments define 
the minimum income, but rather 'why' they do so. Eardley et al (1996:270) argue that the 
pillarisation of Dutch politics and society has had the effect of driving up the level of coverage. 
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introduced. While this can be interpreted as an indication on the part of central 
government that needs might remain unmet by general and now standardised 
social assistance rates, the definition of the needy remained within the 
jurisdiction of the municipalities (Nota van Toelichting, 1974)8. 
This framework for the provision of social assistance and Bijzondere Bijstand 
remained in place for six years until 1980, when a further centralising Act (The 
National Assistance (Calculation of Additional Benefits) Decree) stipulated the 
'criteria for the ability to bear financial loads' or the rules under which 
decisions on income, assets and means should be taken into consideration 
when awarding Bijzondere Bijstand to people in need (Nota van Toelichting, 
1980). Effectively then, this legislation introduced standardised means tests 
common to all municipalities for the administration of Bijzondere Bijstand (Van 
Oorschot and Smolenaars 1993: 17). In 1984 central legislation introduced a 
threshold value: no Bijzondere Bijstand could be given if the cost of the 
applicant's need exceeded the costs of the administration to meet it. These 
very small expenditures were considered to be 'general costs' and therefore 
excluded (Nota van Toelichting, 1984). 
With such incremental centralisation and the introduction of more rules 
however, municipalities started to complain, citing the argument that they 
could not grant Bijzondere Bijstand in accordance with the true individualised 
needs of every single inhabitant. The administrating municipalities 
increasingly found themselves inflexible in their response to the needs of their 
8 Explanatory notes to the legislation 
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inhabitants, whose situations did not comply with the rules of central 
legislation (Van Oorschot and Smolenaars 1993:17). 
Given the latter points, it is perhaps not surprising that in the course of the 
1980s many Dutch municipalities implemented local income assistance 
policies.9 The timing of these might be considered significant in a wider social 
security context: nationally prescribed general social assistance rates, and an 
individualised, and nationally defined criteria for Bijzondere Bijstand, 
alongside a wider economic climate of recession and rising unemployment. It 
is in these circumstances moreover, that central government takes the 
austerity measure of freezing the rate of the minimum wage and consequently 
the levels of social assistance. This climate saw those in long-term 
unemployment more at risk of poverty. These local assistance polices were 
not appreciated by the National Government, as they saw them as 
undermining the national economic policy (Van Oorschot and Smolenaars 
1993). 
In both countries then, what we see in the development of social assistance is 
a move from local discretion in nationally financed social assistance provision 
towards nationally set standardised social assistance rates and increasing 
uniformity in exceptional provision. As the following section of the chapter 
highlights, there are also similarities, as well as differences, in the return to 
discretion in exceptional payment schemes in the two countries. 
9 Comprising income assistance and exemptions from local taxes for those on a low income. 
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Returning to discretion in Britain and the Netherlands: 'New 
Managerialism' and 'Managed Liberalisation' 
This section of the chapter is concerned with situating the policy changes 
leading to the exceptional need schemes within social assistance in both 
countries under study as they were at the time of research in their wider social 
and political context. A number of similarities are highlighted: constrained 
economic environments, the reform of administrative structures, the desire to 
target those most in need and a return to discretion in the context of capped 
budgets. Furthermore, increased (work-related) conditionality in the social 
assistance schemes under study for certain groups can be discerned. 
However, the degree to which (paternalistic) activation measures were 
included in the Social Fund and Bijzondere Bijstand is shown to differ 
essentially because such measures 'had to be realised within a matrix of 
ongoing practises, existing institutions and prior legislation' (De Swaan 
1988: 157) in both countries. 
The Social Fund 
In their attempt to 'roll back the state' and concomitantly encourage individual 
enterprise through lowering taxation, in their second term of office the 
Conservative Government undertook a major review of one of the largest and 
fastest growing parts of public expenditure in the UK: the social security 
system (Clasen 1994:171). In keeping with their ideological beliefs for the role 
of social security, the policy changes that resulted from the 'Fowler Review' in 
1986 were aimed at targeting those most in need, and reducing the role of the 
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state in the provision of social security (Millar 1994:1).10 This time period 
began a process of many cuts to benefits especially with respect to the 
unemployed (Clasen 1994:179). 
Legislation further aimed at a simplification of the social assistance scheme in 
order to reduce bureaucracy and administration costs. The reforms to 
emerge from the Fowler Review saw Supplementary Benefit and Exceptional 
Need Payments replaced with Income Support and the Social Fund. 
Essentially, Income Support introduced a common basic structure of 
assessment and payment for means tested benefits. Many of the previous 
criteria under the former Supplementary Benefit scheme for differentiating 
weekly payments between different claimants were collapsed into far fewer 
distinctions, primarily based on age. Additional premiums were to be payable 
for certain categories of people, for example pensioners and lone parents. 
The arguments for premiums included simplification and the fact that they 
were usually paid automatically, rather than having to be claimed separately. 
The Government also argued that the new structure made it easier to direct 
additional resources at specific groups (Eardley et al 1996b:412). 
The introduction of the Social Fund for meeting the one-off needs of social 
assistance beneficiaries was arguably one of the most contentious social 
security reforms enacted in this period, and attracted a plethora of debate, 
criticism and evaluative research 11 (see for example Huby and Dix 1992:2/3; 
10 Policies to encourage private welfare pensions, cutting social insurance benefit eligibility 
and a greater reliance on means tested benefits were also instigated in this time period (see 
for example, Evans 1998). 
11 In fact, much of the (limited) comparative research on such payments by UK scholars 
seem to have emerged in this time period (Craig 1992, Tester 1987). 
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Walker et al 1991). The replacement for the Single Payment Scheme was 
largely based on discretion, offered predominantly loans, and operated within 
strict cash limits (see further in the chapter for a fuller description of the Social 
Fund's objectives at the time of research). From 1988 a distinction was made 
between certain specified one-off payments which remained a legal right 
(these were mostly concerned with life course events, birth, death and older 
age) and most one-off grants and loans, which became discretionary, all paid 
from the Social Fund (Eardley 1996:392b). 
The government argued that the Social Fund was designed to solve the 
problems that had emerged from earlier schemes: finding the correct balance 
between discretion and entitlement; solving boundary disputes; containing 
expenditure; the relationship between essential and exceptional needs, and 
the role of tribunals in challenging decisions (Craig 2003:21). Regarding the 
role of tribunals in challenging decisions, Wikeley et al (2002:211) argue that 
the establishment of the Independent Review Service (I RS) for discretionary 
Social Fund decisions was intended to insulate the scheme from control 
outside the Department of Social Security. IRS Inspectors were to be 
appointed by the Social Fund Commissioner who, in turn, was appointed by 
the Secretary of State. Thus the right of appeal to an independent tribunal to 
decisions made by Social Fund Officers had been removed (Huby and Dix 
1992:2). 
The Social Fund was also designed to tie in with the government's wider 'care 
in the community' policy: described as a 'health and social services policy 
developed by conservative governments in the 1980s to encourage people to 
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enter or remain in the community rather than being taken into residential care' 
(Wikeley et al 2002:481). Linking a cash grant to health and social service 
provision in this way was also envisaged to depend in part on a deal of 
communication between local offices and social work departments, thus 
'changing the boundaries between the social security system and the 
traditional domain of the social work professions' (Wikeley et aI2002:481). 
As said, the introduction of Income Support was an attempt to rationalise and 
simplify the administration of means tested benefits. Income Support was 
largely to be processed by using computers, whilst the Social Fund would be 
administered by a separate group of specially trained Civil Servants. 
Previously, Supplementary Benefit Officers had been responsible for all of the 
client's income needs, and so what we see here is the effective separation of 
the administration of the client's regular from their exceptional needs. 
In line with their New Right ideological belief in the impact of social security on 
individual (rational economic) behaviour, the Conservative Government went 
on to enact a number of changes in the eligibility and generosity of 
(especially) unemployment benefits in order to improve work incentives 
(Clasen 1994:174). The structure of implementation in Britain at this time 
however, has implications for the increasing conditionality in social assistance 
benefit on work seeking behaviour for some categories of claimants that we 
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see in 1989 with the 'actively seeking work test', and the later introduction of 
Jobseeker's Allowance in 1996.12 Because of different Government 
Departments and local offices for employment on the one hand and social 
security on the other13, essentially the increased surveillance, sanctions and 
obligations for the receipt of social assistance benefit that such paternalistic 
welfare to work policies embody were administered by Employment Officials 
in Jobcentres 14 - who acted as agents for the (former) Department of Social 
Security in administering benefit and policing work seeking behaviour - not 
those who administered Income Support claims or Social Fund Officers in the 
(then) Department of Social Security. 
Managerialism and the 'Next Steps' 
The implementation of the Social Fund would have been further affected by 
the Conservative Government's attack on the bureaucracy of the welfare state 
and reform of the Civil Service through its 'Next Steps' initiative. Ling 
(1994:34) argues that the Conservative Government recognised that its New 
Right project partly depended on its ability to marginalise and undermine the 
institutional bases of support for the Keynesian welfare state from within: thus 
public sector professionals and public bureaucrats were especially targeted. 
It is argued that Thatcher had a personal distaste of (especially senior) civil 
12 In 1996, this separation was further compounded because the unemployed were effectively 
separated out as a group and put onto Jobseeker's Allowance (JSA). This included a means-
tested and a contributory based element, and the work seeking requirements were taken 
away from other groups of social assistance claimants (lone parents, pensioners and disabled 
people). 
13 The functions of policing the work seeking behaviour of and administering benefits to the 
unemployed in Britain have been merged and separated at different time periods. :r~ World 
War II the functions were merged, separated in the early 1970s, and merged again In 1987 
with the establishment of the Employment Service (see Fletcher 1997). 
14 See for example, Wright (2003). 
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servants, partly due to the political association perceived to exist between the 
senior Civil Service and the pre-Thatcherite political consensus (Ling 
1994:37). 
The reform implemented from the so-called Ibbs report, is argued to have 
constituted the most radical break in the history of the Civil Service since the 
Northcote- Trevelyan report of the 1850s. The latter had proposed the 
implementation of a professional, male, Oxbridge elite recruited for life 
through examination as the basis for a depoliticised 'public administration' 
(Ling 1994:33/34). 
In order to increase the efficiency of public administration, and the effective 
separation of policy from operation, the report advocated the breaking up of 
the Civil Service into separate agencies that would be responsible for carrying 
out quasi-contractual obligations (established in a 'framework agreement') 
(Ling 1994:38). The DSS was thus reorganised into five agencies each with a 
quasi-contractual relationship with the central department. The result was that 
950/0 of social security staff were employed by agencies leaving only a core of 
less than 2000 staff under the permanent secretary at headquarters. The 
'core' of each department, was to have responsibility for advising ministers on 
policy; drawing up strategic plans for the department; setting targets for 
agencies and monitoring their performance (Ling 1994:39). 
Non-strategic decisions were therefore to be devolved downwards, and 
resources and objectives would be centrally controlled whilst entrepreneurship 
concerning how best to achieve these targets would be encouraged. The 
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· Benefits Agency was one of the largest agencies introduced under the Next 
Steps programme. Given that the Next Steps initiative was concerned with 
separating the areas of policy formation and implementation agencies can be 
considered semi-autonomous. While the sponsoring department (then DSS 
subsequently Department for Work and Pensions (DWP)) set the Benefit 
Agency's budget and objectives, the agency had 'managerial independence' 
(Kavanagh 1996:327). 
Such reforms were, it is argued by Clarke and Newman (1997:36), essentially 
an attempt to change and manage the culture of the Civil Service. Old notions 
of progress, based on the state and its professionals paternalistically solving 
social problems, were displaced by a more limited vision of 'more effective 
service delivery'. 'New Managerialism' as an organising principle is thus 
argued to have intersected with the New Right project of reshaping state 
institutions in several ways. Decentralisation, contracting, the creation of 
'quasi-markets', privatisation and other processes integral to state 
restructuring have all placed new emphasis on managerial and business 
skills. The authors argue that this was not just a process of organisational 
restructuring, but a large-scale process of cultural change through which 
'hearts and minds' could be engaged. 
'Managed Liberalisation': Dutch Decentralisation 
Until the mid 1980s the main characteristics of the Dutch welfare state 
included a focus on income compensation via universal and generous 
benefits, the almost complete lack of an active labour market policy, and a 
'friendly and lenient administration' (Van der Veen and Trommel 1998:2). 
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However, during the recession experienced by almost all western welfare 
states, from 1975-85 the numbers of social security benefit recipients in the 
Netherlands soared, initiating a discussion about the future of the system. 15 
Initially, the debate centred on financial matters but later shifted to more 
fundamental issues, including the possibility for increasing control, and the 
necessity of 'modernising' social security (Van der Veen and Trommel 
1998:8). 
The resulting modernisation that took place has been described as a process 
of 'managed liberalisation' (Van der Veen and TrommeI1998:12). On the one 
hand there is more scope for market provision in the social security system 
but on the other hand the state tries to manage this market and so limits the 
freedom of choice. As in Britain, Van der Veen and Trammel (1998:12) argue 
that a process of cultural change with regard to social security was set in 
motion, which entered the Municipal Social Services at the end of the 1980s. 
A particular target here was the 'lenient and friendly' implementation style. It 
was argued that front line workers were negligent in inspecting clients and 
hence only selectively enforcing clients' rights and duties. 
With the rise of mass unemployment (and the inability of existing social 
insurance compensation to cope with it) in the 1980s, dependency on social 
assistance rose steeply, and the Municipal Social Services were transformed 
into 'benefit factories' (Van den Brande et al 1994:12). Thus, social work, 
which had been the core business of the Municipal Social Services in the 
15 In the first 5 years (1975-80) the receipt of disability benefits doubled, and in the second 5 
years (1980-85) unemployment benefits tripled. 
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1970s, became subordinate to an administration of handing out benefits the 
following decade. Moreover, as the social work culture of the Municipal Social 
Services and their street level staff was primarily directed at the well being of 
clients, a major argument concerned staff not taking responsibility for the 
beneficiary's labour market integration. This was considered to be an alien 
trade to them, and one that they considered pointless anyway because of 
poor economic conditions (Van den Brande et aI1994:12). 
In the 1980s, the 'permissive and sometimes fatalistic attitude' (Van der Veen 
and Trommel 1998: 12) of the Municipal Social Services came under 
increasing criticism. It was argued that they were making social assistance 
clients worse off as dependency for many unemployed people threatened to 
become structural. Moreover, when issues of fraud and misuse of benefits 
turned out to be more serious than thought, the functioning of the Municipal 
Social Services came under ever more scrutiny, pressuring them to 
differentiate between the deserving and the undeserving poor. On the one 
hand, this led to attempts to specify rules and obligations, to an increasing 
selectivity of the system and to a growth in inspection of clients and 
monitoring of front line staff. On the other hand it also led to a rearrangement 
of responsibility, authority and the partial deregulation of social assistance in 
1991 (Van der Veen and TrommeI1998:12). 16 
Such moves were taken in the context of a wider 'Social Renewal Policy', 
presented by central government as the flagship of its general 
16 Van Oorschot and Smolenaars (1993) argue that such steps were taken partly because of 
central government's distaste of local income assistance policies. 
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decentralisation policy. Launched in an attempt to combat multifaceted social 
problems such as juvenile crime, high unemployment among ethnic 
minorities, deteriorating neighbourhoods and the isolation of the elderly, the 
policy was to be implemented at the lowest possible level. In order to ensure 
that the problems could be tackled in their totality, existing bureaucratic 
structures needed to be broken down and new co-operation lines between 
services and institutions to be developed (Van Oorschot and Smolenaars 
1993:8). 
The decentralising legislation effectively saw a number of provisions, formally 
financed from separate budgets brought under the definition of Bijzondere 
Bijstand. In particular, directing monies to the labour market reintegration of 
social assistance beneficiaries was one of the explicit aims of the 
decentralisation of Bijzondere Bijstand by central government. Van Oorschot 
and Smolenaars (1993: 18/19) argue that by devolving more discretion to 
municipalities in the administration of Bijzondere Bijstand, a more effective 
targeting of 'people in real need' was intended.17 To this end, central 
guidelines with regard to calculating a person's financial bearing power, 
established in 1980, were abolished, with the effect that municipalities could 
again decide whom those in real need were (Nota van Toelichting 1989/90).18 
17 The respondent from the Vereniging Nederlandse Gemeenten (VNG) (Associati,on of 
Dutch Municipalities) argued that decentralisation occurred because of the complaints by 
local government of their inflexibility to meet the needs of their inhabitants under the 
centralising rules. The respondent implied that central government could never have a correct 
understanding of 537 communities. 
18 The proviso being that the threshold value still exists. 
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This decentralisation also brought with it significant changes in the financial 
arrangements for Bijzondere Bijstand however. Instead of central government 
meeting 90% of the cost of Bijzondere Bijstand, municipalities were to receive 
an annual fixed lump sum 19 into their Gementefonds or general budget: from 
which they could decide how much to spend on the special expenses of their 
inhabitants. 20 Social assistance then consisted of a basic benefit that was to 
be the same for all clients and of a bonus which was dependent on the living 
conditions of clients. Municipalities were to establish the rights of these 
citizens to such a bonus, but they also had to finance them. Therefore the 
deregulation of social assistance was effectively accompanied by the impetus 
for municipalities to limit their discretion (Van der Veen and Trommel 
1998:12). 
Activation measures to stimulate the labour force participation of social 
assistance recipients were also initiated in this time period. The duties of the 
clients were laid down in clear terms, and an indication of this change was the 
introduction of 'reorientation talks' in 1988 initiated by the Ministry of Social 
Affairs. The Ministry stipulated that the labour market chances of all 
beneficiaries should be assessed on a regular basis. This measure can be 
seen as one of the first concrete outputs of active labour market policy, and 
represented a change in emphasis for the Municipal Social Services and its 
organisational culture (Van den Brande et al 1994:13). The functional 
19 Van Oorschot and Smolenaars (1993: 19) argue that municipalities have to do more with 
this form of assistance but with a fixed and expectedly too low budget. They further argue that 
essentially, this situation might be expected to have implications for the client groups that ~ill 
benefit from such provision: households with the best chances on the labour market being 
favoured over those handicapped by age, health or long term unemployment. 
20 Rather than accounting for outputs, the concern seems currently to be on municipalities 
producing evidence on the results of their local anti-poverty measures (VNG respondent.). 
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decentralisation of the labour provisions in 1991 also had implications for the 
Municipal Social Services, who were then supposed to co-operate with the 
labour provisions in order to contribute to the creation of a just and efficient 
labour market intermediation (Van den Brande et al 1994: 13). 
Influenced both by public debate and central regulation, the Municipal Social 
Services tried to regain their legitimacy by further improving their 
management and administrative performance. By the mid 1990s therefore, 
active labour market policy had become an integral aspect of a broader 
process of organisational and administrative reform for most Municipal Social 
Services. Tendencies towards specialisation and 'new' management 
concepts - such as standard operating procedures - were introduced usually 
alongside automation. One of the more important developments for the 
purposes of this chapter was the introduction of 'Individual Trajectory 
Monitoring' (Individue/e Traject Bege/eiding, /TB)21 for clients in social, 
education and work experience projects. Clients with a certain distance 
(measured in 4 phases) from the labour market were to be guided and trained 
to a level which should enable them to compete in the labour market (Van den 
Brande et al 1994:14). Special units were created for this purpose, 
sometimes by the Municipal Social Services themselves but also in co-
operation with the labour provisions or by a third party when it is contracted 
out. 
21 This was referred to by policy makers and administrators as a 'traject'. 
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Van den Brande et al (1994:14) argue that whilst the embracing (after some 
initial doubts) of active labour market policy by most Municipal Social Services 
as a new social instrument is striking, in general the Municipal Social Services 
have tried to find a balance between social work and active labour market 
policy, which has had unintended consequences. The authors argue that 
Individual Monitoring has caused a classification of clients into 'good', 'bad' 
and 'no' chance on the labour market. The consequences of this can be that 
the labour office integrates clients with 'good' labour market chances; the 
clients with 'bad chances' are taken up by individual monitoring organisations 
and the ones with 'no chances' are left in the hands of the municipal worker. 
In 1996 legislation further defined the evidence that the social assistance 
client had to provide concerning their earnings and living situations, and the 
client was also obliged to co-operate with investigations into possible fraud 
and violations of administrative rules. The number of obligations was 
increased with respect to job search activities and schooling programmes. 
Van der Veen and Trommel (1998:19) argue that this 'hardening' of the Dutch 
welfare state was well demonstrated by the extension of work duties to lone 
parents. Their 'status apart' was restricted with the 1996 reforms: when their 
children reached the age of 5, lone parents would be expected to become 
active in the labour market. 
Besides the extension of duties, a large variety of financial incentives were 
also introduced to stimulate the labour market behaviour of social assistance 
beneficiaries. These included financial sanctions, but also incentives with 
Bijzondere Bijstand. Such payments were to act as 'carrots' to the labour 
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market and could be written into clients' individual reintegration plans to fund 
childcare or education for example (Van der Veen and Trommel 1998:20). 
Since 1996 then, the organisation of social assistance has been reformed 
based on the principal-agent model, which has essentially been used to re-
arrange the relationship between the state (as legislator) and the local 
municipalities (as administrators). By giving the municipalities responsibility 
for a part of the social assistance budget the government is trying to 
encourage efficiency at the level of daily administration (Van der Veen and 
Trommel 1998:22). 'Managed Liberalisation' of the Dutch welfare state, along 
with increasing the activating character has led to the strengthening of the 
duties of claimants or benefit recipients and social rights have gradually 
become more conditional. These attempts changed the administrative culture: 
from 'lenient and friendly' it has gradually become more rigorous and coercive 
(Van der Veen and Trommel 1998:22). 
In sum, as the preceding sections have demonstrated, the origins of a 
national and comprehensive income maintenance system in Britain and the 
Netherlands essentially led to different traditions of cash/care, local/national 
social assistance and exceptional need provision. Subsequent central 
government responses to similar challenges of economic recession and rising 
(long-term) unemployment in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Le. the reform 
of administrative structures and increasing conditionality in social assistance 
benefits) had therefore to be implemented through existing structures and with 
existing policy in place in both countries. Whilst such changes led to 
exceptional need schemes which may broadly be described as decentralised, 
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budget limited and discretionary, at the level of administration the Dutch 
system was firmly situated within an 'activity fare' social assistance, whilst the 
Social Fund in Britain remained separated largely from 'welfare to work' 
policy. 
Given that such diverse social assistance configurations might be expected to 
influence the frame of reference of those who make discretionary decisions on 
the needs of social assistance beneficiaries, the following part of the chapter 
documents both the policy aims and the organisational contexts as they were 
at the time of research. 
Policy aims and organisational structures 
The following section outlines the aims of policy and the organisational 
contexts of administration in both countries under study. Drawing on the 
theoretical propositions outlined in the previous chapter, it highlights that 
administrative discretion in Britain is more tightly constrained than in the 
Netherlands. Social fund Officers' discretion is structured by the national 
Social Fund decision makers guide, by managerialist organisational 
requirements of meeting targets for clearing work and by their obligation of 
managing a devolved budget. Further, the structure of the 'Social Fund 
Section' can essentially be seen as geared to processing a large number of 
exceptional need applications in accordance with these accountability (i.e. 
budgets and targets) measures. The Dutch administrators on the other hand 
are responsible overall for activating their clients either socially or to the 
labour market and their discretionary decisions in respect of exceptional need 
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payments are less constrained by central (or local) directions than in Britain. 
Rather, their constraints in discretionary decision making are more likely to 
arise from their perceptions of clients' reciprocal behaviour - or the lack of it _ 
for the receipt of social assistance benefit. 
Britain 
At the time of the research, the Social Fund Guide (SFG) for decision-makers 
stated that, 'the Social Fund is a scheme to help people with needs which are 
difficult to meet from regular income' (SFG, 1000), and that it was comprised 
of two distinct parts. The first was a regulated scheme, providing entitlement 
to maternity, funeral, cold weather and winter fuel payments for people 
satisfying certain qualifying conditions. Given the specific interest in 
discretionary decision making in this thesis, this part of the Social Fund is of 
less interest than the second, which was described as 'a discretionary 
scheme under which people may be eligible in certain circumstances for a: 
• Community Care Grant (CCG) - intended to meet, or help meet, a need 
for community care. 
• Budgeting Loan (BL) - to meet or help meet an intermittent expense. 
• Crisis Loan - to meet, or help meet, an immediate short term need'. 
Applicants generally had to be on a 'qualifying benefit', essentially Income 
Support or income-based Jobseeker's Allowance for CCGs (but could apply if 
leaving care within six weeks (hospital or prison for example) before the 
receipt of a qualifying benefit) and Budgeting Loans. For the latter the 
applicant must have been in receipt of a qualifying benefit for a period of six 
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months. Crisis Loans were not restricted to those on a qualifying benefit, but 
did have strict eligibility criteria in respect of the level of need: a Crisis Loan 
should essentially only have been awarded where it constituted the only 
means of avoiding serious damage or risk to the health or safety of the 
applicant or member of the applicants family, unless the need was for rent in 
advance when the applicant was leaving institutional or residential care (SFG 
4701). The decision-makers guide containing the national Directions issued 
by the Secretary of State was over 200 pages long, sufficient to say here then 
that such a number of Directions will greatly constrain the decision-makers 
discretion. Furthermore, such constraints will be compounded by their 
organisational context, discussed below, of being required to work to targets 
and manage a budget. 
Starting from the top of the hierarchical structure, this section will describe the 
organisation of the Social Fund section within a local office at the time of 
research, drawing primarily on the main office in which research was 
conducted. 
The annual budget for the Social Fund was awarded by the Department for 
Work and Pensions (DWP) to Districts in the UK, which contained a number 
of local offices. The local office processed all claims for (social insurance and 
social assistance related) benefit in (back office) sections. There was a public 
reception area for customers where they could enquire about the range of 
social security benefits, the Social Fund included. Of particular importance in 
this respect was the 'counter staff', the more experienced of whom were quite 
knowledgeable about the range of benefits available and who often acted as 
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gatekeepers, 'advising' people as to which of the Social Fund payments they 
might have wanted to apply for. Whilst many of the Social Fund applications 
were made by post, applicants requesting a review of a decision, or applying 
in person at the office for a Crisis Loan would usually be interviewed in a 
separate (and sometimes screened, as in partitioned) cubicle. 
Social Fund sections were made up of a number of Civil Service staff each 
with different duties. The Higher Executive Officer (HEO) or Social Fund 
Manager (SFM) was answerable to the (Assistant) District Manager(s) and 
was responsible for setting local priorities. This involved monitoring the District 
budget and advising staff accordingly as to what (high, medium or low) priority 
items should be met. The SFM also worked closely with other (private, public 
and voluntary) organisations in the local area in order to ascertain needs and 
disseminate information about the Social Fund. In each office there were a 
number of 'Social Fund decision makers' (Executive Officer grade) who were 
also known by their previous title: Social Fund Officers (SFOs). 22 
Social Fund decision-makers had a number of 'Social Fund key work 
objectives'. These included a focus on 'active customer focused services' and 
targets for accuracy in decision-making. Claims clearance times - i.e. targets 
- were given in order to 'contribute effectively to the achievement of secure 
and accurate service'. Other objectives included 'effectively managing the 
Community Care Grant budget; accepting responsibility for business results 
22 Essentially however the decision-makers (Social Fund Officers) were not formally constrained by the 
Social Fund Manager. 
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and demonstrating a commitment to the policies and culture of the agency'. 
When requested, they undertook a review of their colleagues' decisions. 
The responsibilities of the A4s (administrative officer) in the local office were 
mostly, but not wholly, concerned with non-discretionary payments from the 
Social Fund. Their objectives included accurately calculating entitlements to 
Budgeting Loans, maternity and funeral claims and contributing towards 
targets as outlined in the District Business Plan. They were required to 
accurately action 'work available reports' and mail on a daily basis. Further, 
they were responsible for accurately implementing and controlling the 
recovery23 of Social Fund loans and referrals for civil proceedings, thus 
making an effective contribution towards District recovery targets. They were 
required to deal professionally with enquiries from both internal and external 
customers, and reply to written and telephone enquiries. When requested, 
they were required to comprehensively gather information on Crisis Loan 
applications (which might involve speaking with the applicant) to enable 
accurate decision making by Social Fund Officers. 
A 1 s (administrative assistant) in the local office were required to accurately 
register Social Fund applications for the decision-makers thus contributing to 
clearance targets, accurately maintain transfers of Social Fund documents, 
file Social Fund documents on a daily basis and maintain stationery stocks on 
a fortnightly basis. 
23 'Recoveries': trying to trace people with an outstanding debt to the Social Fund who have 
(mostly) left benefit. 
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The objectives and targets that Social Fund staff are given to work with might 
be argued to be in line with the process of New Managerialism in public 
management outlined earlier in the chapter. The stress on meeting targets 
and agency objectives for any given member of staff is further underlined and 
enforced by the performance related pay system introduced in the 1980s and 
1990s (Waine 2000:237). 
The Netherlands 
As seen, the Dutch municipalities were responsible for the administration of 
the nationally financed social assistance benefit Aigemene Bijstandswet 
(ABW). While the primary stated objective of ABW was to provide a 
guaranteed income to all Dutch citizens in need, subsidiary aims included the 
prevention of long-term dependency on benefits and the promotion of social 
integration (Ministry for Social Affairs and Employment in Eardley et al 
1996:273). At the time of the research, the national social assistance rates in 
the Netherlands were linked to the Dutch minimum wage: couples received 
100% of the minimum wage, single parents 70% and the rate for single 
people was 50% of the minimum wage. In the latter two claimant categories 
however, a 20% supplement could be claimed if the beneficiary could prove to 
the municipality that they did not co-habit. 
The latter context then, effectively set the national and standardised 
framework within which all of the Dutch municipalities were obliged to offer 
social assistance. Anti-poverty policy in the Netherlands however, was both a 
national and a local concern and each level of government had its own 
responsibilities. The following subsection considers the local policy making 
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context as it was at the time of the research. Although set in a national 
framework, the benefits which will be outlined and described, could 
theoretically exhibit a great deal of diversity across municipalities. The 
following sections therefore will refer specifically to the municipalities in which 
the study was conducted. 
Dutch municipalities had three main sources of income. Funds were raised 
through local taxes and funds were also received from national government 
for the implementation of specific goals. Of particular concern to the present 
research is the third source of income from the 'Gemeentefonds' known as 
the general or municipal fund. The latter was essentially a budget devolved 
from central government to the local level without an earmark. Some of the 
broad goals for this devolved fund however were set within a general 
agreement between local and national levels of government that there was a 
need for a policy against poverty. It was within this loose framework that the 
Dutch municipalities created their own anti-poverty policy with reference to 
their own local context and concerns. While Dutch municipalities were 
obliged to take steps to prevent situations of poverty, the Gemeentefonds was 
classed as general means. Consequently not all of the funds necessarily had 
to be spent on anti-poverty policy. 
The responsibility of central government in anti-poverty measures therefore 
was to define and provide for the broad social minimum via the national and 
standardised social assistance rates. The 537 Dutch municipalities 
conversely, from their Gemeentefonds had the duty, and/or power to create a 
local anti-poverty policy based on what they perceived to be their particular 
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needs, interests and problems. To be able to fine-tune benefits to local and 
personal circumstances, the municipalities had to design and implement an 
assistance supplements policy, comprising the rules under which beneficiaries 
could claim supplements to their basic (ABW social assistance) benefits: 
subsidies for training and education, costs related to (paid) work and special 
needs costs (Van Oorschot 1998:13). 
The form and detail of municipal anti-poverty measures that this general 
budget was spent on therefore varied from one municipality to the next. For 
instance municipalities could administer what might effectively be termed as a 
'blanket' subsidy over and above any national provision to those on social 
assistance or who were reliant on a low income. One such scheme existed in 
the main municipality of research and entailed the social assistance 
beneficiary receiving a few hundred guilders per year for the relief or 
prevention of social isolation. It was thus intended24 for social and cultural 
excursions to the theatre or cinema, or for the membership of sports or other 
clubs. 
It is worth emphasising at this point that such 'blanket' local assistance 
measures were not implemented in all municipalities. The resulting 
geographical diversity and variation in the position of Dutch citizens reliant on 
the social minimum has been pointed out (Muffels and Fouarge 2000:23). 
24 Although, because proof of spending is not required, it can in principle be spent on anything 
the client wishes. 
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Moreover, there seems every reason to suppose that the diversity among 
municipalities will remain a continuing feature of this form of social protection. 
For example, not all municipalities will have large numbers of citizens reliant 
on social assistance or low incomes. Furthermore, complexities in the political 
and religious compositions of the Dutch municipalities might also be thought 
to exert some influence. One respondene5 argued that some of the smaller 
localities employed Calvinistic conceptions of the causes of poverty. As a 
consequence, there may be no well-developed municipal anti-poverty policies 
and those in need are encouraged to turn to the church rather than be cared 
for by the state. Because of the extensive decentralisation of Dutch social 
assistance, it has been argued that such provision now lacks a 'collective 
characte~6, (Van Oorschot 1998: 14) with in an income maintenance system 
often characterised as all encompassing. 
Notwithstanding the latter point, a common instrument used in the prevention 
of poverty by the Dutch municipalities was the meeting of special needs on an 
individualised basis with Bijzondere Bijstand. As seen, municipalities, 
although obliged to offer such individual assistance could, from their general 
budget, decide what amounts were to be spent on meeting such needs. 
Support could be expressed in the form of meeting either a one-off, or a 
continuing need that a given individual might have had. Municipalities were 
relatively free to decide on eligibility criteria and circumstances that warranted 
the granting of this type of assistance and could implement their own means 
25 VNG representative. 
26 Such lack of standardisation however, seems of no concern to local policy makers, who 
seem to enjoy and guard these powers (interviews with local policy makers). 
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tests in considering the financial bearing power of those on a low income (Van 
Oorschot and Smolenaars 1993:18/19). There was a nationally stipulated 
threshold value for such assistance however. Any need below this monetary 
amount was classed as being a general cost that should be met from general 
social assistance benefit rather than a special cost. 
Bijzondere Bijstancf7 exhibited a concern for individual development, and 
seemed to respond to relatively diverse needs. For instance, provision could 
be used to meet ongoing regular payments for special dietary and medical 
costs, for furniture in special28 cases and to acquire the skills to work. In this 
respect, Eardley et al (1996:279) noted that the most common items for which 
regular extra payments were made included re-training costs, dietary needs, 
special medical costs, childcare, transport, and household help. However, the 
authors further pointed to a lack of continuity in the kinds of costs met by the 
municipalities administrating Bijzondere Bijs tan d, a finding not wholly 
unexpected, when we consider that municipalities could both define a special 
need and determine the circumstances and conditions which warranted 
support. 
Both of the municipal offices included in the present research administered 
Bijzondere Bijstand in recognition of the services provided by municipal credit 
banks (Gemeentelijke Kredietbank) for which there are no British equivalents 
(Tester 1987:11). Such banks effectively take account of 'social 
27 Bearing in mind the previous definition of what the general and national social assistance 
rates are thought to cover. . 
28 The general social assistance rates (are supposed to) cover f~rnlture n.e~ds. However, a 
woman leaving her partner and setting up home for example, might be eligible for such a 
payment. 
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circumstances' when providing (sometimes not commercially viable) loans to 
those on a low income (Tester 1987: 11). In theory, as Tester (1987: 18) notes, 
clients requesting an exceptional payment from the local municipal office 
should be referred on to the credit bank. Only if refused a loan by the credit 
bank should they then (re)apply to the municipal office. 
At the time of research, The Dutch labour market was characterised by high 
employment growth, a large share of part time employment and low levels of 
unemployment. However, this 'Dutch job miracle' (Hemerijck et al 2000:229), 
coincided with a large share of long-term unemployment, and a substantial 
number of temporary jobs (Muffels and Fouarge 2000: 16). There was thus a 
local policy concern - expressed by national organisations, local policy makers 
and administrators alike - that the long-term unemployed reliant on social 
assistance and the growing number of unfilled vacancies be actively matched. 
In the context of the latter concern however there was a realisation by local 
policy makers that citizens in need and reliant on social assistance as a form 
of income maintenance were not a homogenous group. As Van Oorschot 
noted (1998: 13) it had 'been realised that nearly half of the social assistance 
beneficiaries ha(d) very little real chance on the labour market', albeit perhaps 
for different reasons. In effect, at the local level this necessitated 
differentiating between those clients thought able to work and those with 
(severe) physical, psychological or social problems. While the latter client 
groups would be expected to remain (in the interim at least) on social 
assistance and be 'socially' activated, for others who might have drug or 
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alcohol addictions or severe debt problems, work activation measures were 
considered. Without such measures the Dutch employment 'miracle' would 
have been left to choose from a pool of long-term unemployed beneficiaries 
who, policy makers and administrators argued, did not possess such basic 
job-skills as 'getting out of bed at seven o'clock in the morning,.29 As the 
chapter describes (below), it was the municipal administrator's job to manage 
this process of social and labour market activation. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, organisational hierarchies and divisions in the 
administration of social assistance varied from one municipality to the next. 
One of the municipalities included in the present research had recently 
situated their workers in one of the new Centre for Work and Income3o 
establishments. Here there were two sets of so-called 'consulents': one 
responsible for social assistance income and one for work seeking behaviour. 
They were required to liaise with each other about any given client. Further, 
there were supervisory decision-makers situated in the building, who checked 
their discretionary decisions and acted as a reference point for staff if they 
had any questions on policy. 
In the municipality in which most of the research was conducted the situation 
was different and a little more complex due to an ongoing process of changing 
administrative practices towards a more intensive case-management system. 
There were thus two sets of administrators: consulents and case-managers. 
Both consulents and case-managers were required to administer social 
2~his was a common concern in the interviews with policy makers and administrators. 
30 Essentially along the lines of the Jobcentre Plus: one point of contact for all people of 
working age dealing with work and benefits. 
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assistance and check that clients were meeting reciprocal obligations (these 
tasks were separated in the municipality mentioned above). The major 
difference was that case-managers had more time to allocate to their (smaller 
number of) clients. In the case of Bijzondere Bijstand the case-manager's 
discretion was broadened and they were encouraged to work more to the to 
'spirit' of the legislation. Under this new system the social assistance 
beneficiary would be required to sign a written and binding contract detailing 
the mutual contractual obligations of both themselves and the municipality. 
In short the central point to make here is that both consu/ents and case-
managers were, in the main research municipality, responsible for the clients 
social assistance income as well as being concerned with the activation of 
individuals into, what Spies and Van Berkel (2001: 1 05) called, an 'activity 
fare'. This included both work-related activities and programs for social 
activation (for example participating in neighbourhood groups). Again, as in 
the former municipality, discretionary decisions were checked on a regular 
basis by supervisory 'decision-makers' although, at the time of conducting 
interviews, it had not yet been decided as to whether the case-managers' 
decisions were to be checked in this way. 
Gonsu/ents and case-managers were thus concerned to take note of 
information31 (which may have been compiled previously by a colleague) 
31 In order to combat regional differences two 'standardising' instruments were being 
introduced: a computerised information system containing in~or~atio~ on the .historical 
backgrounds of clients which are to be used by. all organlsatlo~s I~ the field of work and 
income provision. Clients will also be measured In terms of their distance from the labour 
market. (Spies and Van Berkel 2001 :125). 
117 
provided on the applicant's 'distance from the labour market', measured in 
four 'phases', which the client should be moved along. The consulent or case-
manager then had to devise the client's Individuele Traject 8egeleiding 
colloquially known as a traject, which should be tailored to the individual's 
needs and possibilities, in order to ensure the clients integration into work or 
social participation took place along a smooth chain of command. 
Policy makers in both municipalities stressed that the importance of a smooth 
chain of management for the integration into either work or social participation 
was that such techniques were thought to leave less room for the social 
assistance client to 'fall back on their previous ways'. Therefore, complicated 
social problems as the client may have faced had to be tackled logically and 
continuously on the traject to work, for instance, overcoming drug problems, 
settling debts, and learning to work (again). It was thought that there was little 
point, for example, of offering a course or job vacancy to a social assistance 
client who may be receiving psychiatric help or going through a divorce, 
before they were ready to take it. 
Emphasis on a smooth integration process was further considered to be 
necessary because the administrator had to devise and manage packages 
combining state, private and non-statutory organisations, hence the timing of 
each problem-solving instrument or program had to be managed correctly. As 
the emphasis here is on guiding or managing a client through the process of 
labour market or social integration it might be argued that part of the Dutch 
administrator's role was concerned with reaching a paternalistic social 
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diagnosis: motivating and helping clients with drug or debt problems, where 
the latter 'liked it or not'32 was a core part of the job. 
Within this framework then, consulents and case-managers were required to 
determine the client's entitlement to (nationally set) social assistance33 and, 
over and above this, consider any need for a discretionary ongoing payment 
(for instance for certain medical or dietary requirements) from Bijzondere 
Bijstand. Consulents and case-managers were also responsible for dealing 
with any exceptional need, for example a cooker or a washing machine, that 
the client might later have. When making this discretionary decision, one 
local policy maker stressed that the administrator should keep in mind that 
(where possible) the client's ultimate goal was the labour market. 
We can see then that administrators were charged with different 
responsibilities. The Dutch administrators were responsible for meeting 
exceptional needs of social assistance beneficiaries whilst having to activate 
the beneficiary either socially or to the labour market. The British Social Fund 
officer on the other hand was charged with meeting exceptional need in the 
context of a limited budget and targets for clearing work. Essentially, in 
reference to the 'people processing/people changing' continuum outlined in 
the previous chapter, the Dutch administrators may be hypothesised to be 
more concerned with 'people changing' when compared to their British 
counterparts. Such differences might be expected to go some way to 
informing their discretionary decisions on need, and will be further reflected in 
32 This was encountered 'not often but daily' in the main municipality of research. 
33 As well as any 'local' income measures that they might be entitled to. 
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the qualifications that are required for their respective occupations, discussed 
below. 
Professionals or bureaucrats? The nature of the personnel responsible 
for implementation 
As L0demel (1997: 10) notes, the training and professional orientation of the 
staff employed to implement social assistance and, by extension, exceptional 
need payments varies. In particular, L0demel asserts that, where social 
assistance has remained local and cash-care multifunctional, social workers 
are much more likely to play a central role. This distinction also holds 
between schemes that are discretionary and entitlement based. Discretionary 
schemes will be more likely to employ social workers rather than 
administrative staff to assess applications. 
Bearing in mind the historical origins and development of policy in the 
Netherlands and Britain outlined earlier, the following section of the chapter 
illustrates that the distinctions outlined above hold to some degree in the two 
countries. Such differences, along with their organisational goals and 
contexts, would essentially be expected to be significant for informing staff's 
frame of reference in awarding exceptional payments. 
Essentially, municipalities recruit administrators according to certain 
educational and occupational criteria as well as personal qualities, which are 
thought to be highly relevant by policy makers to the goals of the 
120 
organisation.34 For example, the main municipality of research recruited 
people who had completed a four-year Hoger Beroeps Onderwijs (HBOl5 
course in social and legal services or who could demonstrate equivalent 
intellect and working ability. They were looking for professionals who wanted 
both to move on after 5 years, and with the personality that could respond to 
and cope with stress, aggression and emotion. 
The British administrators conversely were recruited into the Benefit Agency 
mostly on the basis of meeting a number (determined by the grade of staff) of 
'competencies' (for example teamwork; communication and problem solving) 
which were derived from experiential questioning. Educational qualifications 
were also taken into account and depended on the grade of staff that was 
being recruited. 
Conclusion 
Mabbett and Bolderson (1999:50) argue that the central/local systems that 
underlie the structure of state implementation can influence the development 
as well as the nature of any given social policy. This chapter has highlighted 
that the origin of social assistance in Britain and the Netherlands has led to 
different developments in, and traditions of, cash/care social assistance 
provIsion. 
34 Municipal policy makers interviewed asserted that th~y had move? away fro~ recruiti~g 
'social workers' in the mid 1990s which (partly) accords with the changing role outlined earlier 
for the municipal social services in the reintegration of the long term unemployed. However, 
some longer serving members of staff still had a social work background. 
35 Translates to 'higher vocational education' and comprises one year's work experience. 
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Specifically, the origins of national and comprehensive systems of income 
maintenance in Britain and the Netherlands resulted in differences in the 
degree to which national social assistance schemes in both countries were 
centralised and whether, like their Poor Law predecessors, they retained a 
link with 'care'. 
Notwithstanding the different origins of social assistance, a number of 
similarities in the development of policy were highlighted in both countries _ 
specifically moves to and from discretion - in an attempt to resolve the 
respective issues of inequity and rigidity in exceptional need provision. The 
actors involved in resolving these debates however were seen to depend on 
the degree of centralisation: which essentially influenced the outcome. In the 
Netherlands, the origins and development of Bijzondere Bijstand can 
essentially be seen as a representation of a struggle for the definition of need 
between central and local tiers of government. In Britain conversely, moves to 
and from standardisation stem from central government's concerns about 
equity amongst claimants and with containing costs. 
The chapter highlighted that the concern to reform administrative structures 
inherent in the projects of 'Managed Liberalisation' and 'New Managerialism' 
in the Netherlands and Britain respectively, saw the emergence of budget 
limited exceptional need schemes and increased discretion to the locality. 
The degree of centralisation and cash and/or care previously established 
however essentially affected whether or not such provision was incorporated 
in an activating social assistance policy. Whilst Bijzondere Bijstand was firmly 
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situated in an 'activity fare' context, the Social Fund remained largely separate 
from the administration of 'welfare to work'. 
The chapter concluded by hypothesising that the historical origins and 
development of policy in this area would be expected to lead to similarities 
and differences in implementation practises. Before presenting a comparative 
analysis of the divergence observed, chapter 4 outlines and discusses the 
methodological approach adopted. 
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Chapter 4 'Going Dutch': the methodology of doing comparative case-
study research 
Given the concern with identifying and explaining differences and similarities 
in discretionary decision-making within social assistance schemes in Britain 
and the Netherlands, the present research is essentially a qualitative cross-
national case study in the substantive area of social security. 
This chapter outlines and discusses both the methodological approach taken 
and the methods used for the collection and generation of secondary and 
primary data. After justifying the methodological approach employed, an 
account of how and why the methods of sampling, data generation, collection 
and analysis were deemed the most appropriate to meet the aims of the 
research (outlined in chapter 1) is given along with a discussion on their 
benefits and limitations. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the 
validity and wider application of the research findings. 
Methodological approach 
While all social research can be argued to involve comparison of some type 1, 
the term 'cross national' refers explicitly to comparisons between countries 
(May 2001 :200). That said, most scholars in the field use the terms 
comparative and cross-national interchangeably to refer to the 'explicit, 
systematic and contextual analysis of one or more phenomena in more than 
one country' (Kennett 2001 :3; Clasen 1999:2). 2 
1 In the practise of social research, 'the choice to study an aspect of human relations 
represents selectivity via comparison' (May 2001 :205). .' . 
2 Bearing in mind the warnings forwarded in regards to treating nations or .countnes as. distinct 
homogenous entities: we can not assume that people sharing a geographical space will share 
a culture (May 2001 :201). 
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As in the social sciences generally perhaps, there is no consensus as to what 
cross-national research is, or should be about (discussed below). There is 
more agreement however regarding the benefits that can be gained from 
employing a comparative cross-national perspective. Comparing an aspect of 
social policy across countries highlights the different mixes (between the 
state, market and family for example) in providing welfare for individuals 
(Clasen 2003:578). Further, understanding and explaining the ways in which 
different societies and cultures experience and act upon similar social, 
economic and political changes (May 2001 :203) may afford an opportunity for 
policy learning or borrowing between them (Clasen 2003:580).3 
Comparisons can also provide us with an 'import-mirror view' (May 2001 :208). 
Dogan (2002:72) argues for instance that, via a dialectical process, the view 
that we gain 'from afar strengthens the perceptions of our own society' so that 
'one knows one's own country better when one knows other countries too' 
(Dogan 2002:72). Moreover, coming from the perspective of an 'outsider' to 
another country can lead researchers to ask questions that those more 
familiar with the system under study would not. Such research endeavours 
can therefore lead us to reflect upon both our own and others' social systems 
and the taken for granted cultural norms and values that underpin them 
(Clasen 2003:581; May 2001 :208). Comparative cross-national analysis can 
therefore be considered as a method of discovery, 'an approach to knowing 
social reality through the examination of similarities and differences between 
3 In this respect Tester's (1987) exploration of social loans in the Netherlands was undertaken 
to learn lessons relevant to the introduction of the proposed Social Fund. 
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data gathered from more than one nation' (Elder 1976:210 quoted in Kennett 
and Yeates 2001 :41). 
As intimated above, there is no agreement as to whether cross-national 
research should be 'descriptive, evaluative or analytical' (Hantrais and 
Mangen 1996: 1). As a case study concerned with discretionary decisions in 
exceptional payment schemes in Britain and the Netherlands essentially the 
present research sets out to 'study particular issues or phenomena in two or 
more countries with the express intention of comparing their manifestations in 
different socio-cultural settings' (Hantrais and Mangen 1996: 1). The explicit 
focus is thus on diversity in the systems of provision and a concern with 
identifying systematic patterns of similarities and differences in order to 
account for diverse responses found (Ragin 1994:108). 
As noted in chapter 2, cross-national case studies of a single policy area in a 
small number of countries such as this are said to constitute the latest 
generation of comparative studies (Abrahamson 1999:409; Clasen 1999:3; 
Mabbett and Bolderson 1999:48). Methodologically therefore they are related 
to a wider tradition of comparative research. Taking a case-study approach 
can essentially be contrasted with 'grand theories' of political and economic 
development that are essentially interested in identifying either convergence 
or divergence, where hypotheses are derived by the researcher from theory 
and then tested (Mabbett and Bolderson 1999:41). Chapter 2 highlighted that, 
to date, most large-scale comparative work in social assistance has outlined a 
number of broad trends in provision (Ditch 1999; Gough 1998). Although 
useful for identifying 'universal trends' in advanced industrial societies such 
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research can essentially be accused of underestimating the impact of cultural 
differences (Hantrais and Mangen 1996:5). 
Whilst theories of economic convergence were used for the generation of 
deductive hypotheses in the present research, inductive methods were also 
used in order to consider factors of divergence. The research was designed to 
facilitate a more interactive relationship between theory and observation. 
Such a methodological approach is as stated in chapter 2, closely associated 
with Esping-Andersen's (1990; 1999) thesis on worlds of welfare capitalism, 
which argues that different welfare state regimes will respond differently to the 
same 'global ising forces'. 
Essentially then, the present research sought to understand and explain 
empirically observed differences and similarities in the administration of 
exceptional need payments by reference to the socio-economic context and 
historical evolution of policy in this area in Britain and the Netherlands. This 
necessitated an interpretative and qualitative understanding which is reflected 
in the data sources and methods: analysis of documents (official policy and 
academic) and in-depth interviews with the use of vignettes with 
administrators of exceptional payments in both countries. As discussed below, 
such a methodological approach meant that 'linguistic and cultural factors 
could not be downplayed' (Hantrais and Mangen 1996:5). 
Methods 
Whilst it is argued that there is no distinct social science cross-national 
method (Mabbett and Bolderson 1999:34), it is widely recognised that 
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employing a cross national perspective adds to methodological problems. 
Specifically, the generation of comparable data, identifying or constructing 
appropriate concepts that can be applied across countries, and achieving a 
sufficient sensitivity towards the different historical and cultural contexts in 
which national social policies are embedded (Clasen 2003:579) can be 
particularly problematic and can ultimately challenge the validity of cross 
national findings. 
After justifying the choice of countries included in the research, the chapter 
will outline the strategies and associated challenges that arose in applying the 
qualitative methodology cross nationally and provide an account of how the 
issues involved in accessing, collecting, generating and analysing primary and 
secondary data were overcome. 
Choice of countries 
The selection of countries for a cross-national study needs to be justified not 
least because the choice of countries or cases for comparison will affect the 
research questions that can be asked (Ebbinghaus 2003:13). The issue of 
how similar or different the countries included for study can be seems 
contingent on the theoretical justification offered by the researcher (Dogan 
and Pelassy 1990). It is only within a given theoretical framework that 
research questions, and hence choice of countries will seem meaningful 
(0yen 1990:4). 
Given the present focus on diversity in exceptional need schemes, Britain and 
the Netherlands constitute a potentially interesting comparison and meet 
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Ragin's (1994: 113) criteria of 'sharing membership in a meaningful, 
empirically defined category, and offering some potential for advancing social 
scientific thinking'. As chapter 3 demonstrated, Britain and the Netherlands 
both have developed welfare states, with programmes in place to meet the 
exceptional needs of those on social assistance. However, whilst the present 
schemes share some broad similarities, it was further demonstrated that the 
historical development of these schemes have led to different configurations 
of social assistance and exceptional need payments, which set the context for 
implementation and inform the administrative frameworks for the award of 
discretionary payments. 
The selection of countries included in the research was also contingent on the 
topic area. Given the lack of in-depth comparative research on social 
assistance and exceptional need payments the choice of research questions 
and countries initially seemed unlimited. However, when attempting to 
construct a manageable research project, too little knowledge in the area of 
interest can prove frustrating. As Hantrais and Mangen (1996:3) rightly point 
out 'gaps in knowledge' can prevent effective cross-national comparisons, 
essentially because, at the very least, 'mapping' or descriptive comparative 
work across countries is a prerequisite for building hypotheses. Practical 
issues also influenced and confirmed the choice of countries. Firstly, the 
student capitalised on her familiarity with the UK's culture and system of 
provision. Secondly, having established a theoretical justification for 
comparison with the Netherlands, the student was able to benefit from 
contacts established between the primary supervisor of the thesis and a 
Dutch academic in the field. Ultimately then, countries and questions were 
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chosen according to the research topic, theoretical framework and prior 
knowledge of cases (Ebbinghaus 2003:13). 
Comparing Britain and the Netherlands fundamentally affected access to, and 
the quality and comparability of, data for analysis (Hantrais and Mangen 
1996:6). Given that the findings of this study ultimately rest on one person's 
analysis and interpretation of documents and in-depth interviews, the 
following section discusses the issues that were involved in accessing the 
secondary and primary data sources needed. 
Accessing documents 
Access to a wide and more varied range of secondary data (in this case 
academic and official, policy related, literature) than is provided by a single 
country study is one of the main advantages of comparative work. However, 
several issues can render the collection of such data problematic (Mabbett 
and Bolderson 1994:34). In case research - where one aim is to locate trends 
in relation to the wider social context - secondary data is required about a 
range of background factors. Given that the researcher was based in the UK, 
it was relatively simple to get both the academic and official sources required 
for that country's system of provision. In the case of the Netherlands however 
obtaining sources in the English language was more difficult and 
methodological issues raised by documentary analysis were compounded by 
the cross-national element. 
In particular, initial familiarity with the Dutch system had to be gained almost 
entirely from secondary academic and policy texts written in English (see 
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below). Many of these up to date (1998/99) writings stressed that 'social 
workers' were responsible for the implementation of social assistance and 
initial hypotheses in the first few months of the research project were 
generated accordingly. On the first research visit to the Netherlands however , 
conversations with local policy makers, made it apparent that recruitment 
criteria had changed in the previous 5 years or so and social workers were no 
longer specifically recruited by municipalities for the administration of social 
assistance. 
Whilst this did not necessitate an abandonment of the research focus, it does 
highlight the difficulties involved in generating hypotheses for empirical 
research in more than one country from secondary sources and the 
importance of early research visits. Such visits however are obviously 
constrained by issues of cost. In the present case, the student was fortunate 
enough to receive funds from COSTA 13 for a 'short-term scientific' project of 
two weeks duration. This initial visit was used to cultivate networks for the 
main research and fieldwork visits. 4 
A recognised issue where secondary sources are to be used in cross national 
research is the availability of comparable data, and the fact that data sets do 
not always exist in a standard format for the topic of interest in all of the 
countries under study. Such issues can potentially invalidate comparisons or 
make them extremely difficult. In his study of discretionary social assistance 
payments to meet exceptional needs, Ditch (1995:356) had already noted that 
4 This extended visit (discussed further in the chapter) was part funded by the Carnegie Trust 
for the Universities of Scotland. 
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some European governments did not report the amounts spent on these 
payments.5 In the present research, differences in the degree to which 
central/local government were responsible for social assistance provision 
essentially meant that there were differences in collecting both expenditure 
figures and official policy documents in the two countries under study. For 
example, in the relatively centralised UK system, the national guide for Social 
Fund decision-makers, yearly reports and statistics on national expenditure 
were available to down load from the Internet from one Government 
Department. In the Netherlands conversely, accessing comparable secondary 
data and sources reflected the fact that social assistance provision is the 
concern of both local and national government. The total amount allocated by 
central government for Bijzondere Bijstand was available from one source. 
However, the specific amounts that were actually spent by each municipality 
and the respective guidelines for implementation of policy were firmly local 
concerns and had to be accessed accordingly. 
A further consideration in cross-national research is whether documentary 
sources are available in a language accessible to the researcher. In this case, 
much of the municipal policy material required was not, texts were in the 
Dutch language and the researcher had limited capabilities in this respect. 
Therefore the material needed had to be (selectively) translated into English. 
Given the potential costs of employing a commercial agency for this, two 
Dutch nationals resident in the UK - both of who had excellent bi-lingual skills, 
5 As Hantrais and Mangen (1996:8) note, in some countries information may be more limited 
or even non-existent on a particular policy output because the issue has attracted less 
attention from policy makers. 
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were employed to assist with translations and some basic Dutch language 
lessons for the researcher. 6 
The chapter now turns to those issues that were encountered in accessing 
participants for the qualitative in-depth interviews in both countries. First 
however, a brief rationale for the sampling procedure adopted is given. 
Sampling 
Given that the empirical work was in part concerned to test, develop and 
generate theory on administrative action or practices (using concepts such as 
'people-processing' and 'people changing') offices and administrators in both 
countries were sampled in the light of these theoretical concerns (Strauss and 
Corbin 1990: 176). Because of the sampling strategy adopted, the research 
can make no claim to being representative of the wider population of interest 
in either country. However, given the aims of the research, the latter point 
was thought to be of less importance. That said, Lipsky's (1980) assertion that 
the coping routines and behaviour of social service agency staff, might in part 
be contingent on the area in which they work (degree of poverty; amount of 
applicants/case-loads per administrator) did inform the geographical areas 
that were included in both countries. Such assertions did not prescribe the 
offices chosen however, ultimately because of the challenges encountered in 
gaining access to offices (particularly in Britain), which are highlighted below. 
6 One agency quoted a figure of £500 for a few days work. 
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Accessing local and municipal offices 
The empirical research discussed below was conducted during an extended 
field visit to the Netherlands in the summer (May - July) of 2001, and in 
Britain during the winter/spring 2001/02. On site interviews were carried out 
with 25 street-level staff in two municipal offices in the Netherlands (in 
addition, 3 municipal policy makers, a local politician, a representative from 
the VNG and several Dutch academics in the field were also interviewed). In 
Britain, 17 street-level Social Fund staff in three local offices (see Appendix 1 
for details of participant's gender) were interviewed. Whilst assurances of 
anonymity of location?, staff and customers were crucial factors for 
respondents' participation in the research there was essentially no single 
successful strategy for accessing each research location. 
Those who implement discretionary payments in both countries are 
government officials, who therefore work in government institutions. As many 
commentators have argued, accessing institutional settings can require that 
the researcher gain consent from gatekeepers who have the power to grant 
permission that research be carried out (Burgess 1991 :195; Homan 1991 :83; 
Mason 1996:57). Duke (2002:39) notes the political dimensions involved in 
conducting research on elites in the policy network and negotiating access to 
those who, rather than being the 'objects' of policy, are in the relatively 
powerful position of 'making' policy. She argues however that 'there is a 
paucity of methodological and reflexive accounts' (2002:41) of how elite 
populations are researched. 
7 For this reason offices will remain anonymous and staff are not given pseudonyms. 
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The following section of the chapter highlights that, in line with the principle of 
informed consent (Bulmer 1982), gaining access was a multi-layered and on-
going process with participants. It illustrates that, whilst the consent of those 
at the top of the hierarchy was a necessary precondition for accessing such 
settings - for different reasons in both countries - it did not guarantee the 
participation of the discretionary decision-makers. 
The Netherlands 
Primarily, consent was negotiated with policy makers and senior managers in 
municipal offices who agreed, in principle, to the research and subsequently 
acted as a point of initial contact between the researcher and the street-level 
decision-makers. In both locales, policy-makers forwarded a letter of 
introduction to the street-level staff from the researcher, which briefly 
explained the research and invited them to contact the researcher bye-mail. 
Whilst this meant that participation was entirely voluntary the initial response 
rate was low. It subsequently transpired during one of the first interviews that 
some potential respondents were quite anxious about conducting an interview 
in English that dealt with the technicalities of administering social security 
benefits.8 However, their inquisitiveness in the research and their colleagues' 
assurances that it 'wasn't so bad' to conduct an interview about their work in 
the English language eventually overcame their fears. 
In the second municipality in which letters of introduction had been left 
however there were evidently no such powerful feelings of inquisitiveness to 
8 One of the first respondents stated that they had been so worried about the interview that 
they had spent the weekend with a Dutch/English dictionary looking up English words like 
'policy'. 
135 
overcome any language fears. After seven weeks, and several phone calls to 
the point of contact no respondents had come forward. The strategy adopted 
here was to take up an invitation previously offered by a local politician to 
'shadow' them for the day.9 Hearing the researcher's plight, one brief 
telephone call later and the local politician declared that it 'been arranged' for 
the student to go in to the municipal office the next day. 
Whilst consent was sought individually with all staff interviewed in this office, 
given the manner in which the setting was accessed (from above) the 
researcher can never know how freely staff gave it (Mason 1996:57). What 
the participants did feel free to say however was, with one exception, that they 
wanted to be interviewed in pairs (in fact, in once case there were 3 
participants) so that they could 'help each other' with their English. This 
ultimately had consequences for the quality of the data generated and will be 
discussed further in issues concerning language (below). 
Britain 
In the office in which the majority of the research was conducted in Britain 
initial consent was given from a senior manager who, as in the Netherlands, 
agreed to distribute an introductory letter to the Social Fund staff. Further 
contact was made with the senior figure who voiced that staff had no 
objections to the researcher visiting the office. This office was subsequently 
9 This entailed sitting through eight meetings, all of which were conducted in Dutch. 
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visited one day a week for a period of approximately 6 weeks during which 
time access was further negotiated with each member of staff interviewed. 
Using the strategy above, initial access was again negotiated with a senior 
manager to a second local office. This time however, the street level staff 
refused to participate in the research. Accounts of 'not getting in' to research 
locations are perhaps less written about in methodological texts, partly 
because they can perhaps be seen as an admission of failure. However, 
such encounters essentially constitute data in themselves and their analysis 
can provide 'instructional material' (Punch 1986:14). 
Adhering to the principle of continually seeking consent from participants, staff 
in the second office were informed by the researcher that they were being 
asked to take part in in-depth interviews in which a series of vignettes would 
be used. Discussion between the researcher and staff ensued and ultimately 
staff decided to refuse to participate in the research stating concerns that the 
researcher could be looking at differences in their decision making, and that 
such findings might ultimately be published. As Homan (1991 :78) argues, 
refusal by potential participants can be seen as defensible positions that 
'skilled researchers' should be able to erode, rather than legitimate stands 
that should be accepted and unchallenged. 
In regard to the present study, the researcher did stress to staff that the 
primary interest of the research was differences in decision-making between 
administrators in the two countries, rather than between Social Fund Officers 
in Britain. However, this did not quell staff concerns and they still questioned 
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the need to interview 'more than one officer'. Eventually, they did offer to treat 
the researcher as a 'press and public relations' exercise. This 'interview' 
consisted of the Social Fund Officer sitting with the Social Fund 'manual' 
quoting directions and regulations in response to the vignette scenarios. This 
at least assured the researcher that the data generated in the previous office 
had been rich and relatively unfettered. 
Trying to provide a reflexive account of why consent was refused is quite 
difficult. We can discern that assurances of anonymity were not enough in this 
case to overcome any sensitivity that staff might have felt about (differences 
in) their discretionary decision making. Further, there were wider occupational 
issues for DWP staff at that time, one of which was the proposal to introduce 
un-screened environments for Social Fund staff in Jobcentre Plus offices. 
Because of that experience highlighting that consent from the top of an 
organisational hierarchy does not (and ethically should not) guarantee 
participation from street level staff a different strategy was used to gain 
access to decision-makers in two further local offices in Britain. Essentially 
access was first sought from street-level staff who in turn negotiated consent 
for the researcher to visit the office with those further up the organisational 
hierarchy.10 This strategy however did have drawbacks in that the research 
visits were conducted in one day and hence less time was spent in the offices. 
10 When the researcher telephoned a local office, it was invariably a Social Fund Officer that 
took the initial call. Instead of asking to speak with the Social Fund Manager (as had been the 
previous strategy), the researcher instead explained the research to the Social Fund Officer, 
who subsequently agreed to take part (and ask one or two of their colleagues to do so) and 
moreover to arrange it with their manager. 
138 
Through numerous visits to the two main offices of research in both countries 
, 
a deal of familiarity with the settings was achieved. This also facilitated social 
access and helped ensure a degree of trust between respondents and 
interviewer (argued to be essential in qualitative research for getting 
respondents to 'open up' (May 1997:119)). In the main office in Britain staff 
often voiced that the camaraderie in the office was one of the main benefits of 
their working environments. As 'the student in to get her degree' the 
researcher was not immune to the odd jocular comment. After the first couple 
of visits, a standing joke on the researcher's arrival at the office came from 
one or other participant along the lines of 'you can do the Crisis Loans today 
can't you - you know enough about them by now'. 
One of the primary analytical benefits of spending time in the research setting 
was that it also facilitated some direct (although informal) observation of 
working practises. Without doubt, such observations served an important role 
in contextual ising and substantiating the data gained from in-depth interviews. 
More formal observation of staff client interaction was also carried out in the 
Netherlands when the researcher was invited to sit in on a face to face 
meeting between administrator and a client requesting payment from 
Bijzondere Bijstandfor a washing machine. 
In-depth semi-structured interviews 
On site in-depth qualitative interviews utilising vignettes were carried out with 
administrators of exceptional payments essentially in order to generate an 
understanding of the 'conceptual frameworks of actors in both countries' 
(Mabbett and Bolderson 1999:51). The benefit of flexible qualitative interviews 
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is that they allow the researcher to gain an insight into a given social process 
and to understand the symbolic worlds of participants, thus facilitating a 
greater understanding of the meanings that participants give to their actions 
(Fielding 1993: 157). In ethnographic tradition then, they allow the researcher 
to 'get at' the participant's perceptions and definitions of the situation and 
facilitate an in-depth knowledge of social behaviour. Interviews were semi-
structured (see Appendix 2) and thematic questions were constructed from 
the theoretical literature. Essentially, the interviews were structured enough 
to allow comparability of responses within and between countries and yet 
flexible enough to allow the researcher to probe responses, and allow 
participants to answer more on their own terms than is permitted by a 
standardised interview (May 1997: 123). 
None of the participants refused the request that the interview be tape-
recorded and hence all were. Interviews lasted between 45 minutes and 2 
hours, with the average being just over an hour. Depending on availability, 
interviews were conducted either in screened or un-screened rooms in Britain, 
and entirely in un-screened rooms in the Netherlands. The environment in 
which the interviews were conducted was of course data in itself and said 
something about both the relative levels of demand and the resources 
allocated to provision by Government in both systems. In comparison to 
Britain the interview rooms in the Netherlands were clean,11 air conditioned, , 
had low level lighting, and because there was no screen to spatially partition 
11 As Tester also noted in her comparison of the two locales (1987:40). It is noticeable that, in 
three of the four offices visited for research purposes, staff requested that the student access 
the building via the staff entrance rather than the customer one. 
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client from administrator, felt less hostile, unless one happened to be sitting in 
the 'client's chair' and tried to put this back under the desk when leaving the 
room: impossible, being as it was bolted to the floor. Security guards were 
located in all offices in both countries and hence (although differing in degrees 
of subtlety) there were signs as to the threat of violence. Other indicators of 
their respective working environments came from the surroundings whilst the 
interviews took place. For example, in Britain 'outside' the room one could 
primarily hear bustle from the staff on one side, and the noise from the 
customer side on the other. In the Netherlands, there was a distinct lack of 
noise from the customer side (perhaps because it was further away, or 
because the main wall partition was better sound proofed). 
Interview questions were designed and worded in order to be as non-
threatening as possible. One of the first questions asked, 'how did you come 
to be in this job'?, was particularly helpful in this respect. Whilst it had a firm 
theoretical underpinning (to test Lipsky's (1980) assertion that street level 
bureaucrats seek out their helping professions) it also served as a 'warm up' 
question which immediately seemed to put respondents at ease. Without fail it 
elicited rich, detailed and often quite personal data further indicating a degree 
of trust on the part of participants. 
Given the highly flexible nature of this data generating method, questions 
could be re-worded by the interviewer and responses explored. In both 
countries the method allowed new themes and concepts ('the regulars', , 
'motivation') to emerge in the first interviews that could then be followed up in 
subsequent interviews with respondents. In sum, the interviews were found to 
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be structured enough for comparative purposes yet flexible enough as a 
method of discovery. As discussed below however, there are issues 
concerning 'language' (and hence ultimately understanding) involved in 
applying such a method cross nationally. That said, it is argued here that the 
method itself went some way to overcoming these. 
'The limits of my language mean the limits of my world,12 
One of the benefits of qualitative interviewing or 'conversations with a 
purpose' (Mason 1996:38) is that participants can provide the researcher with 
an in-depth account of their perceptions of their social world. In a cross 
national context, a shared language for communication and understanding 
concepts between researcher and interviewee is crucial. Given that the 
researcher spoke little Dutch, all of the interviews were conducted in English. 
As discussed in regards to accessing participants, some Dutch administrators 
were worried that they would not be able to explain themselves properly or 
would misrepresent themselves and their work by communicating in a 
language which was foreign to them. Administrators perhaps recognised that 
language was not simply a medium for conveying concepts. As Hantrais and 
Mangen (1996:7) note, words are part of a conceptual system that reflect 
institutions, thought processes, values and ideology, implying that the 
approach to a topic and the interpretation of it might well differ, according to 
the language of expression. 
For instance, if a culture has no notion of any given concept, then 
transference, and translation arguably become problematic. There is also the 
12 Wittgenstein (1923) quoted in Winch (1958:18). 
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difficulty of fully understanding the meaning of terms, which within a particular 
national, or indeed organisational, context may have a cultural loading. In the 
present research for example the researcher was initially unsure of the 
meanings attributed by the Dutch administrators to clients they perceived as 
'not motivated'. Was that conceptually comparable to 'lazy'? Through probing 
in numerous interviews however, such meanings gradually became clearer. 
Whilst understanding such cultural meanings was challenging, it was also a 
fascinating and enjoyable process to engage in (there were similar issues 
arising in interviews with Social Fund Officers. On more than one occasion the 
researcher encountered informal terms - administrative concepts of 'regulars' 
for example, - which had to be explained to the researcher and their meaning 
checked in subsequent interviews). Ultimately the process of making, 
interpreting and checking meaning between interviewee and interviewer is 
made absolutely explicit when one party responds in a language foreign to 
them. 
The major difficulty for the Dutch respondents was that they had to translate 
Dutch concepts, into an English equivalent. Thus, May (2001 :216) argues that 
even where the interviewees' command of English is good, there may be 
terms in their own language for which they do not know (or can not 
remember) the English equivalent, and this can lead to ambiguity. Partly this 
can be overcome however, by the method itself. In the present research the 
qualitative interviews were superbly suited to being able to negotiate and 
check meaning and allow a detailed explanation of concepts. 
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For example, the following quote highlights this. The participant in question 
could not remember the English word 'independent'. In order to get meaning 
and understanding across to the researcher they were left with little option but 
to explain the concept of it in detail: 
Participant: in the case of the medical em, situations, where 
people say , I need that because I have medical problems', 
we have eh, contacts with uh, we call it the GG013. 
Researcher: oh, what's that? 
Participant: it's a sort of, I don't know how to say it. A sort of 
hospital, but not, people are not laying in the hospital. But 
there work doctors there and they have uh, a dentist and 
they have for every sort of things they have a specialist 
there. And most, and if (clients) have medical (pauses) I am 
not a doctor and I can not decide for my customer if it is 
necessary for him. So if there comes uh, a request for, we 
send it to the GGO, and he is also uh, how do you say that? 
Uh. So, if people go to their own. They have to go there, 
maybe they have already been earlier to another doctor: 
they still have to go there (to the GGO) because they are not 
Researcher: they're independent? 
Participant: Independent! That's the word! Independent: do 
not know the customer before, so he can make an 
independent advise for us .. 
Whilst the majority of respondents felt comfortable enough to conduct the 
interview unaided14 in English, a sizeable minority of them - notably all of 
whom worked in the second municipality in which access was negotiated with 
13 Gemeentelijke Gezondheids Dienst (Municipal Health service). 
14 It was standard practise for interviewees before hand to forewarn the interviewer that they 
might need 'help with some words'. 
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the local politician mentioned above - did not, and requested that they be 
interviewed together so that they could 'help each other' with their English. 
Jentsch (1998:278) notes that there are two main methodological issues 
raised when interpreters facilitate communication, which are usually 'swept 
under the carpet by researchers'. The first is the effect of a third (and in this 
case sometimes even a fourth) person on the social dynamics of the 
interview. Interpreters are not mere instruments for the transference of 
speech; the interviewer and the interviewee can and will ascribe a more 
active role to them. Indeed, by far the major effect in regards to the present 
research was the change of dynamics from a one to one interview that such 
situations entailed. Subsequent interaction was relatively difficult to manage 
for the researcher. Who to maintain eye contact with when speaking? How to 
probe one interesting response without appearing rude or uninterested in the 
other participants' answers? Given time constraints in conducting interviews 
with up to three people at a time, in the main it worked out that different 
participants gave extended answers to different questions. Moreover, in the 
most extreme case (3 participants together) it was not at all clear as to which 
of the participants' interpretation was being elicited for analysis at any given 
time. 
For example, the following extract illustrates that respondents were 
sometimes concerned to negotiate meaning between themselves, and the 
data generated is therefore more like that gained from the method of a focus 
group (Cronin 2001 :168). 
145 
(discussing scenario 3, see Appendix 3) 
Participant 1: Oh yeah, difficult 
Participant 2: Difficult, because the ex-partner's sold the 
things and that's difficult to prove. 
Participant 3: I think if they can not prove it so, it's always 
difficult. 
Researcher: Because she can not prove 
Participant 3: That the ex partner's sold the things 
Participant 2: And that she had them before 
Participant 3: But when she's six months in that home, 
well I think it's normal that you don't have any stuff then 
Participant 1: But she has first to go to the credit bank 
Participant 3: Yes, of course, it's always first to the credit 
bank .. 
In relation to language, one of the most crucial points for qualitative 
researchers employing the skills of an interpreter would be that the data 
generated between the interviewer and the interviewee has been 'filtered' by a 
third party. This is related to Jentsch's (1998:287) second point: the effect on 
the (counter) transference of speech. Interpreters might 'simplify' answers, or 
change the meaning of a question, which has consequences for the 
faithfulness of the interpretation. In the main however, the respondents' 
English language skills were very good, and most of them only needed the 
odd word translated from their colleague, either an English word spoken by 
the interviewer into Dutch, or a Dutch word translated into English for their 
response. 
Vignettes 
A series of vignettes (see Appendix 3) were also employed in the in-depth 
interviews in order to further elicit and explore the factors informing the 
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administrative frame of reference for the award of discretionary payments in 
both countries. 15 Previous cross-national research in this topic area has used 
vignettes in order to help explain the ways in which social assistance systems 
structure provision to meet exceptional need (Ditch 1995). Whilst this concern 
was not absent from the present research, vignettes were primarily used as a 
tool for eliciting qualitative data from administrators on their perceptions and 
meanings of the deserving and undeserving poor in both countries. 
Vignettes have been defined as 'short descriptions of a person or social 
situation, which contain precise references to what are thought to be the most 
important factors in the decision-making or judgement making process of 
respondents' (Lee 1993:79). The literature on vignettes as a method 
emphasises the usefulness of the technique when the researcher is 
concerned with employing a standardised data collection tool. In the current 
research, presenting the same case scenarios of social assistance 
beneficiaries requesting exceptional payments to respondents ensured a 
degree of standardisation across countries and administrators whilst allowing 
the researcher to explore the two different, administrative groups' responses 
to, and interpretations of, uniform situations (Barter and Renold 1999). 
As well as providing a degree of standardisation however, the vignette is also 
a method which acknowledges that meanings are social and morality may 
well be situationally specific (Finch 1987: 105/106). Thus while vignettes 
allowed the researcher to control the situation presented to respondents, 
15 In an attempt to avoid ambiguity, the vignettes were translated into Dutc~. for the 
administrators in the Netherlands. However, when reading the vignettes aloud, administrators 
translated them into English. 
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participants could define the meaning of the four hypothetical applicants' 
situation In their own terms. By presenting the participant with a set of 
concrete and detailed situations, the vignette elicited administrative 
perceptions, opinions, beliefs and attitudes regarding the deserving and 
undeserving poor, thus helping to derive the cultural and organisational norms 
that informed the administrators' frame of reference and working practises. 
In order to avoid problems of boredom and fatigue (Lee 1993:80) the number 
of vignettes presented to respondents was limited to a total of four. Primarily 
vignettes were constructed with some prior knowledge of the exceptional 
needs that might be met by the respective systems and the theoretical 
writings on the deserving and undeserving poor in mind, thus informing 
whether hypothetical characters were portrayed as able or non able bodied, 
whether they had children and whether they could be perceived as morally 
responsible for their plight or not (Van Oorschot 2000). Further, the length of 
time that hypothetical characters were portrayed as having been on social 
assistance was informed by the dynamics of poverty. 
In constructing the scenarios the researcher attempted to ensure that, as 
Barter and Renold (1999) argue, stories appeared plausible and real to 
participants. However, the authors' suggestion that stories need to avoid 
depicting disastrous events, and should instead reflect 'mundane' 
occurrences was thought not to be appropriate for this research. 
Paradoxically the researcher considered that in order to appear plausible and 
real to participants who administer exceptional need payments stories would, 
in part, have to depict disastrous scenarios. This of course reflects the 
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contextual nature of social research. The scenarios presented to 
administrators were highly recognisable in each country, as the following 
quotes exemplify. 
In Britain, one respondent voiced: 
Participant: They're quite likely scenarios by the way. 
Researcher: are they? 
Participant: Yeah, they are, they're more or less what passes 
across our desks, you know on a regular basis. So they're as 
near the truth as you'll probably get, uh, and we have to 
decide, looking at them individually: pay, don't pay sort of 
thing. So I mean. They're quite good though. I don't know, 
where did you get them? Did you make them up or ? 
Researcher: I did, yeah. 
Respondent: Woah! (laughs) you, you can get a job here 
then! (laughs) Yeah, they're more or less true to life, 
absolutely, yeah. We get them on a regular basis. So yeah, 
you're clued up about what's happening: anytime you want a 
job at the social! 
Similarly, in the Netherlands a supervisory decision-maker commented that: 
Respondent: The cases you brought to us, they were cases 
that are happening, yeah well, all the day .. They are no(t) 
special cases or exceptions .... those cases are our regular 
work, so that's, those are the items that .. I see twenty times 
a day, yeah. And the consulents well, they have them three 
or four times a day .. The people who don't have a job at this 
moment and are depending on the Bijstand we give them, 
well they are the people who have the more, the most 
problems and the less expectations about the future, so the 
things you .. or the cases you brought to us, well, it's one on 
one at this moment. 
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Essentially, the vignettes contained sufficient context for respondents to have 
an understanding about the situation being depicted, but were vague enough 
to 'force' participants to provide and construct additional social factors about 
(their perceptions of) deserving and undeserving clients upon which they 
would base their discretionary decisions. In practise, this initially felt like a 
process of 'appropriation' from the researcher. For example, on occasions in 
the Netherlands, the hypothetical applicant in vignette scenario 1 became a 
former 'drug addict' with a 'difficult past'. 
Comparatively speaking then, the vignettes represented a standardised tool 
for the generation of qualitative data and allowed the divergent responses of 
the systems and administrators to emerge. They elicited well the tensions that 
arose in the Dutch system in trying to activate people whilst meeting 
exceptional need and in the case of Britain, in trying to meet need in the 
context of a limited budget. Such issues could then be probed further in the 
context of the in-depth interviews. Ultimately, vignettes served as an efficient 
tool for gathering comparable data to enable the identification of similarities 
and differences in practise (Third 2000:456). 
Undoubtedly however, there are difficulties in general ising from the 
judgements or responses participants make when confronted with a vignette 
to their actual behaviour when faced with a comparable situation (Lee 
1993:81). What was notable in the present research, was that the scenarios, 
because recognisable, often prompted respondents to discuss discretionary 
decisions they had made in the past when confronted with similar 
circumstances. They thus talked not only of what they 'would do' in such 
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situations but of what they 'had done' previously. Moreover, the responses 
generated by the vignettes concurred with data from in-depth interviews and 
observation. 
The final benefit of this method in the context of researching an area of social 
security provision was found to be that 'areas which are controversial as a 
consequence of changes to the normative consensus surrounding them, are 
very readily studied with vignettes' (Lee 1993:81). In Britain many of those 
interviewed were relatively long serving members of staff and had seen many 
changes to the system they worked in, and in the municipality in which the 
majority of research was conducted in the Netherlands they were in the 
process of changing to a case-management system, thus information on 'what 
would have happened to the applicant' before was often forwarded 
unprompted. 
Analysis 
As in much qualitative research perhaps, analysis was not a distinct stage in 
the research, rather it was an ongoing and sequential process that began 
when the researcher was gathering data (Fielding 1993: 167). Concerned with 
identifying and explaining similarities and differences in exceptional need 
provision analysis was an interactive process and findings were generated by 
moving between deduction (from literature) and induction (generating 
theoretical propositions from empirical data generated). 16 
16 There is some debate as to whether testing or generating theory are the proper pursuit of 
case-studies (see for example Goldthorpe 1997 and other contributions to that volume). 
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As said, the qualitative interviews allowed the emergence of analytical themes 
that could be followed up in subsequent interviews. To this end, fieldwork 
journals were kept by the researcher, and notes were written up on the way to 
and from offices. Some of these notes necessarily contained the researcher's 
feelings regarding the process of conducting qualitative work in this topic 
area. Thus, whilst steps were taken to limit potential harm to participants, it is 
also recognised that there may be ethical issues for a researcher engaged in 
an in-depth study on such a topic. Suffice it to say that the dynamics of 
poverty offer little respite to those researching (or for that matter, and far more 
importantly, working) in the realms of exceptional payments. This was 
especially so in the British context of the 'segregated Social Fund' (rather than 
the Dutch system where administrators often voiced that they got satisfaction 
out of 'getting people on a job'): staff seemed daily subsumed in human 
misery for a living. As others have argued however (Lee 1995:53; Kleinman 
and Copp 1993) such feelings can essentially serve an analytical purpose and 
in the present research staff coping mechanisms were brought to the fore. 
Social Fund staff in particular often voiced for example that on starting their 
jobs, they had to change or as they sometimes put it 'become hard'; 'not think 
about it', use 'black humour' and (try) to disengage themselves from their 
clients. 
Familiarity with the data generated, and hence analytic understanding was 
also facilitated by the researcher transcribing the data tapes. In this way, 
emerging themes were picked up. Because of their semi-structured, yet 
qualitative and in-depth nature, the interview data generated facilitated a 
number of analytic strategies. Their qualitative nature allowed that the data 
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could be cut and pasted by theme, and interviews were also kept in their 
entirety to maintain records of any inconsistencies in individuals' accounts. 
Being semi-structured they further allowed the comparison of administrative 
responses to specific theoretically informed questions, and hypothetical 
applicants (via vignettes) within and between countries. Given the amount of 
qualitative data that interviews generated, analytical themes were first 
identified and written up country by country before the comparative analysis 
proper was undertaken. 
As May (1997:185) points out in regards to cross-national research, the 
analyses and interpretations made by researchers should avoid 'simply 
tacking on preconceived ideas and even prejudices on the operation of 
societies' as this will do little to further our understanding. For the present 
research this primarily raises questions about the assertions made by the 
researcher on the Dutch system and administrative practises. 
Partly this was overcome by living in the Netherlands (as an outsider) for an 
extended period of time (3 months) 17, which facilitated a degree of cultural 
immersion. Because familiarity with the national history and culture is 
considered essential in case research, 0yen (1990:16) also recommends 
close collaboration with a country-based social scientist to use the latter's 
17 For the main research visit. This was preceded by an initial visit of 2 weeks, and the 
researcher subsequently visited the Netherlands for a month in the summer of 2002. 
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local knowledge to help tie together the researchers intensive data in a 
meaningful way. The researcher benefited from conversations with a number 
of academics in this respect. On every research visit Wim Van Oorschot 
found time to helpfully discuss the progress of the research (from hypotheses 
building through to initial findings). Joop Roebroek and Ruud Muffels were 
also more than generous with their time for discussion. 
On a day to day basis, any meanings the researcher might have inferred from 
daily observations and interviews (not only those associated with research) 
could be checked later with the Dutch nationals who shared the researcher's 
accommodation. 
One further point that should be made was the usefulness for analytical 
purposes of having conducted fieldwork in the Netherlands first. As 
mentioned earlier one of the purposes and benefits of comparative research is 
that it can provide a 'mirror image' of the system with which the researcher is 
most familiar: Britain in this instance. It might thus be counter intuitive to 
suggest visiting the least familiar country first. Essentially however it 
transpired that, after the empirical research in the Netherlands, the Dutch 
system was the system the researcher knew best, certainly from an 
administrative perspective. Returning to Britain and conducting empirical 
research then facilitated more of an 'outsiders' perspective of the British 
system. Particular issues that stood out in this respect became the perceived 
lack of control, the lack of house visits, and the frustration of staff with the 
system they worked in. 
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Validity 
Debates concerning the grounds on which analytic findings should be 
considered reliable and valid are said ultimately to depend on the theory of 
the social world employed (Kirk and Miller 1986:50). The philosophy of 
qualitative research considers the social world as embedded in a specific time 
and place and recognises that interaction between researcher and 
participants will partly be dependent on their respective social characteristics. 
Hence 'replicability' in any positivistic sense is seen to be problematic. 
Nevertheless, such research can employ strategies to help assure the 
researcher that they have accurately portrayed and interpreted the 'meaning 
attached by participants to what is being studied' (Johnson 1997: 1). Primarily, 
in the present research triangulation of qualitative methods for collecting 
primary data was used.18 Extended periods in the fieldwork settings and 
observation of working practises (as discussed earlier in the chapter) thus 
helped to contextualise the data generated in the interviews with vignette 
scenarios. Methods were applied in a systematic and rigorous way and as 
stated above, detailed sets of field (and analytical) notes were kept throughout 
the research process. 
Generaliseabilty 
It is recognised that there are inherent difficulties in drawing wider 
generalisations from detailed cross-national case studies that necessarily 
focus on a small number of countries (Clasen 1994:4). In part this might be 
overcome by, for example, choosing countries for inclusion that are 
18 Thus there was less risk of generating conflicting findings than if combining quantitative and 
qualitative methods for example (Mason 1996:149). 
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recognised to belong to a given regime type as forwarded by Esping-
Andersen (1990). As chapter 2 highlighted, the UK has been posited as a 
liberal welfare regime and the Netherlands as (although not without debate) 
conservative. Given the recognition that social assistance regimes might be 
quite distinct from the wider welfare regime in which they are situated 
however such a strategy is not without caveats. Moreover, limitations in this 
respect should also be recognised given the accessing and (theoretical) 
sampling strategies adopted and the relatively small (and non-representative) 
number of offices and administrators included in the study from each country. 
That said, much of the country specific research findings generated do concur 
with previous empirical research in both countries. 
Ultimately perhaps, as Goldstone (1997:108) notes, the logic of comparative 
case studies is a combination of deductive and inductive reasoning aimed 
more at providing explanations for particular cases, rather than at providing 
general hypotheses that apply uniformly to all cases in a suspected case-
universe. As he goes on to say, the findings (regarding administrative 
perceptions and behaviour in given contexts) from the present research could 
be suggested as 'general hypotheses' which could, in further research, then 
be tested and modified by expanding the range of cases. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to outline both the methodological approach taken 
and the benefits and limitations of the methods chosen to meet the aims of 
the research. As seen, whilst there is no distinct cross-national method, such 
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research does highlight some of the issues raised in making social scientific 
as opposed to impressionistic comparisons (Mabbett and Bolderson 1999:34). 
Essentially in cross-national case studies that try to get closer to culture 
specific factors there are problems involved in applying the methodology 
(Mabbett and Bolderson 1999:50). 
As has been highlighted, this cross-national research project inherently 
required the researcher to consider many methodological issues and devise 
strategies in an attempt to overcome the problems that were encountered. 
Some of the problems that were faced equate with the conduct of qualitative 
research more generally. As such, they could not have been entirely 
anticipated by the researcher and had to be resolved as they arose. The 
chapter thus highlighted the strategies pursued to gain access to and 
informed consent from the decision-makers, which were compounded in the 
Netherlands by issues of language. 
It is hoped that the logic of this account, the explicit discussion of the solutions 
adopted, and the noted limitations of the data will inform the evaluation of the 
researchers interpretations, and convince others that the theoretical leaps 
made in the following chapters are justified. 
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Chapter 5 Administrative routes to employment 
Social seNice delivery jobs are among the most stressful in society 
(Elmore 1997:251). Street-level bureaucrats are often confronted with 
inadequate resources, physical and psychological threats and conflicting 
and ambiguous role expectations. Nevertheless, 'people often enter 
public employment, particularly street-level bureaucracies, with at least 
some commitment to seNice', seeking out 'these occupations because 
of their potential as socially useful roles' (Lipsky 1980:xii). 
However, following Peters' (1985:89) suggestion that we should study the 
motivations personnel hold for applying for such positions, this chapter 
highlights differences in the reasons that the two sets of administrators 
gave for applying for their employment positions. The chapter illustrates 
• 
that the Dutch administrators had often purposely embarked on a 
previous course of study and a subsequent career in helping people. By 
contrast, those who have 'ended up' (B.01.06.W) as Social Fund Officers 
in Britain primarily came straight from school or from a bureaucratic 
background, and had mostly perceived the Civil SeNice, rather than 'the 
social' as a means to helping themselves get a secure career. 1 These 
different paths to their employment positions, perceived by administrators 
as stigmatised by the wider public, essentially contained differing degrees 
of choice. 
1 Most of the interviewees in Britain were long serving members of staff. 
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Motivations to employment 
Whilst asked to make the same kinds of decisions about (the sometimes 
complex exceptional needs of) social assistance clients, the two sets of 
workers come equipped to deal with their stressful occupations with quite 
different personal resources. 
Essentially, diverse educational and occupational backgrounds of the two 
sets of workers may in part be expected to affect their performance in a 
bureaucratic setting (Peters 1985:74). For example a professional 
'helping ideology', or the lack of one, might be expected to inform their 
values and dispositions, influence their 'framework of meaning' (Oegeling 
and Colebatch 1997:354) and may determine the degree to which the 
workers are 'pro-client' (Prottas 1979: 116/117). 
Recruitment 
Whilst this chapter focuses primarily on the motivations to employment, 
educational backgrounds and organisational training, it is of course 
recognised that the ways in which governments go about selecting and 
training (either professional or bureaucratic) personnel are the ways in 
which they narrow the range of possible outcomes of the policy-making 
process (Peters 1985:74; Bradshaw 1981 :141).2 
For example, the municipality in which the majority of the research was 
conducted in the Netherlands sought specifically to recruit administrators 
who had a relatively high professional qualification. A case-manager was 
2 Although, as later chapters will illustrate, this is by no means the only way: narrowing 
the policy outcome can also be accomplished by requiring staff to work within a cash-
limited budget. 
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expected to have attained a Higher Vocational Education (HBd) in, for 
example, Social and Legal services, or to possess an equivalent level of 
intellectual and working ability. HaGs are usually four-year courses and 
incorporate a year of practical work experience, for example in a 
Jobcentre. The majority of staff had attained either an HBG, a 
qualification in law or/and some kind of 'people-changing' (for example 
teaching or social work) occupation. Those responsible for recruiting 
case-managers expected prospective candidates would want to move on 
after 5 years or so. A relatively high turnover of staff was thought to be a 
price worth paying by the Head of Administration (HOA) in return for the 
professional capacities, interviewing or 'good diagnosis' skills and 'high 
levels of thinking', (HOA) brought to the job. 
Researcher: so why do they leave after three or four years? 
Uh they leave because they have a high level of education 
and uh they want to do something else. They are socially uh, 
educated, see lots of things which happens, want to be, to 
playa good role in the society and uh, well (after) three or 
four years [ ] they go to a higher level or they go to uh, [] to 
Immigration; Some go to other cities and do the same work, 
um some go to uh those private organisations who help 
people with their trajects. Uh, there are people who go to 
study again (HOA). 
In Britain conversely, the majority of staff interviewed had attained 0 
Grades and Highers, and a small minority had undertaken a year or two 
at university before deciding to withdraw. At the time of research, staff 
were recruited for the Benefit Agency office, rather than for specific Social 
Fund tasks. Basic grades of staff (for instance Clerical Officers) were 
3 Hoger 8eroeps Onderwijs (Higher Professional Education). 
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recruited both on the basis of qualifications (five 0 levels including 
English and arithmetic) and their ability to engage with 'experiential 
questioning', which determines how applicants rate against 'a number of 
competencies', for example 'teamwork, communications, and some 
aspect of problem solving' (Social Fund Manager) (SFM). Going up the 
grades appointment became competitive by qualification. 
In general terms, you don't normally recruit for a particular 
function. You would recruit for the office, and then decide 
which function is, is needing them. [ ] Under equal 
opportunities legislation, you can't discard, em, one 
particular qualification against another. You must accept all 
the qualifications in the round. [ ] so, I mean in the olden 
days, you might have looked at someone with, an art 
qualification, and said well, 'I'm not really looking for that 
type of qualification, I'm maybe looking for a mathematical 
qualification'. [] but you can't do that under equal opps. 
legislation. [ ] and neither can you discriminate against 
someone who's overqualified, in perhaps your estimation. 
Em, 'cos I mean if I'm looking at clerical grades, in the olden 
days I might have said em, 'well, I don't think that person'lI 
stay. Because that person is evidently overqualified' (SFM). 
From a comparative perspective then there are differences both in 
respect of the qualifications sought, and the length of time recruiters 
expect staff to remain with the organisation. In this vein, the following 
section highlights that the Dutch administrators had often previously 
worked in other 'people changing' occupations, and did not rule out 
changing jobs in the future. In Britain in contrast, the longer-serving 
members of staff had either come to the Department straight from school, 
or from a bureaucratic background, and often made reference to their 
future Civil Service pension. 
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Choice or chance? 
Bearing in mind Lipsky's (1980:xii) contention that street-level 
bureaucrats seek out these occupations because of their potential as 
socially useful roles, this section of the chapter highlights the differences 
in the routes to employment taken by the two sets of exceptional need 
administrators. From a comparative perspective these can essentially 
be seen to involve differing degrees of choice and chance. In the 
Netherlands the majority of administrators stated that a desire to help 
people, their previous study and their work experience had led them to 
seek out or apply for their positions of employment at the Socia Ie Dienst. 
In Britain conversely, the longer serving administrators had mostly 'seen 
an advert' for the Civil Service (rather than the Benefits Agency), in which 
they too could use their previous work experience in an office or 
administrative environment. 
Primarily, the Dutch respondents' motivations to employment were what 
Clarke and Wilson might have called 'purposive' (1961 :135). For 
instance, after their studies several staff had previously worked for a 
private Jobcentre and couched their move to the Sociale Dienst in terms 
of attaining an increased level of involvement with clients. Such 
motivations are quite in line with Lipsky's (1980) assertion that street level 
bureaucrats seek out their helping professions in order to perform a 
worthwhile role in society. 
because of the interest in government and in um making 
things happen in society I thought I could better work here 
(Sociale Dienst) than there (private Jobcentre), because 
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they're all, everything is about profit and nothing about 
people, and um, and the things behind people (NL.01.02.M). 
the contact with the people (in the Jobcentre) is very short. 
So they come in and you write them in and you search a job 
and then they are gone. And I wanted more, I wanted to be 
more involved with people, and um, mean something. So I 
can (now) help them, yeah, and offer them all kinds of things 
so they can be better. Or I can take them, yeah, the 
difficulties away so that somebody can go to ah, work or 
(NL.01.14.W). 
I've studied a course for social and um law; it's 50% social 
and 500/0 law. Um, yeah, it's a good school for this kind of 
job. [ ] I had a placement in (a town in the UK) with the 
Citizens Advice Bureau. [ ] You have here in Holland, you 
have Bureau Sociale Rights, it's the same, and from that job, 
they create the school, yeah. You understand? 
Researcher: yeah. So it's more to do with welfare rights and 
Yes, yes. Welfare rights and um to learn to talk .. with 
clients. And the problems they have. (NL.02.06.W). 
A further characteristic with the Dutch administrators seemed to be that, 
at the time of qualifying or gaining their professional qualification in law or 
a people changing occupation, some respondents were unable to secure 
employment in their chosen field. Confronted with high unemployment or 
tight labour markets, they had therefore used their skills or law training in 
a sector which might be expected to expand in such economic 
conditions: social security administration. 
I did law studies, and (when) I graduated, at that time there 
was no work for a law graduate, so I went to the (Jobcentre) 
and they had work here. So I came here and I stayed 
(NL.01.13.W). 
However, this was still often couched in terms of utilising an opportunity 
to help people. 
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I ha(d) studied for being a teacher, and uh, after (graduating) 
teacher work wasn't quite available at that time, so I was 
looking for something else to do in the meantime, before I 
could go (to work in a) school and uh, so I came here 
because I wanted to do, the same as in school, I wanted to 
work with people, with children, and so I thought in this job I 
could do - in a very different way but - do something with 
people (NL.01.06.M). 
Eh, it was never a plan for me to work at social services. I 
wanted child protection. But it's difficult because I was ready 
from school when I was 22 and I was too young, actually, to 
do child protection. So I got here first in a department who 
just em. When people have debts and you try to get (them) 
back, and I didn't like it. I wanted more contact with clients 
and be able to do something for them, and this is nicer 
because it uh, well you really try to help people 
(NL.01.11.W). 
In line with the recruiter's perception outlined earlier that staff would move 
on after a relatively short time, several administrators contended that they 
would not remain in their current employment position for the rest of their 
working life. 
Not that I will work here for ever, but, it feels good, and as 
long as it feels good, and I got a new challenge with the case 
management (NL.01.04.W) 
Yes, that's always fine to know that if, that I have (trained to 
teach). I'm not stuck here for, for the rest of my life. So, yes 
(NL.01.06.M). 
In Britain, a desire to help people was rarely given by administrators as a 
reason for applying to work in the Civil Service (although, as the following 
chapter clearly illustrates, staff perceive that their job is to do just that). 
Rather, in the days of the Civil Service Commission, the longer serving 
members of staff had applied for what they primarily perceived at the time 
to be an alluring 'Civil Service' post. Being a Civil Servant was perceived 
as 'nice, safe and secure. Good pension, and your job was very safe and 
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secure' (B.02.DM1.W). In comparison to the Dutch administrators they 
were perhaps motivated by 'self-regarding values' (Tullock 1997:88); 
attracted by the material and 'solidary' incentives (Clarke and Wilson 
1961: 135) of the fringe benefits of secure and relatively well rewarded 
employment. 
When I left school I had a job in an office, applied to get into 
the Civil Service, um, because the Civil Service was a good 
job, you know? Promotions, steady work. Along with like 
banking. It was the sort of thing you went in for if you didn't 
want to be a teacher or a doctor or something like that. If you 
didn't go to university, you'd kind of fall back on the Civil 
Service (B.01.DM6.W). 
My dad said (the Civil Service) would be a great job, he said 
it would be wonderful [ ] I wished I'd never believed him! 
(laughs). No, um, it was just office work I wanted to do, um, 
and this was the first job that had kinda come up 
(B.01.CS1.W). 
As the latter quotes highlight, like their Dutch counterparts, several of the 
British administrators also saw the Civil Service as a chance to utilise 
their previous work experience in a banking or office environment. 
I'd worked with (a high street bank) prior to that. [ ] and I got 
transferred to (another place), and I was having to meet 
expenses. And the travelling at the time was having an effect 
as well [ ] So I saw the advert (for the Civil Service) 
(B.01.DM5.M) 
Even for the shorter serving members of staff who had knowingly applied 
for employment positions in the Benefits Agency, it is still the perception 
of office or administrative work that attracts them to the job. 
I just saw the job at the Jobcentre. Em, it was actually the 
Jobcentre that had said to me, em, that if I was interested. 
165 
And at that time, at that point, there wasn't a lot of clerical 
work going about, and I didn't really know if I wanted to do 
anything else. I always, I've always worked, within an office 
environment. I mean before hand it was em, doing accounts 
[] So when they said that this had come up. And, needs 
must as well (B.01.BL.W). 
As seen, the Dutch administrators had often sought out an increased 
level of involvement with social assistance clients at the Sociale Dienst, 
which, (as the following chapter illustrates) is perceived as being for 
people who have more than financial problems. The majority of Social 
Fund Officers however recounted that in the days of the Civil Service 
Commission, they had effectively been recruited into the Civil Service 
not knowing which Department they would subsequently be sent to work 
in. Significantly, whilst the officers had been able to give a preference 
for which department they would like to work, in no instance had this 
been for the NAB/DHSS/DSS, where they had eventually been placed. 
It would seem that of all the departments available to Civil Servants, 'the 
social' is perceived as that with the least status. 
Unlike staff in (what were perceived to be) less demanding and more 
prestigious Government Departments, Social Fund staff stressed that, as 
Howe (1985) also found, they were not able to sit and drink tea or coffee 
all day. 
People think we just sit here and drink coffee, they don't 
realise. There are Civil Servants that do that, but they're 
away up there (motions above her head). I mean, the social 
security is the pits. It's the worst, it's the lowest department, I 
mean that's the one that nobody ever puts they want (to 
work in on the form). 
Researcher: do you think so? 
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Oh yeah, nobody wants it. I mean I ticked I wanted to work in 
Agriculture and Fisheries, and then, well, there was three 
that I ticked and this wasn't one. But this. It's the easiest 
Department to get into, and the hardest one to get out of. 
That's how the DSS, well that's how it's known. 
Researcher: is it, is it known like that throughout? 
It's known like that, yeah. Easiest to get into and the hardest 
to get out of (B.02.DM1.W). 
When I actually attended for my interview, you didn't. You 
had a choice, it was like Inland Revenue, eh, Social. 
Benefits. Well it wasn't Benefits Agency then; 
Supplementary Benefits, that sort of thing. Um, so you had a 
choice, and I don't think I. Mines was the fourth tick for this 
place. But basically, after you got through the interview, they 
just allocated you a place to go, and I was allocated here 
(B.01.DM6.W). 
I think it was in one of the papers or something 'join the Civil 
Service - a career for you' and all that sort of stuff [ ] I sat 
the Civil Servant's exam, and I got posted to, what it was 
then called -you're far to young to remember of course - the 
National Assistance Board. [ ] It could have been any 
Department. Just picked it out the hat 'National Assistance 
Board', [ ] so, yeah, I started and I thought 'I'll try this 'till I 
find something better', as you do (laughs) [ ] I just started 
until I could find something more rewarding and ha ha, yeah 
(laughs) there you go. [ ] So. They're not issuing any 
packages at the moment, so I'll have to soldier on 'till I'm 
sixty I'm afraid (B.01.DM3.M). 
Just as many of the long serving administrators would not have chosen to 
work at 'the social', once in they stated that they had 'ended up' in the 
Social Fund section because they had been 'picked' to do it when the 
scheme was introduced in 1988, or had subsequently been 'put' or 
'moved' there. 
Well, I was on the counter; it was just a natural progression. 
At one point the counter was staffed by my grade because 
there were too many of us. And then when we got enough of 
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the ?ther grades, they had. to find jobs, so, I was just put to 
Social Fund ... are you asking me that question in the realms 
of did I choose it? (To work in the Social Fund section) 
Researcher: yes. 
No! (laughs) 
Researcher: right. 
But, I'm very much of the opinion: they can put me where 
they want, I'm not. I'd really. I'd no particular interest, and no 
particular dislike of it. [ ] never really. Don't particularly think 
it's the job for me, but I've never found my true vocation, that 
could afford to pay me. So I'm still here. I've got a pension. 
(pauses) You get used to, your job (01.DM1.W). 
Social Fund started in 1988, and we were just basically 
chosen. It was just a case of whatever jobs were available, 
they hand-picked so many people to start it off. [] I've been 
doing different jobs on and off, but I always seem to end up 
back at Social Fund (01.DM6.W). 
In sum, there are differences both in the degree to which the two sets of 
administrators purposely chose to work in 'the social'/ Socia Ie Dienst, and 
the personal resources (i.e. from their education and previous 
employment) they subsequently brought with them to their jobs. Such 
differences also have implications for the amount of job satisfaction the 
two sets of administrators enjoy and, as the following chapter illustrates, 
perceptions of their clientele. 
Relatively speaking, British administrators were less likely to say that they 
enjoyed their jobs, more likely to complain that their pay was insufficient, 
that they were under-funded, understaffed and, as the following section 
illustrates, that their organisational training was inadequate. 
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Training 
Confirming earlier research (Elmore 1997:251), both sets of 
administrators stated that their jobs were stressful and challenging. 
There were differences however, in the administrative perceptions of the 
organisational training they had received to equip, or help them deal with 
threatening and stressful situations. Staff perceptions of the adequacy of 
training are not insignificant when we consider that the administrators 
were dealing regularly with very vulnerable people who might themselves 
be experiencing stressful or harrowing situations. Apart from the stress 
associated with having insufficient or no money, instances of illness, 
death, divorce, separation and abuse are all situations in which social 
assistance beneficiaries may request an exceptional payment. 
In the Netherlands the majority of administrators, especially in the main 
municipality of research, stated that they had received adequate training. 
Each had undergone a three-month in-house training course before finally 
being assessed for their suitability for employment.4 The training 
comprises of (national and municipal) social security law; training in 
computer systems and how to communicate/deal with clients. 
There is a very good education programme upstairs. So you 
um, have a solicitation in which they ask you tough 
questions, and then three months of education on the 
second floor here, in a special space, and then the first six 
weeks are a lot of the social welfare law. The law for other 
social um, you not only need the social welfare, you've got 
all the pension things; when you're sick: Which comes when 
and how and what? [ ] and then you have communication, 
and special payments, and all the other things we have 
(NL.01.04.W). 
4 On average, 2 or 3 from 15 trainees 'don't make the end' (Head of Administration) of 
the three month period. 
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Once 'put downstairs' as they termed it, the new recruit had a named 
mentor for between six months and a year, which the majority considered 
very helpful. 
For the first (six months downstairs) you get a mentor so you 
don't have to do it alone. If you have questions then you can 
ask them. And he is sitting next to you doing his own job, 
but, you can ask him, you can always ask him. And the 
reason we do that is to prevent that someone is drowning 
here! (NL.01.06.M). 
However, many perceived that no amount of training could quite prepare 
them for what they would subsequently meet 'downstairs'. The diversity 
of clients and their situations however, were often offered by 
administrators as factors that made their jobs interesting and challenging. 
I think it more depends on the person you are, on the 
qualities you have [ ] than on the training, because 
everybody can learn about the law, what the law says 
(NL.02.01.W). 
When you come downstairs you're always (participant 
mimics a gaping stare of disbelief) .. It's all new to you, but 
you get very much training in social capabilities uh, how you 
(do) interviews with people, with aggression. Yes, and you 
have to learn the legislation, and the computer. So yes. 
(NL.01.10.W). 
The most I've learned to do the job .. just by doing the job. 
And to speak with a lot of people, because you can try role-
playing interactions (in training) yes. But it isn't real. The 
people who are coming here react always different .. There 
isn't a standard for it [ ] I am changed [ ] the way I speak to 
people, it's uh, you are so much growing with these people, 
you always have a mirror in front of you, and you learn a lot 
from the job [ ] about uh other people and about uh, uh how 
to react at, how to react at people and em, uh people are 
reacting to me. I think it's uh, everyone goes through that. 
(NL.01.16.W). 
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In Britain in contrast, rather than completing a relatively comprehensive 
training period before starting work, several staff perceived that their 
training was inadequate and inappropriately timed. 5 For instance, staff 
perceived that what they considered to be essential training often came 
after they had been doing their job for a period of time. Similarly, staff had 
often been temporarily promoted, ('TP'd' as they often termed it) to a 
more responsible position before they had been formally trained for it. 
(Discussing training for making decisions on Crisis Loan 
applications) I never really had much training as such 
because I was only like temporary promoted. I sat in a 
couple of times, em, and then I was really just left to my own 
devices, because it's a discretionary. Em, I had a, I've got 
examples, I still have examples of the other em, B3's 
decisions that I like to refer to, just to help myself, if not then 
I just ask advice on that, so there wasn't really any training 
as such apart from my past experience being in the section 
and em, dealing with the Crisis Loans from the other side -
actually information gathering [ ] 
(Discussing training for (Crisis Loan) interviewing 
techniques) Em, I was desk trained on that. Em, sat with 
somebody and came out and listened while somebody else 
did it. I must admit the first time doing it yourself's scary 
(laughs). But em, that, that was basically the training for 
that. Em, desk training and just listening to what everybody 
else said, and how they dealt with the customers. I did get 
sent on a face to face interviewing course. Em, that was two 
days up in (a town) where you were em, given different 
scenarios, and how to deal with, yeah. Your attitude has a lot 
to do with how. Your attitude towards a customer, can be the 
difference between them getting angry and being ok, yeah 
(B.01.BL.W). 
5 This is not to undermine the detailed knowledge of the organisation and other benefits 
that those longer serving members of staff, in their previous roles, had accrued. 
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Many of the longer serving members of staff also remembered the initial 
training for the Social Fund scheme when it was first introduced, and 
recounted it as inadequate.6 
I went on a training course for the Social Fund, which is 
about the worst training course I've ever been on in my life, it 
was pretty [ ] absolutely awful. They were saying things like 
eh, it was sort of money advice, you were supposed to offer 
money advice to customers then, how to you know, manage 
your income. The advice we were to give customers then 
was 'don't shop when you're hungry'. I mean, customers on 
benefit are always going to be hungry I would think, 'don't 
shop when you're hungry, 'cos you'll buy stuff you'll not 
probably eat', it was crazy, absolutely crazy course 
(B.01.DM3.M). 
One of the shorter serving members of staff recounted how her training 
course for Social Fund decision-makers included an informal education in 
how to cope with the stress of working under a limited budget: be 
'cynical', and use 'black comedy'. 
When I was at my training course, the people that were there 
had all been promoted to EO's: I was a direct entrant. They 
had all, at some stage been decision-makers em, in offices 
acting up (temporarily promoted), and then they'd been 
promoted. And they would talk about customers (gives a 
heavy sigh) you know, and I thought 'that's not very nice'. 
Researcher: they would talk about them in a cynical or a 
derogatory way? 
A derogatory way. Em, also when they were going through 
decisions, 'cos we'd have mock decisions to make, you 
know, going through decisions and saying 'they won't get 
that, and they won't get that. And they won't get that'. And I 
though, 'oh, that's not very fair', and we had discussions 
about it, bringing me into it, and they said 'well, you'll 
discover that it's not that easy. There's lots of reasons why', 
and I don't know whether I'm getting cynical, I hope not, but I 
6 In the same vein many thought that the fund itself had been introduced with little 
thought. 
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now know where they're coming from, because when you 
deal with these forms, certain people, and not by any 
means all. This is where I find it hard, because there are so 
many genuine ones, and you can't give them, because you 
don't have the money, and I find it, and they don't qualify, 
and I find it so so difficult. It' very stressful, I mean we have a 
really good laugh, in a black comedy kind of way, and if 
anybody could hear us! But it's really, that's the way you 
deal with it (B.03.DM2.W). 
Such organisational coping mechanisms seem to be essential 
requirements for Social Fund Officers. Staff often recounted harrowing 
incidents that had either taken place in the office or that they had read 
about on application forms. Essentially perhaps, in comparison to the 
Dutch administrators, Social Fund staff were being asked to deal with 
situations/client groups that they may have relatively little training for, or 
insight into. 
em, there's people slit their wrists (in the office). 
Researcher: oh no. 
Somebody (a colleague) was interviewing. I mean it was 
only kid on, 'cos they (participant motions up arms rather 
than across them) went that way instead of that way, but you 
get that kind of thing, yeah. 
Researcher: what are they doing that for? 
Attention? Blackmail? 'If you don't pay me I'll, I'll slit my 
wrists'. 'Yeah go'n then'. And, occasionally, you get people 
leaving kids: we just phone the social work. 
Researcher: they leave their kids here? 
Mhm. 
Researcher: what for? 
'Well, you feed them'. If they get a knockback, I mean they 
use them. Well children, often children get used as a 
blackmailer: they're a means to money (B.01.DM1.W). 
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As seen then, there were differences in the skills and resources that the 
two sets of administrators brought to their jobs. Moreover, there was 
found to be differences in their motivations to employment, which can be 
seen to question Lipsky's (1980) assertion that all street-level bureaucrats 
seek out their helping professions. 
'I don't tell people where I work' 
The following section illustrates however, that there were also remarkable 
similarities in that the two sets of administrators perceived that the (local 
and municipal) offices they worked in were stigmatised by the public. This 
perception was so strong that administrators often voiced a reticence to 
'own up' or 'admit' to their occupations. 
In keeping perhaps with working in a liberal welfare regime, staff in Britain 
perceived that they had a reputation for being 'stingy' people 
(I say) I work in the Benefits Agency. Don't go into any 
details or anything! But a lot of (staff) don't even want to say 
that, you know? I usually say 'I work in the Benefits Agency' 
and they think 'oh'. Em, because a lot of people have got 
perceptions of what you do in the Benefits Agency [] they 
just think of 'Bread' and this woman who used to sit (in 
reception), [ ] 'oh you're like that woman in bread'. 'No I 
hope not'! (B.01.CSM.W). 
In the Netherlands some of the workers perceived that the wider public 
considered staff employed in the public sector (in line with the New 
Right's discourse) inefficient. 
You have to work very hard [ ] but [ ] you hear at parties 'you 
(work for) a local service so you are 'oh it's four 0 clock, I 
have to go home'. (You) work from nine to four and you go [] 
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drop everything you have in your hand, and you go home'. 
But that's not true (NL.01.13.W). 
In keeping with L0demel's (1997) argument of municipal social 
assistance provision being the more liberal element of a generous 
income maintenance system, staff further (and frequently) voiced that 
they often faced criticism of their clients from friends and family, or from 
people they met at parties, where accusations of 'working with the 
enemy' were levied at them. They felt that they often had to spend time 
defending their clients - primarily perceived as 'lazy people and 
foreigners7" - by explaining that not everybody committed fraud or that 
some people were not able to work. 
(when I tell people that I work at the Socia Ie Dienst, I ) 
always get a reaction from them! 'People who are having 
welfare they are lazy', or 'there is coming only black people'. 
They uh, they don't know what it's about. (NL.01.16.W). 
they say 'oh they can go to work. They always keep their 
hand open for money, when they can go to work' 
(NL.02.04.W). 
or people tell me 'it's only foreign people that ask for money', 
something like that (NL.02.06.W). 
In Britain conversely, local offices were perceived by administrators to be 
stigmatised essentially because they constituted a 'horrible place to come 
to'. Partly, the reasons for this perception can be found in the inverse of 
7 Migrants are over represented among the long-term unemployed in the Netherlands 
(Spies and Berkel 2001 :110). 
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L0demel's argument for Norway: local offices in Britain are not only for 
the 'people with problems'. Thus in 'the social' the major theme seemed 
to be that the people seeking only money: pensioners or people signing 
sick for the first time, were 'thrown in' at the initial reception area with 
those whom the administrators referred to as the 'regulars' the 
'troublemakers' and the 'hardnuts' who were perceived by administrators 
to demand their rights loudly and aggressively. 
You don't tell many people you work in the social [ ] it's a 
horrible place to come to. 
Researcher: for? 
For anybody, um, Jobcentre Plus is going to change all this 
(participant looks at tape recorder, gives a silent laugh, hand 
over mouth) em, but just the whole atmosphere in the office. 
For people who are genuinely in need of benefits, they come 
in and half of them have never been here before, you know. 
And it's quite daunting to come in, and there's all the screens 
and there's all the people who are siting effing and blinding 
(B.01.CS1.W). 
This theme was especially In respect of the 'elderly deserving' who 
administrators perceived were 'frightened out of their wits' at having to sit 
in what could often be a volatile reception area. 
I don't know if you've had the chance to sit out on the 
counter? 
Researcher: no, I haven't. 
That would be an eye opener for you, just to sit, and just 
listen. It's. It's disgu- I feel really. The ones that I feel heart 
sorry for are like your widowers, your pensioners, people 
who are maybe signing sick for the first time: and they see 
the junkies and the druggies that are practically doing their 
deals at the front door (B.01.DM1.W). 
We get the little old woman that comes in a~er them and 
she'll say 'oh, I've been sitting out there With all these, 
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smackheads or whatever they call them'. Um and it's a 
shame. It's a shame that these people, that, out there (in 
reception) you can't just sit and be like in a surgery waiting 
room, for your name being called out or whatever. It's eh, 
fights break out, you've got kids screeching, you've got them 
shouting and. We've had everything out there from them 
actually using the hypodermics: we've had them lying on the 
floor. I mean there's children there too, so it's. I don't know 
(B.01.DM2.W). 
Disclosing their occupation depended very much on the social context 
participants found themselves in. Essentially both sets of workers spoke 
of assessing any given social situation in terms of whether they were 
likely to be considered a source of valuable information (and thus 
barraged for information on the benefits system) or a target of complaint. 
Similarly, sometimes quite literally, administrators feared revealing their 
occupation to someone who was on benefit. 
I won't tell them what Department, very rarely. [ ] because, if 
you say you work for the social, they think 'she's a grass. 
She wants to find out what I'm doing so she can'. I mean 
people might be working on the side. So as soon as you say 
'I work for the DSS', that's it (B.02.DM1.W). 
If it's people I know who don't know me awful well, but I 
know of them and I know what they're like then, and I've got 
a good idea they aren't on benefits then, it's ok, I just say I 
work for the Benefits Agency. Em, but other than that I just 
say 'oh, I work in (town 4) in an office', and just move on the 
conversation. 'Cos I've been in situations, where, you know, 
the minute people find out, they're right in there (makes an 
aggressive growling noise) (B.01.DM6.W). 
In the Netherlands administrators who might have any form of contact 
with clients were similarly reticent to reveal their occupation. 
uh, no. I don't tell many people when I .. for instance at a 
birthday party .. I'm not so open in it that I (will say) this is 
my job. Because many times there are people (there and) 
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they get the benefits .. and uh, I don't want them to know 
that I am working here, because then I get many questions 
about fraud, and those kinds of things or if they are living 
together, or what else, and I think well, I'm not working 
now, it's my party. 
Researcher: they want to ask you questions about? 
yea, what they can use, what they can do, and also they 
sometimes .. they are making fraud in it, and then they say 
'well then she knows me so maybe she is going to get me 
into it (trouble) or something' .. when I meet people who 
have a job, and I'm sure they have a job and I'm in a 
conversation then I will go (into it) more (laughs).. some 
people from those neighbourhoods .. when the (whole) 
street is in uitkering .. are very negative about social 
services .. (NL.01.12.W) . 
I mostly say I'm working for the municipality [ ] . Um 
because the job I do, for myself I think it's a very good job, 
it's a nice job, I .. otherwise I don't stick to it .. but a lot of 
people have something about 'oh are you doing that job, 
oh oh oh!' .. and so I don't tell them .... it's never a nice 
situation when you meet somebody (getting benefit) from 
this office .. (NL.02.03.W) 
Conclusion 
This chapter has illustrated differences in the degree to which 
administrators in the two countries under study had sought out their 
positions of employment because of their potential as socially useful or 
worthwhile roles (Lipsky 1980). Such findings are significant when we 
consider Peters' (1985:90) link between the requirements of social 
change and the public or personal motivations - and commitments - of the 
administrators being recruited to bring about that change. 
As seen, the longer serving members of staff in the Social Fund had no 
particular desire to work in the Department for Work and Pensions. 
Rather they initially perceived the Civil Service as a secure and steady 
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job with good fringe benefits and would have preferred to have worked in 
(what they perceived to be) a more prestigious Department like 
Agriculture and Fisheries or the Inland Revenue. The Dutch 
administrators on the other hand, had previously completed a period of 
law or/and 'people changing' study. They often couched their move to the 
'stigmatised' Socia Ie Dienst as being deliberately designed both to enable 
them to utilise their previous study and attain an increased level of 
involvement with social assistance clients and their 'problems'. 
A particularly striking point from a comparative perspective is the 
difference observed in the educational (professional/bureaucratic) 
backgrounds of the two sets of workers. In sum, administrators in both 
countries may be thought to command quite different personal and 
professional resources. These, in turn, may go some way to informing 
their discretionary decision making about social assistance beneficiaries 
with similar and complex needs. 
The following chapters present a comparative analysis of the meanings 
which the administrators attach to their behaviour in their welfare 
structures (Barrett and Fudge 1981 :7), and respond to the exceptional 
needs of clients: with similar characteristics8 , needs and problems. These 
meanings must be firmly grounded in the workers understandings of what 
they perceive they are there to do with, for or to their clients and 
customers with exceptional payments. 
8 As outlined in chapter 4 in the contextual validity of vignettes presented to 
administrators. 
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Chapter 6 Organisational contexts: administrative concerns, 
methods and constraints 
This chapter situates the two sets of administrators in their specific and particular 
organisational contexts. As chapter 2 argued, along with the educational 
backgrounds of workers outlined in the previous chapter, the structure and goals 
of an organisation are assumed to go some way to informing discretionary 
decision making. Essentially the chapter highlights administrative perceptions of 
the constraints arising from a 'paternalistic' (Mead 1997) context of welfare 
administration in which workers are concerned with changing the behaviour of 
their clients in the Netherlands, and a 'Managerial' (Clarke and Newman 1997) 
context which sees the administrator concerned to process a large number of 
applicants in Britain. 
In the degree to which they structure and constrain the workers' discretionary 
behaviour (Elmore 1997:246), diverse organisational contexts both present 
themselves to, and are experienced by, staff as 'horizons of possibilities' 
(Emerson and Paley 1992:246) which stipulate the principles and procedures by 
which administrators must 'look for, find and display adequate argumentation for 
their decisions' (Knegt 1987:123). The chapter argues that the contexts inform 
the major administrative points of reference for awarding an exceptional payment 
and subsequently generate conflicting goals for the administrators who must 
either meet exceptional need whilst activating beneficiaries, or whilst managing a 
budget. The resultant tension must be worked out by them on the ground, and, 
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significantly affect decisions about 'who should get what and why' (van Oorschot 
2000). 
'Helping people' 
Different configurations of social assistance in the two countries notwithstanding, 
from within their welfare state as a workplace, the two sets of administrators 
voiced an indistinguishable common purpose or concern: to help people in need 
who had nowhere else to go. The workers thus perceived that they were, in the 
eyes of their clients, the last resort. That said, their respective welfare 
configurations could clearly be seen to influence administrative understandings of 
what they were trying to help people with, or do. In the Netherlands, perceptions 
of 'the Municipality (as) the last resort for income' (NL.01.01.M) are very much 
like the theoretical conceptualisation of social assistance: the last form of income 
maintenance for those in need, or without any other means of subsistence (Ditch 
et al. 1997:3). Following L0demel (1997), the Sociale Dienst, and by extension 
social assistance provision, was (as the previous chapter suggested) further 
considered to be for people perceived to have more than financial 'problems'. 
It's the final urn, organisation, the end station. If there is 
really nothing else, then you go to the Sociale Dienst. So 
there are a lot of problems (that) they have: the clients 
(NL.02.06.W). 
In contrast, the fragmented nature of the social assistance scheme in Britain 
meant that those who administered the Social Fund, whilst situated in a local 
Social Security Office, or, as they termed it 'the social' (which as outlined in 
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chapter 3 is a point of contact for social insurance as well as social assistance 
beneficiaries), considered themselves as working in a hived off 'section', the 
'loans and grants department' (B.01.CO.W). The 'last resort' in this configuration 
is not social assistance per se. Rather, the 'Social Fund section' is the last port of 
call for social assistance beneficiaries requiring help with 'one-off' expenses or 
needs. 
I would describe it as a section that helped people, in you 
know, a one off situation. Where they've got a large 
expense, that they couldn't fund themselves, and it was a 
necessity that they had it. And if you're on income 
support, you can't get credit anywhere. [ ] so therefore 
the people that we're helping can't get the money 
anywhere else [ ] we're the last resort, we're like the bank 
of England: the lender of last resort! (B.02.DM1.W). 
Last resort: safety net or trampoline? 
As outlined previously in chapters 2 and 3, both countries may be thought of as 
having 'workfare' social assistance schemes: theoretically conceptualised as 
trampolines, which aim to bounce 'dependent' social assistance beneficiaries 
(back) into the labour market, by compelling them to become self-sufficient 
(L0demel and Trickey 2001 :2). As the following section illustrates however, 
whilst Bijzondere Bijstand is explicitly used by the municipal administrator as a 
policy implement in this respect, the discretionary part of the 'hived off' Social 
Fund, as a safety net for the most vulnerable, is not. Comparatively speaking, 
this leads the Dutch administrators to take a relatively wide perspective of any 
given client's exceptional need in the context of labour market and/or social 
activation. The Social Fund Officer's focus on the other hand is far narrower, 
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charged as they are with targeting exceptional payments on 'those most in need'. 
Concomitantly, diverse administrative perceptions of what they try to help people 
with, or do to people with these payments, can be situated near opposing ends of 
the 'people changing'-'people processing' theoretical continuum outlined in 
chapter 2, and structure the degree to which they regard 'changes in a client's 
behaviour (in a desired direction) important' (Lipsky 1980:59) when deciding 
upon an exceptional need application. 
The Netherlands: 'Trying to get the client to' 
Charged with administering a 'workfare', or more appropriately an 'activity fare,1 
social assistance scheme, Dutch administrators voiced a concern to 'help' their 
clients 'get out' of social assistance and achieve self-reliance. Whilst Social Fund 
staff in their 'encapsulated' (03.DM2.W) section are not formally charged with 
ensuring that beneficiaries meet any stated behavioural 'obligations' for the 
condition of social assistance, or directly involved with administering any other 
aspect of a client's overall income levels2 , the Dutch consulents and case-
managers considered that beneficiaries' obligations were just as important as 
their rights to an income from the Municipality. 
Concomitantly, the consulents and case-managers perceived that, broadly 
speaking, their functions entailed both deciding on, as well as supervising the 
1 Where as said, education, training and voluntary work were seen as important in getting clients 
to the labour market. 
2 Although, as subsequent chapters will demonstrate, they were 'concerned' about them. 
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'balance in between' their set caseload of clients' 'rights and obligations' 
(NL.01.12.W). On the ground, balancing the rights and obligations of any given 
client, or in effect administering social assistance as a trampoline as well a safety 
net, meant that administrators considered themselves to be performing a 'dual 
role'. They provided clients with an income, which included adjudications of any 
discretionary benefit applied for, and at the same time encouraged clients to take 
part in an activity fare. 
I work with people who need the welfare, and em, there 
are two things in that. First I have to make sure that they 
get every month the money that they have the right to, 
and on the other side I have to try to get them to school 
or to get them to a job (NL.01.06.M). 
I help people who are needy, uh well to get to work, or to 
get a better education (and) from there go to work. Or 
when people (are) not able to work, uh well to supply 
social assistance, because then it's necessary. I try to get 
them out of social assistance to work, education, or to 
work for free (NL.01.09.M). 
Processing beneficiaries' monthly benefit forms (posted to the office by clients), 
and making sure clients get their benefit or as they termed it, 'uitkering, could be 
accomplished by the administrator via the computer system. Attempting to get 
clients out of social assistance however, in effect incurred the administrator trying 
to change their clients' attitude and/or behaviour (Hasenfeld and Weaver 
1996:240) and required a different set of technologies, one of which, as will be 
highlighted, was Bijzondere Bijstand, or exceptional payments. 
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As we might expect in the context of an activity fare (and given the educational 
backgrounds of the Dutch administrators highlighted in the previous chapter), the 
emphasis given to changing the behaviour of clients by case-managers and 
consulents, was, in part, underpinned by a relatively sophisticated understanding 
of the dynamics of new, or modern poverty (Leisering and Walker 1998). 
Nevertheless, administrators perceived that structural barriers to the labour 
market, lack of human capital, or a mismatch between labour supply and demand 
were essentially to be overcome by focusing on the individual client's problems 
and/or behaviour.3 
The client group has come a lot smaller, and the people 
in the centre (hard-core unemployed) well, they are the 
people with the problems. If they're not out now (then) 
they don't get out very soon. A lot of employers are 
saying 'well, how is it possible that we have about 
100,000 unemployed people in the Netherlands, and we 
have 100,000 vacancies?' 'Well, they don't match', that's 
the simple answer: they don't match, really. And the 
(clients) have to be trained to get matched in those jobs 
(NL.01.02.M). 
Consulents and case-managers therefore voiced a concern to 'try to get the 
client' to move through a number of stages which would better prepare them for 
labour market participation by investing them with social skills, knowledge, and 
job seeking guidance (Spies and van Berkel 2001 :125). Essentially, the workers 
attempted to steer, guide, and/or coax the client as far away from social 
assistance dependency, and as near to self-sufficiency as possible. In effect, the 
3 It is this focus on clients' behaviour and attitude in the context of an 'activity fare' social 
assistance provision, that leads Handler and Hasenfeld (1991: 138) to argue that all ideologies of 
'Workfare' ultimately arise, and derive their legitimacy, from the same dominant rule that views 
poverty as a 'personal' rather than a social deficit. 
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'paternalistic' administrator 'attempted to reduce poverty and other social 
problems by directive and supervisory means' of implementation (Mead 1997:2). 
The administrative perception, in line with the basic assumption of the casework 
method, was that the client could almost always do something about his or her 
problem (Handler 1979:20), and in the frame of obligations and rights, had to do 
something about it. Crucially, these enforcement or regulatory functions that 
administrators brought to bear on a client, the administration of 'tough love' 
(Shragge 1997:19), also claimed to 'serve the poor themselves' (Mead 1997:22). 
Interference with a clients behaviour was often justified by claims that the 
individual concerned, by being encouraged to get off welfare, was 'being made to 
act for their own welfare' (Lively 1983). 
I have to see it (in this case the client's 'debt problem') 
and when I see it I have to be doing something with it. I 
have to say: 'you have to go to social work, you can't do 
this on your own'. They have to make their appointment 
themselves, but I have to, it's my responsibility to point 
them at, that they have a way to be helped. They have to 
make a move to go to social work, and then they can go 
further on, and the big, the most important point now is 
work, or education, or voluntary work [ ] to make them 
able to make themselves employable, and self sufficient 
(NL.01.04.W). 
While the latter concern to get beneficiaries to the labour market was very 
pervasive, without exception the workers also perceived that some of their 
clients, those with severe social, physical or psychological problems or 
unemployed people aged over 58, would not be expected ever to attain complete 
self-sufficiency. Obligations for these clients, where voiced by administrators, 
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translated to participating in neighbourhood groups, where they could talk with 
people in a similar situation to themselves and thus avoid social isolation. 
The organisational goals of activating clients, either socially and/or to the labour 
market, clearly informed a categorisation and separation of clients into those 
thought (at some future point) able to work, and those perceived as not able or 
expected to work. 
Some people couldn't help if they are not working, 
because there are a lot of situations, em, some people 
are not capable for um to work. So, uh, like their living 
must be, as, we must try to give them a life as good as 
we can (NL.01.16.W). 
Giving the latter clients a 'life as good as we can' (NL.01.16.W) depends in part, 
on the administrative definition of a good life for a(n impotent} social assistance 
beneficiary (see chapters 7 and 8). For the present discussion, the latter 
participant's quote highlights that the division of impotent/able-bodied social 
assistance clients is of paramount importance for the administrator when 
deciding on any given applicant's exceptional need request. Whilst the non-able 
bodied or the 'morally pure': thought to have little control over their poverty, 
should be socially activated, those not 'morally excused from work' (Handler and 
Hasenfeld 1991 :20), the able bodied, had to be encouraged, or as the workers 
termed it 'motivated' to become self sufficient and leave the municipal welfare , 
roll. 
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It is in this context that the 'activity fare' administrator decides upon discretionary 
decisions regarding exceptional need. Exceptional payments are thus 
inextricably linked to what they try to do with their clients and Bijzondere Bijstand 
is an explicit tool of implementation in this respect. 
For clients thought unable to work and thus to have little control over their 
situation, the relief of misery, or activating them socially with a exceptional 
payment, was not contradicted by the administrative need to 'uphold the work 
ethic' (Handler and Hasenfeld 1991 :37). For those categorised and classed by 
the administrator as (soon) able to work however, exceptional payments were 
explicitly used as a 'lever to ensure compliance' (Mead 1997:5); as a technology 
or an implement to 'people-change'. The basis of eligibility for an exceptional 
payment then only partly depended on the 'need' presented by the applicant. 
Reforming the individual was just as much a goal for those administering 
Bijzondere Bijstand to the able bodied. 
Subsequently, case-managers and consu/ents considered whether or not the 
payment would get or encourage the able-bodied client to work, and/or whether 
the client was perceived to be acting 'responsibly', or fulfilling their reciprocal 
obligations for the receipt of social assistance (Handler and Hasenfeld 
1991 :201). The work seeking behaviour and/or attitude of clients who are not 
morally excused from paid labour participation then becomes both explicit and 
central to the discretionary decision. 
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(VVe) do something for the person: we expect the person 
to do something for us, and eh in the longer run for 
himself (NL.01.02.M). 
However, the workers perceived that not all of their clients wanted to do 
something for either themselves or the administrator, which can be seen to 
question one of the central legitimising arguments for paternalistic social policies. 
For example, Mead (1997) contends that the administrative influence brought to 
bear on social assistance beneficiaries merely steers the client in the direction 
they would want to go if they only knew the route to take. Long term social 
assistance beneficiaries assert that they want to work, but their behaviour 
continually fails to match their stated aspirations. They are not therefore being 
compelled to do something that they do not want to do, or something alien to 
them. Rather, social assistance beneficiaries simply now 'have to do what they 
always wanted to do' (Mead 1997:64). This contention however, only partly 
resonated with those that are charged with activating clients to the labour market 
in the Netherlands, and administrators continually stressed the importance of a 
'motivated client', and of 'motivating clients'. 
From their point of view it was far easier to work with, to supervise, direct, and 
oversee the transition of a 'motivated' social assistance beneficiary to a potential 
worker. The motivated client is one who, ashamed to be in and therefore eager to 
get out of social assistance, 'works with' the case-manager or consu/ent and who 
actively complies with the administrator by participating in their reinsertion traject. 
The latter clients display an attitude of reciprocity: they 'want to do something 
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back' for the administrator and the Municipality in return for aid. Much like the 
paternalistic conceptualisation of beneficiaries outlined above, the motivated 
client is perceived by administrators to want out of social assistance, but, 
alienated from the world of work for a long period of time, inhabits what 
Engbersen (1989:78/79) refers to as a 'conformist4 culture of unemployment' 
and can not quite accomplish this on his or her own. Such clients 
wants to get out, but they really don't know how or what 
(to do). It shakens peoples lives when they try to get out. 
You can imagine if someone is already ten years 
unemployed the life is, um the life is different from the life 
that you and I know: about getting up at seven o'clock. 
Why should they get up at seven o'clock? (NL.01.02.M) 
Furthermore, administrators recognised that such clients' 'problems' were often 
intricately connected and not easily surmounted in the short term. 
Money problems: they have to pay debts, and uh 
psychological problems, yes, a lot. [ ] and alcohol 
problems, and when somebody has for 28 years a drugs 
problem it's not easy to (get them to work) (NL.01.05.W). 
Essentially, administrators perceived that 'conformist' clients showed willing, 
wanted to change their 'lifestyle problems5, and were motivated enough to take 
the advice/prescribed solutions of the administrator. Other clients however were 
not considered to be at all 'motivated', were thought to exhibit a less than 
4 Engbersen (1989) makes the distinction between 'conformist cultures of unemployme~t' wh~re 
beneficiaries look for work, and an 'enterprising/calculated' culture of unemployment, In which 
beneficiaries have made rational decisions to remain (fraudulently) unemployed. 
5 Administrators were often concerned with the 'rhythm' of such beneficiaries days: staying up 
late to watch television, and getting up late in the morning. 
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reciprocal attitude, and resist every step of the way back to the labour market. In 
keeping with descriptions of the Netherlands' income maintenance system as 
social democratic (Goodin et al 1999) and the argument that associated 
understandings of poverty are largely structural rather than personal (Ditch et al 
1997:39) workers perceived that some of their clients could be better described 
as the 'calculating or the enterprising unemployed' (Engbersen 1989: 78/79). 
You have to work a lot with people who are angry, or who 
do not want to work with you and don't want to get a job, 
and only want money from the government and nothing 
else (NL.01.0S.W). 
Some people don't want to get out (of social assistance) 
because they're involved in crime um, and they use the 
Bijstand only as an income for taxes. Uh, and some 
people, well, they work, they work (on the) black (labour 
market) (NL.01.02.M). 
The Dutch administrators thus claimed to be charged with changing or altering 
the behaviour of a diverse group of social assistance beneficiaries with 'fears, 
problems, or escape routes' (NL.01.04.W). Effectively, this meant that 
You have to motivate people the right way or the bad way 
(NL.01.02.M) 
In line with what Mead (1997) terms a 'paternalistic' approach, motivating 
beneficiaries the 'right way or the bad way' incurred the administrator fine-tuning 
the balance between the client's rights and their obligations; between the 
amounts of 'help and hassle' (Mead 1997:61) administered in an attempt to 
oversee the transition to a job ready client. Clients considered as 'difficult' or 'not 
191 
motivated' were perceived to require far more influence or time and effort on the 
part of the administrator. Beneficiaries, who reneged on their obligations by 
dropping out of classes for example, had to be pursued by the case-manager or 
cansu/ent. 
If everything goes well and the people from the (private 
organisation who implement the client's trajectory to the 
labour market) say, 'well, it's going very well', you don't 
have to see the client. But if they say 'well, he's not 
coming, or it's not going very well, then you have to invite 
the client in to talk about this' (NL.01.05.W). 
'Talking about this' with the client, was sometimes referred to as trying to motivate 
clients by emphasising the social contract, which is inherent in paternalistic social 
policies. Participants were often reminded that they had a responsibility to satisfy 
certain behavioural requirements, such as staying in their traject to receive aid. 
Administrators reported that they often pointed out the consequences for clients 
should they fail to meet the expected behavioural expectations. 
So you say to the client: 'if you don't go (to the 
training/traject) then you get less money (by way of a 
benefit sanction). Otherwise you are trying to stress their 
responsibility: 'everybody has to work, you have to earn 
your own money, uh this (the municipality) is the last 
station' (NL.01.05.W). 
Thus, as Mead (1997:5) argues, paternalist income programmes, and 
concomitantly those who administered these payments, were concerned to use 
the 'benefits on which people depended as a lever to ensure compliance'. 
Ultimately however the administrators' perception was that they could not force 
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an unmotivated beneficiary to work. Enforcing 'mandatory welfare to work 
programmes' was therefore seen as a major difficulty with those clients perceived 
not to want to work (Hasenfeld and Weaver 1996: 235). This difficulty was often 
compounded for the consulent (but not for the case-manager) because of their 
frequently changing and often high case loads, which effectively meant that 
developing long standing or in-depth client-administrative relationships was 
sometimes difficult. Such barriers or constraints should not be underestimated in 
militating against the policy aim of 'helping' or activating people to the labour 
market. Where resource and/or time constraints were perceived as an issue, 
some staff choose to 'cream' off the best or 'compliant' clients (Lipsky 1980), i.e. 
those who were motivated and wanted to work 
If somebody doesn't want to work (then) that's difficult uh, 
I don't put energy into that sort of people. I think if you 
have 225 clients you must put your energy into the 
people who wants to work, and not too much energy in 
the people who doesn't want to. Because, it takes very 
much time to make (a) report (about) those kinds of 
people, and uh, I can put my energy in other clients 
(NL.01.07.W). 
The latter 'kinds of people' moreover, elicited a particular tension for the 
administrator when it came to a request for an exceptional payment. As Trickey 
(2001 :289) points out, the concern to elicit both 'care and control' over the 'able-
bodied poor' means that the 'workfare' or in this case activity fare administrator 
must at the same time 'perform a social work and a policing role' with such 
beneficiaries. In effect, as the following participant's quote illustrates, having two 
conflicting goals, trying to relieve misery with an exceptional need payment whilst 
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maintaining the work ethic of clients who were perceived 'not to want out of social 
assistance' was 
s~mething that every colleague of mine has to grapple 
With, because, on the one hand you try to get them as 
independable as possible, and on the other hand you 
make them very dependable because uh, you give them 
money (NL.01.02.M). 
This tension was worked out case by case. Ultimately, staff perceived that, 
It can't be that easy to apply for something and you get it, 
you know? (NL.01.0S.W). 
As chapter 7 will illustrate, whilst administrators perceived that they could not 
physically force such beneficiaries to work or to change their behaviour and/or 
attitude, they could chastise or try to encourage them with an exceptional 
payment. 
The degree of discretion, or the administrative possibilities that arise from this 
paternalistic welfare configuration in the Netherlands include a deal of choice 'to 
give or not to give' (NL.01.12.W) an exceptional payment; to give in the form of a 
loan or a grant. In this respect, administrators, (most especially case-managers) 
claimed to be able to exercise a considerable amount of autonomy, and that they 
had, or could create, space to exercise their judgement. Indeed, in line with the 
'implementation as organisational development' (Elmore 1997) (chapter 2), case-
managers especially thought that they were being actively encouraged to use 
their initiative. Whilst formally, (consulents more than case-managers) were 
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obliged to work within a decision-making framework for deciding whether and in 
what form an exceptional need payment should be awarded, the majority of staff 
stated that they were able to pit their wits against the legislation and thus had a 
'lot of freedom' (NL.01.08.M) to manoeuvre within it. They perceived that as long 
as they individualised the payment to their client's specific circumstances and 
problems, and often, as shall be seen, (ir-}responsible behaviour, they could give 
'almost anything' 
It's really up to you, how important you find it, and if you 
are smart enough, because huh? You stay human uh? 
So there are persons and you have read their file and 
you say 'oh no. No. I am really kind of gonna work hard 
to find a way to not give it', and then there are other 
(clients) where you say, 'I'm really going to find a way to 
give them everything they ask (for) (NL.01.12.W). 
(the framework) is a kind of procedure: make an inquiry if 
they can get it or not; in a loan or a grant. But, also in the 
workbook it says uh, that you have to look at the 
individual circumstances, so you can make exceptions to 
the general rules, but you have to motivate it very well 
why you make that exception (NL.01.09.M). 
Britain: 'Checking applications' 
Unlike their Dutch counterparts, the Social Fund Officers,6 discretion in the British 
configuration of social assistance for categorising and deciding on 'deserving and 
undeserving' applicants was tightly constrained by the organisational 
mechanisms in place to structure and control their behaviour (Elmore 1997:246), 
as previous research has also found (Huby and Dix 1992). The British officers 
6 Staff are formally termed as 'Social Fund Decision-Makers'. However, whilst voicing this term, 
they frequently referred to themselves by their previous title of 'Social Fund Officer'. 
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were obliged to administer a safety net for the most vulnerable whilst 'watching 
the budget' and meeting targets for clearing work. 
Social Fund Officers' primary concerns were to target a very specific and pre-
defined social assistance population defined by Central Government Directions 
regarding the categories of applicant that payment could be awarded to, which 
the workers perceived as 'very stringent to get into' (B.01.DM2.W). Essentially, 
'applicants who faced a threat of care'; a 'serious risk to their health and safety', 
or who were experiencing 'exceptional pressure', should be 'helped', but not 
'changed' with these discretionary payments. Staff concomitantly perceived that 
Community Care Grants, for instance, were for specific groups of poor people. 
Being poor, or on a low income per se, was not reason enough to warrant 
payment, because then, 'everybody would get it' (B.02.DM2.W). 
You know how the grants are sort of looked upon? They 
need to be coming out of care; a threat of going into care; 
a family under pressure; a prisoner on short-term 
release, or a planned resettlement program 
(B.03.DM1.W). 
Unlike their Dutch activity fare counterparts therefore, Social Fund Officers in 
their 'people processing' section that 'gave' things to people rather than 'did' 
things to them, voiced no wider concern to move their customers out of social 
assistance. Rather, staff activities in the Social Fund section were more 
concerned with collecting information about customers and using that information 
in accordance with prescribed rules, to follow a 'described course of action' 
(Elmore 1978:194). 'The directions'; 'the regulations' and 'the guidance', 
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contained in the Social Fund Guide, were, as previous research has found 
(Walker et al 1991), often referred to by staff in order to 'classify and dispose' of 
customers (Hasenfeld and Weaver 1996:240). The following participant's quote 
illustrates the emphasis that Social Fund administrators make when describing 
their jobs, both to the minutiae of decision making or their processing functions 
and their reliance on rules which tightly bound their discretion 
I check applications from people who apply for grants, 
which are not repayable, for loans which obviously are 
repayable. Make such enquiries as is necessary. Use the 
directions and guidance I'm given [ ] and uh hopefully 
come to a balanced decision, using the law, the 
directions, area decision maker's guidance regarding 
budget status (B.01.DM4.M). 
It is by these functions then, that the officer seeks to determine whether the 
discretionary application is, in the informal but pervasive discourse of the Social 
Fund, a 'payor a nill knock-back'. In comparison with the Dutch administrators 
therefore, there was less emphasis on the 'problems' or behaviour of social 
assistance customers necessitating the intervention of their 'expert' or 
paternalistic judgement. Comparatively speaking British administrators may be 
better described as 'rational bureaucrats' concerned with the 'appropriate 
application of a body of rules and regulations', (Clarke and Newman 1997:6/7) in 
order to come to a decision. 
7Many of the Social Fund staff had been with the DWP so long that they spoke of knowing the 
guide (previously called the Social Fund Manual), or as one of them termed it 'the weighty tome' 
'off by heart'. 
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However, giving things to people without 'doing things' to them, along with the 
narrow focus on (some of the) eligible groups that Social Fund Officers were 
obliged to take, saw them share and articulate one of Anderson's (1991) main 
concerns regarding the separation of cash and care, or more specifically, cash 
and control over the behaviour of the (able-bodied) client. Theirs, Social Fund 
Officers perceived, was a last resort in which no responsibility or obligations for 
the receipt of aid were required from those most in need. Concomitantly, those 
social assistance beneficiaries not considered by 'the system' to be most in need 
of exceptional, discretionary payments8 were the 'normal people'. Ultimately, 
those who exhibited some form of responsibility, were about to start work, or 
looking for a job, were, officers perceived, 'punished', 'excluded' and 'not allowed 
help' by way of a discretionary payment from this 'hived off' exceptional need 
section. As the following participants quotes highlights, the 'irresponsible' or more 
'undeserving' groups however, were given 'aid without behavioural requirements' 
(Mead 1997:3). As Sims et al (1993:24) argue then, and previous research has 
suggested (Huby and Dix 1992:93) tight organisational mechanisms of control 
which structure administrative action need not secure the normative 
acquiescence of the workers: 
And I'll tell you what, the people who come in here, 
normal folk: nothing wrong with them, but they're just 
down on their luck, no money, can't really afford the loan, 
because they're trying to say 'oh, I can't afford this, and I 
need to budget'. They get nothing because they're 
ordinary. Whereas the junkies or the discharged 
prisoners, and your discharged prisoners: 99% of them 
go back into prison, so why, why should they get 
8 Rather than a Budgeting Loan. 
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resettled, 'cos I always say to myself: 'they're just having 
a wee holiday here, before they go back care of Her 
Majesty'. But I can see what the general public. It's the 
groups that have brought most of the problems upon 
themselves, get the aid. But am I being? Although if you 
do get the case where a lone parent or a recovering drug 
addict, and they are genuine, you want to help them 
(B.01.DM1.W). 
So virtually everybody that is turned down for money 
says that: 'if I was on drink', eh, 'if I was an alcoholic or a 
drug addict' (I would get some money). I mean that's, so 
maybe it's just the general perception of 'if you're not 
trying to do anything to keep yourself and em, get out of 
the bit, well, we throw money after you' (laughs) 
(B.02.DM2.W). 
Some of them get on their high horse: 'I'm entitled, I'm 
entitled', and you feel like saying 'it's my income tax 
that's paying this', you know. You think, 'you're a 
layabout, you've not worked, and you're never going to 
work' (B.02.DM1.W). 
As well as this concern with differentiating between pre-defined groups (as 
defined by Central Government Directions) of 'deserving' applicants for 
Community Care Grants, Social Fund Officers' discretion is further constrained by 
'the guidance' provided to assist them in making their decisions. They frequently 
voiced a concern to differentiate between what they termed as the normal, or on-
going needs, and the exceptional needs of the pre-defined categories of low-
income groups. For example, replacement items or on-going needs (Le. a 
need/item not related to the applicant's ability to remain in the community), 
should, according to the majority of administrators, have been met by way of a 
Budgeting Loan. Budgeting loans were perceived by staff to be determined more 
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on 'objective' eligibility criteria9: the length of time on benefit, and the family 
composition of the applicant. What staff glean from 'the guidance', and therefore 
look for in a CCG application is a 'new need', which must relate to the applicant's 
ability to remain in the community. 
Replacement of items is an ongoing need. I mean you or 
I have to replace items. So therefore even if you have 
somebody who's disabled, you know that they are going 
to have to replace the items, so you should be budgeting 
from your income and from your care component. [] But if 
it's a one off [] and it's just suddenly happened. Say (a 
child) had been in foster care, and they'd come home, 
and they had ADHD1O, and they were hyperactive, and a 
bed wetter, and they didn't have a washing machine. 
Although there's DLA 11 paid, we would give them a 
washing machine, because there's something new in the 
household, which is (the child) coming out of foster care. 
That kind of thing. [ ] that's not an ongoing, that's a new 
(need), so we would pay for a community care grant in 
that scenario (B.02.DM1.W). 
Social Fund Officers' discretion is further informed, and more so than in the 
Netherlands constrained, by their concern to 'pay attention to the Area Decision-
Makers guidance regarding budget status' (B.01.DM4.M). Essentially, while the 
Dutch administrators had little direct conception of being budget limited, 
assessment of need in Britain does not take place prior to, or separate from the 
resourcing of intervention to meet it (Clarke and Newman 1997:76). This focus 
on budgets and targets is an integral part of the administrator's job in a 
managerial welfare context: limits on Social Fund Officers are thus 'set by cost 
9 Not always fairly, because they couldn't stop customers 'buying drink and drugs with the 
money'. However, this perception must be understood in the context of a limited eeG fund - from 
which they can not meet people's essential needs. 
10 Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. 
11 Disability living allowance. 
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controls and performance targets' (Clarke and Newman 1997:64). To a large 
extent, therefore, the Dutch concern of trying to meet exceptional need whilst 
activating clients is substituted in the Social Fund Officer's frame of reference by 
their managerial obligation to 'look after the budget' (B.01.DM6.W), which they 
perceive, can not stretch to meeting the needs of those most in need. 
We're talking hard hard times now. [ ] we could (give the 
daily allocation of money for community care grants 
away) in ten minutes and then we could all go down to 
the park and play on the swings. You can see need, but 
you no longer. [ ] That's the problem with the job: sticking 
to the money, you have to stick to the money, because it 
just stores up problems for yourself. It's grossly unfair, 
urn, if someone's need happens to occur in February and 
March, and we haven't policed the system. Because we 
can't say to the client: your need is April to June, you 
know? (B.01.DM5.M). 
'cos we have a budget, we're not allowed to overspend 
on the budget, so, you know? It's swings and 
roundabouts at times; it's like walking a tightrope. There's 
never enough money to meet what people need 
(B.01.DM3.M). 
Because there was never enough money to meet peoples' needs, officers 
perceived that they simply could not manage the budget and meet all of the need 
presented to them. Subsequently, because they had' literally got to bring the 
budget in on penny' (B.01.DM6.W) at the end of the financial year, staff were 
concerned with managing the budget and meeting some of the need. They did 
this by spreading a little money over a large number of customers: giving 
applicants the 'minimum (they could) get away with' (B.01.DM6.W). In effect this 
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meant that only what officers referred to as the 'highest of the high priority items' 
in keeping people out of institutional care would be considered for payment. 
This budget that we've got to operate for community care 
grants is out of order. It's completely, and totally 
ridiculous. I mean people are falling into a category 
where they should be getting paid. 
And you can't? 
They're getting very little. You just give them the 
minimum that you can get away with. [ ] but that to me is 
a scandal [ ] There's people misSing out that should be 
getting help you know [ ] GGG's for example. If you are 
talking about a customer who is setting up house and is 
qualifying under (direction) 4a2 or 4a3. So you know they 
qualify for it, and they've got like three thousand pounds 
worth of household items that they need, because they're 
setting up house with nothing. We then have to pick out 
the items which have the highest priority. Well, the 
government high priority (B.01.DM6.W). 
It's a nightmare sometimes. It's very difficult, knowing 
that these are people's lives and that's. All the items 
they're applying for are important, but you've got to try 
and prioritise them. It is very difficult (S.03.DM1.W). 
Staff thus constantly referred to primarily meeting only the most basic needs of 
('able-bodied') applicants: entirely fitting perhaps with 'liberal' welfare 
conceptions of human needs for subsistence (lgnatieff 1990). As one Social 
Fund Officer explained: 
We work on the premise of the most essential items, for 
anybody is cooker, beds, bedding, pots, pans, crockery 
and cutlery. Now if they had no um, health problems, 
young and fit, um, those would be the items that would 
be the most essential. [ ] every other item, if they're fit 
and healthy as I've said, and they're in walking distance 
of supermarkets, or there's shops around - they can shop 
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daily. So that, no fridge. Washing machines things like 
that, if there's a laundrette, or they're perfectly fit and can 
wash by hand and there's a drying area, then. As long as 
each item after that we can say, 'well, no, you're fit and 
healthy, no, (B.01.DM2.W) 
The latter needs had mostly been informally agreed on by staff in the offices of 
research, as the most essential of all human needs. Consequently, as previous 
research into the Social Fund has highlighted (Huby and Dix 1992) staff 
perceived that they actually had very little discretion in deciding on items that 
could be awarded for payment, and often resented this. 
It's getting to be almost formulised, that we don't have 
any discretion, because (pauses) 
You can't? 
You can't. [ ] and as I've always says as well, you can go 
the wrong way. It's not discretionary: it's (hits desk with 
each word spoken) 'you will only pay that'. That was never 
the intention [ ] you have to make your own individual 
decisions. That you, we can stand up to that and say 'I'm 
sorry, I can argue that and that's what I think'. Em, it's 
extremely difficult with the money. The budget. 
(B.01.DM5.M). 
In effect, their managerial concerns with budgets and (as detailed later in the 
chapter) targets for clearing work, translated to, as they termed it, 'knocking 
back or nilling' as many discretionary applications as possible, and deterring 
customer demand for the immediate Crisis Loans for living expenses (which had 
to be processed on the same day). 'Knocking back' as many 'Iosts, spents or 
stolens,12 as possible, was thought to lower workloads by signalling to potential 
12 Terms used by Social Fund staff for applicants who have spent their benefit moneyl reported 
their benefit money/book lost or stolen. 
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applicants that there was little point in applying, 'in droves' or 'by the bus load' 
(B.01.DM2.W). 
The Crisis Loans, um, that puts pressure on us, because 
we've got to clear them in one day. So that then impacts 
on other business, who are then waiting longer, because 
of these damn targets. Because there was an 
expectation that a lot of these (Crisis Loans) were paid. 
And that attracted more people coming in [ ] a lot of our 
(IRS reviews) are crisis loans and we don't want to pay 
them. But they're getting overturned (at IRS) [ ] I mean 
we'd be awash with claims if we just rolled over and paid 
these (B.01.DM5.M). 
Each organisational context therefore elicits particular constraints to 'helping 
people' for the two sets of workers. The 'paternalistic administrator', in trying to 
change the behaviour or attitudes of their (able-bodied) clients, is able to use 
Bijzondere Bijstand as a lever of compliance in order to overcome the 'role strain 
or confusion' (Young 1981 :36) inherent in meeting need whilst activating (able-
bodied) beneficiaries. Essentially staff attempt to encourage clients to 'work with 
them'. British Social Fund Officers' constraints on helping customers arise from 
their organisational 'managerial' context, in which they can not meet all of the 
need presented to them whilst managing the budget. They are thus concerned 
with excluding as many applicants as possible, rather than persuading, cajoling, 
or disciplining beneficiaries into 'working with' them. 
204 
Separating the 'deserving from the undeserving' poor: administrative 
means and methods 
One of the strongest themes to emerge from the data generated in both countries 
with administrators was their concern to prevent 'fraudulent' or (what they 
considered to be) inappropriate claiming by ascertaining certainty over an 
applicant's exceptional need. The means that the 'paternalist' and 'managerial' 
worker has at his or her disposal generated by the nature of the staff-client 
relationship in their organisations however, Significantly affects the degree to 
which they can achieve this goal, and establish what they perceive to be 
important for the awarding of a payment. The Dutch administrators are 
concerned both to determine the honesty and living standards of those 
'apparently impotent' claimants, as well as the level of motivation and work 
seeking behaviour/attitude of the able bodied. British Social Fund Officers on the 
other hand, perceiving that they are 'not allowed to help' 'responsible people' or 
those seeking work with a discretionary payment, are more concerned with the 
'genuineness' of applicants. 
Comparatively speaking, gaining certainty over a client's exceptional need 
request was far easier for the Dutch administrator. Concerned with developing 
staff-client relationships conducive to 'people-changing' administrators needed to 
ascertain a relatively high level of knowledge about clients and their problems. 
The paternalistic assumption was that clients needed direction if they were to live 
constructively, overcome their problems and attain self-sufficiency. 
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Administrators perceived that especially beneficiaries 'who have a lot of 
problems', left to their own devices, would 'do nothing' (NL.01.05.W). 
Getting people on a job it's, that's not a challenge. It is a 
challenge to resolve the problems around the person. 
So for instance, what kind of problems might they be? 
Um, getting a home, a decent home. Um, debts. Many 
debts (laughs) um, try to learn (the Clients) how to get 
along with money, and how to spend the money. Um, 
addict, um, yeah, when a woman lives alone with 
children: try to get a balance in working and uh looking 
after the children (NL.01.15.W). 
When asked to consider hypothetical applicants (see vignettes in Appendix 3) for 
payment case-managers and consulents frequently voiced that they would 
already 'know their client's' particular circumstances and 'problems'. The face-to-
face client-administrator meetings and conversations held previously (or for the 
specific purpose of the application - see below), would subsequently allow staff 
to individualise the payment to the applicant. In the case of the able-bodied 
beneficiary seeking an exceptional payment, they would also know how 
'motivated' he/she was and, as the following participant's quote highlights, would 
already have a degree of certainty over 'whether or not to give' 
(discussing scenario 1) Well, the first decision I make is, 
how serious is he? When I know him, when it's my client 
and I know he's very serious and he's very motivated and 
I know he doesn't have (clothes suitable for an interview) 
because he always comes in very old clothes, well then I 
know whether to give him (NL.01.03.W). 
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The latter responses, whilst frequent, were not exclusive. As outlined previously 
in the chapter, regular face to face interviews, or an in-depth knowledge of the 
client's case history and problems were often hampered for the consulents 
(rather than case-managers) because of their relatively high, and in some 
instances, frequently changing case loads. However, when they 'did not know 
the client' requesting an exceptional payment, they would want to. Face-to-face 
interviews, amongst other things, allowed administrators to check the motivation, 
or the reciprocal attitude: the willingness to actively look for a job (van Oorschot 
2000:36) and therefore in this configuration of social assistance, the 
'deservingness' of the able bodied unemployed. 
(discussing scenario 1) I would like to know him better, 
before I would say well, we'll give you some money. If 
he's serious about looking for work and things like that 
(NL.01.09.M). 
The principle of individualisation in decision-making necessitates an in-depth 
personal assessment of the client and their circumstances. The rules of what 
normal benefit rates 'should' cover mean that they can not award this type of 
payment to someone whose personal circumstances they do not know in-depth. 
If I know him (and his background) I can make it (the 
case to award payment) stronger, but if I don't know him 
then it's going to be difficult. So on the first instance it's 
no because he um, should be saving. Shoes and a suit is 
normal clothing (NL.01.04.W). 
It depends on how he looks. Is he looking very bad and 
(does) he smell? (NL.01.0S.W). 
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In a system where such payments are used by the administrator as a lever of 
compliance moreover, face-to-face interviews allowed the administrator to 
stipulate the terms on which a payment would be given, or to 'bargain for welfare' 
(Mead 1997:5) with the able-bodied applicant. 
(Discussing what might happen to the male applicant in 
scenario 3 under the case-the management system) for 
him I would make a work police, a contract where we 
make a plan that he can get everything he wants from me 
then at that time (in effect the carpet, cot and pram). 
Everything, but at the same time he gets a (telling that) 
'this is what we agree, this is what you are going to do -
in six months you have to find (a job) and out! And you 
are not coming back to this office within two years 
(NL.01.12.W). 
For those applicants judged as 'impotently' poor, and thus morally excused from 
work the honesty, or sincerity of the client became more of an issue for the 
'activity fare' administrator, echoing Knegt's (1987:122) research. Certainty over 
need (for relatively large and expensive items of household furniture) in such 
instances is primarily gained through house visits, which served a variety of 
purposes in the Netherlands. 
In contrast to what we might expect from what has been described as a social 
democratic income maintenance system (Goodin et al 1999), but more fully in 
line with paternalistic welfare provision, the living conditions of 'impotent' 
applicants requesting furniture needed to be, by administrative standards, visibly 
poor (discussed further in chapter 7). Administrators thus wanted to 'know what 
was happening' at the clients' house (NL.01.15.W), this allowed both a moral 
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evaluation of a client's consumption standards and could also detect fraudulent 
behaviour. 
We (will) go and see the beds and the cooker because 
only one has serious problems (in relation to bed 
wetting), and they are asking for three beds. Well, then 
we wonder: 'well why three when only one has 
(incontinence) problems' (NL.01.03.W). 
Well, first I would ask her why she needs three (new 
beds), and I would go to her house and look at yeah, 
what's really going on (NL.01.09.M). 
Relatively speaking, when considering an applicant's exceptional need, the 
Dutch administrators, in their paternalistic 'people changing' role, were 
concerned with and able to, consider the client's particular underlying reasons for 
being reliant on social assistance. They were further able to pick and choose 
carefully as to who would be helped, how much and under what conditions. Thus, 
their decision involved not only a determination of the reasons for poverty, but 
also a prediction as to the likely effects that a special payment would have in 
relieving it. 
Conversely, for the Social Fund Officers situated in their 'people processing' 
'anti-paternalist' (Clarke and Newman 1997:50) welfare context, the relative 
nature and duration of client-staff encounters differed significantly. In a 
comparative perspective, the degree to which the Social Fund Officer can 
ascertain certainty over an applicant's need is very much constrained. 
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Essentially, staff-client encounters in the Social Fund were seldom face-to-face 
, 
mediated instead by an application form. The customers' problem and whether or 
not it sufficed to place them in one of the pre-determined categories of deserving 
applicants had mostly to be gleaned, in the first instance, from their written word. 
As officers dealt exclusively with the exceptional needs of social assistance 
beneficiaries, customers' circumstances often had to be wholly determined from, 
and verified by, a variety of sources. The DWP computer system allowed the 
officers to ascertain the type, nature and duration of a claimant's benefit history. 
Outside organisations, for instance social work agencies, the housing department 
or a woman's refuge, which might be more involved with the applicant, could be 
contacted by the officer to confirm their story13, as long as the applicant had both 
detailed them, and, because of the Data Protection Act, given their express 
permission, 'ticked the box on the form' (B.01.DM6.W). 
Such documentary procedures were rarely perceived by administrators as the 
best means of ascertaining whether or not somebody fitted the directions for a 
discretionary award. In part, this was due to the nature of the forms, which 
several staff felt customers needed the skills of 'a Philadelphia lawyer to 
understand' (B.01.DM1.W). Often therefore, staff perceived that there existed a 
mis-match between the documentary methods of application to the Social Fund, 
and the literacy competence of clients 
13 This term was repeatedly used by Social Fund Officers to denote the applicant's account of 
their circumstances (rather than a fictional tale), which officer's perceived mayor may not have 
been true. 
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We take the information simply that's put on the claim 
form [ ] we're relying on somebody's ability to fill in a 
form. Not many clients are actually ... very good at that. 
So the applications that come in are usually quite scanty 
(B.01.DM5.M). 
Confirming previous research (Huby and Dix 1992), staff further felt that with 
'processing pieces of paper' (B.01.DM5.M), the resultant lack of any kind of 
personal interaction with customers was simply not conducive to making what 
they termed as 'quality' decisions. Often for instance, it was perceived that 
clients, in trying to articulate their needs on paper, failed to provide an inkling that 
they might be classed as one of the groups eligible for a discretionary award 
You can gauge a lot from a person: talking to them, 
rather than what they write down on a piece of paper [ ] 
the ones that are more difficult is where it could be a 
family under exceptional pressure; it could be domestic 
violence, and it hasn't really come out very well on the 
form. And then when you start to talk to them they say 
'well, this happened'. And it doesn't say anything on the 
form about, woman's aid or that. It's only when you talk to 
them, they say 'well, I've been in a woman's aid hostel' or 
'the police were involved', and then you can find out, you 
can check up the information' (B.02.DM1.W). 
The difficulties of ascertaining need from a piece of paper and/or multi-agencies 
were further compounded for officers by their managerial targets for clearing 
work. Comparatively, the speed at which officers made their decisions on the 
hypothetical applications presented to them was striking. The theoretical 
literature in part, supports this finding. Social Fund staff-client encounters after all 
are 'not concerned to change the behavior' of customers (Hasenfeld 1972:257). 
Staff perceived however that each encounter with the client's written word had to 
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be carried out in as fast a time as possible due to the amount of applications 
received and targets for processing applications. 
I'm involved with Crisis Loan (decision-making) at the 
moment. So it's as customers turn up, they're dealt with 
just as they turn up. Yeah. And the other loans or grants 
are dealt with in date order. We can't do anything else 
other than that method, 'cos if you try to prioritise, you get 
nowhere! Somebody needs a cooker: is that more 
important than a washing machine or whatever, so we 
just date order and we just plough through them. That's 
all we do. 
Researcher: right, so when you say it's date order that's 
like? 
The date received in the office, you get a date stamp on 
it. 
Researcher: and then it's so many days from then, that that 
claim has to be 
Well, there is a, or should be dealt with, within a certain 
period of time, eh, otherwise we get black points for it. It's 
got to be cleared within a certain amount of days, it's not 
always possible, for, for reasons various: staff on sick 
leave or whatever, eh, but we try our best (S.01.DM3.M). 
The grants hit the tray, they're uh, they're recorded by the 
clerical assistants, uh, put in date order into the tray and 
(participant sighs heavily) a couple of us, if there are a 
couple of us there, just muck in and take the oldest ones 
first and just, go through them (8.01.DM4.M). 
Often therefore, forms that lacked (sufficient) information in effect meant that the 
application, if not unambiguously satisfying any of the directions, was rejected 
because of the time it would take to look for further information, and the 
budgetary controls outlined earlier. The onus was then on the applicant to ask 
for a review, where staff carried out a face to face interview, looked for, and often 
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found adequate information, of a sensitive, personal and distressing nature, 
which staff perceived, customers were often reticent to disclose on paper. 
People come in and they're maybe incontinent or they've 
got something that they really don't want anybody to 
know about, and they don't put it down on their claim 
form. I'm there and I'm saying 'have you any health 
problems'? 'No, no I'm fine'. And then I'm trying to say 
'well if you're fine then you don't fit into these categories [ 
] so if you have got anything'. And then all of a sudden 
prfft, they've got all this. And I say 'well, why didn't you 
put it on'? And they say 'oh, I didn't want anyone to know, 
it's personal' [ ] um, I mean I've had some horrendous 
stories here [ ] and naturally, they're saying 'well, would 
you want to put that on a form' (B.01.DM2.W). 
Essentially, the lack of face to face interviews for discretionary payments, meant 
that administrators lacked the ability to gain a great deal of certainty over the 
applicant's need: it was very difficult to decide the 'genuineness' of the applicant 
from a form. 
And you get a far better feel, as to whether somebody's 
em, telling you porkies or not, if you actually speak to 
them. There's no doubt about it. Because anybody can 
say anything on a form. And it works the other way, 
because sometimes you think 'pull the other one', and 
then you speak to the person, you know: 'I think that's a 
very genuine person', you know. And yet you wouldn't 
have got that impression from the written word at all 
(B.02.DM2.W). 
Paradoxically however, where the applicant had tried to signal to the officer that 
they belonged to one of the deserving groups/category of applicant with a high 
priority need, administrators became suspicious, as previous research has also 
found, that the applicant knew how to, what staff interchangeably termed 'play, 
screw or abuse the system' to get themselves a discretionary award (see also 
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Howe 1985). By definition therefore, the genuine or deserving people did not 
know what to put down on the form, and so again missed out. Those that were 'at 
it' (B.03.DM2.W) however 
Know the wording of the code, inside out: 'this would be 
a serious risk to my health and safety if I did not get'. 
They know, they know. They know to say, in certain 
cases, that 'the bed was ruined because of 
incontinence', and the spelling of that can be a joy! [ ] 
So they have a child without a bed. Whereas, the 
genuine case would say 'the child is incontinent 
because of whatever, and I've tried cleaning it, and the 
bed is a bit smelly', em, 'I would like a new bed 
because of that': that's normal replacement, and the 
child's still got a bed, so they can clean it. So that's the 
genuine case, and the other one is 'the child doesn't 
have a bed. The bed's out in the skip' (B.03.DM2.W). 
In the case of Community Care Grants especially, officers perceived, Gust like 
their Dutch counterparts) that house visits, which were rarely funded by their 
superiors, or indeed thought to be welcomed by either claimants or those who 
lobbied on their behalf14, would have been most beneficial. Whilst this finding 
echoes previous research into the Social Fund (Walker et al 1991), the present 
study suggests that what officers were equally concerned with was 'getting the 
word out on the street' that any given CCG claimant might be visited on spec, 
rather than by appointment. This, it was felt, would deter those applicants staff 
perceived were looking for a 'top up of benefit' and out to 'screw or abuse the 
system', (an enduring theme in this area of provision in Britain as chapter 3 
highlighted) because they would not know the exact date/time at which they 
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should engage in such behaviour as hiding their 'stuff up In the loft' 
(B.01.DM5.M) 
If you thought 'this doesn't sound', I'm going to go out 
and check'. Yeah, we'd done that and it had been quite 
successful, because they'd got the items. Especially if 
you didn't tell them you were coming out. But we can't 
fund it anymore. So you've really got to go on what 
they're writing down (B.02.DM1.W). 
Ultimately therefore, the documentary procedures that Social Fund Officers had 
primarily to rely on, and the resultant lack of house visits or face-to-face contact 
with customers, meant that staff were never really sure whether or not they were 
doing something socially worthwhile. 
And paying out the correct need, that's the bit that gets 
me, because then I would feel that when I was sitting 
down with some of these pieces of paper, that this 
person I was thinking about, did need that. Or didn't as 
the case may be, and I could make a correct decision. 
I'm doing the best I can but I don't know whether it's right 
or wrong (B.03.DM2.W). 
Working within these constrains, and in an attempt to ration very scarce 
resources, Social Fund Officers 'invented a version of mass processing' that 
would allow them to 'deal with their public fairly' (Lipsky 1981 :24). Whilst they felt 
unable to ascertain a great deal of certainty over an applicant's need, what they 
could gain certainty about, from the computer system and the customer's 
application form 15, was the previous number of applications the customer had 
14 For instance CAB, Welfare Rights, and the Independent Review Service for the Social Fund 
were often perceived by staff to militate against house visits. 
15 The Clerical Officer details the amount of previous applications on the applicants' form, before 
it is put before the Social Fund Decision-Makers. 
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made to the Social Fund. The administrative meaning of the Social Fund as a 
'one off payment scheme', then becomes very precise, applicants fitting the 
directions should be awarded payment only very rarely. 'If they haven't had one 
before' was a major criterion of deservingness, or factor in the decision-makers 
frame of reference for awarding a Discretionary Community Care grant or Crisis 
Loan. 
(Discussing interviewing customers for Crisis Loans in 
order to determine their 'deservingness') I mean it's 
difficult to say. Because when they come in they're 
usually all in the same, the same boat and it's obvious 
that they are em, on a low income. However, em, 
(pauses) we don't. If they, if they've spent the money and 
they've got proof and they can verify what they've 
actually spent the money on, and they're genuine, and it 
was a one off situation and they know that it'll not happen 
again, then, then, usually we'll pass that on [ ] we usually 
look at their history, if they've had previous: if not then 
that's a big (B.01.CO.W). 
(Discussing scenario 2) I'd then go into the system, we 
have the facility on the system that for um, individual 
items, we can go up to 200 weeks back and see previous 
applications. So what I'd do is, I'd pull that up and I'd start 
saying 'right, what have we had?' if um, they'd had say a 
cooker [ ] repeat claims should em, normally be dealt with 
as a budgeting loan [ ] when we've got so many new 
claims that we're actually looking at (B.01.DMS.M). 
The 'regulars', as staff termed applicants who had previously applied for or been 
awarded (any form of) payments from the Social Fund, were perceived to 
repeatedly, impudently and sometimes angrily demand their rights, and consume 
two of the administrators most scarce resources, time and money. Moreover, 
officers perceived that, because the resources were hoarded by the 'regulars', out 
to 'screw or abuse the system', the (administratively, rather than officially defined) 
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deserving people, either those ineligible for help, or, even more deserving, those 
that did not ask for it in the first place, were missing out. 
What we have is. We have a very small, 5 to 10 to 150/0 
probably of our popular client group, are the regulars. 
There's others who might have been on benefit for years; 
we never hear from, right? And you've got the certain 
crew, that are never away from the place. These are the 
real, that give us the troublesome. Because they're the 
ones that give us repeat work. Time after time after time, 
they take us away from helping the people that don't 
come [ ] because em, many of the people had no 
previous knowledge of social security, there was no one 
telling them. You don't need to tell this 10 to 150/0: they 
could work here! 
Researcher: Who are the, you know those core people? Who are 
they? 
We have a lot of problems with like junkies and that with 
Crisis Loans. The others are lone parents, urn 
incapacities of various disorders, urn, others that have 
managed for some reason to be on benefit for years 
(B.01.DM5.M). 
Within these organisational limits to their discretion, and perhaps Social Fund 
Officer's training/educational backgrounds (discussed previously in chapter 5), 
there was little administrative recourse to the dynamics of poverty or the 
associated barriers to the labour market which might be faced by the groups of 
'regular' or long-term social assistance beneficiaries. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has addressed the nature of the two exceptional need schemes 
under study. The respective configurations of social assistance clearly 
influenced both the workers' perceptions of what they, as the 'last resort', were 
there to provide, and thus do with, for or to applicants: to change or process 
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them. However, in a comparative context, the 'moral code' (Knegt 1987) of those 
who administer exceptional payments from within these two welfare states is 
strikingly similar. Essentially, those compelled to distinguish between the 
'deserving and the undeserving poor' (Handler and Hollingsworth 1971 ) 
differentiate between the impotent and/or responsible 'deserving poor' on the one 
hand, and the able-bodied, irresponsible 'undeserving poor' on the other. 
However, the administrative horizons of possibilities, or lack thereof, for deciding 
on or choosing the 'deserving poor' are structured and constrained by their 
organisational contexts. 
The British 'managerial people-processing' context on the one hand, and the 
Dutch 'paternalistic people-changing' context on the other, can be seen to inform 
and structure what the two sets of workers are concerned to do. In the 
Netherlands, exceptional needs are met by administrators in the context of 
activating or motivating social assistance beneficiaries (either socially or to the 
labour market), whilst the British officers meet the needs of those most in need 
whilst managing a budget and meeting targets for clearing work. The staff client 
relationships which these contexts generate see the Dutch administrators reticent 
to award payment to those clients they do not know relatively well, while in 
Britain, officers are reluctant to award payment to those they know to be 'regular' 
Social Fund applicants. 
In the Netherlands, administrators use Bijzondere Bijstand as a (complex) tool of 
administration, as a 'lever of compliance' to chastise, motivate and/or alter the 
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behaviour of a diverse clientele with 'fears, problems or escape routes' 
(NL.01.04.W). Concerned with the socialisation or re-socialisation of clients , 
discretionary decisions regarding an exceptional payment are firmly situated in 
an assessment of the client's behaviour, their perceived ability and willingness to 
change. The decision explicitly therefore entails a reciprocal element. What has 
the client done, or will the client do, in return for the payment requested. 
Social Fund Officers conversely, separated from the administration of 'welfare to 
work' in Britain administer a safety net for the most vulnerable, and perceive that 
they are 'not allowed' to help claimants whom they often consider to be 
'deserving' of a discretionary payment. Here, the directions, regulations and 
guidance, as well as targets and budgetary constraints inform, structure, and 
constrain decision making, rather than concerns to 'activate clients'. 
In comparison with the Netherlands, the British officers perceived that both time 
and financial resources were inadequate compared to the tasks they were asked 
to perform. A large number of 'customers' press their demands on one side, 
while on the other the Social Fund Officer is subjected to 'intensified forms of 
centralised power and control, through tighter fiscal control, policy directions and 
an apparatus of audit and evaluation' (Clarke and Newman 1997:29). This 
organisational context is perceived as a 'no-win situation', which subsequently 
informs administrative actions of 'knocking back', and/or deterring, as many 
discretionary applications as possible. 
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This chapter then, illustrated that Dutch administrators use exceptional payments 
as an 'implementation method', to achieve the result of getting applicants out of 
social assistance. Conversely, Social Fund Officers are obliged to concentrate on 
results associated with efficiency and evaluation. Relatively speaking the 
methods of implementation to achieve these become less important (Clarke and 
Newman 1997:64). 
Organisational environments and configurations of social assistance have been 
shown to condition the ways the two sets of welfare state workers perceive a 
problem and frame solutions to it. Ultimately, the environments and associated 
methods for separating the 'deserving from the undeserving poor' inform, shape 
and constrain the actual practise of administrative discretion (Hawkins 1992:3) 
and thus can not logically be separated from the discretionary decision itself 
(Emerson and Paley 1992:231). 
From a comparative perspective moreover the degree to which the two sets of 
workers can exercise discretion is, as the following chapter illustrates, the degree 
to which they can effectively exercise social control. 
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Chapter 7 The administration of loans and grants: controlling 
budgets and behaviour 
'Social security and the control of the poor are inseparable issues', argues Dean 
(1991 :59). Drawing on Townsend (1979:823/824) he argues that the function, 
and particularly the administration, of social security benefits has as much to do 
with controlling behaviour as it does with meeting need. By illuminating the 
meanings associated with the administration of forms of exceptional payments, 
loans and grants, this chapter argues that administrative control is contingent on 
particular social assistance configurations. 
Whilst controlling the behaviour of clients is not an absent concern for the British 
administrators, discretionary decision making on loans and grants is informed 
and constrained by managerial concerns of controlting a budget and rationing 
'the demand for services' (Higgins 1980:19). In the Netherlands conversely, 
loans and grants in an 'activity fare' context were used as a system of 
'individualised rewards and punishments' (Dean 1991 :31). Such forms of 
exceptional payments therefore constituted 'the explicit (and paternalistic- 'carrot 
and stick') means used by the 'people-changing' staff to 'influence clients to 
comply' (Hasenfeld and Weaver 1996:238) with their reciprocal obligations for 
the receipt of social assistance. 
'The right money to the right people' 
A comparable and salient theme arising from the present research was the 
Significance administrators in both countries attached to the different forms of 
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payment at their disposal: grants and loans. Notwithstanding the different 
degrees of discretion (outlined in the previous chapter) that the two sets of 
administrators employed, in all instances staff were concerned that, where 
possible, the 'right people,1 received the right form of payment to meet their 
exceptional need. 
In both countries, grants were perceived as a unilateral money exchange, in that 
administrators frequently voiced that clients and customers would not have to 
pay the money back. Within their particular organisational context they did 
consider certain forms of customer and client behaviour as an 'equal good from 
their subjective perspective' however (Goodin 2002:588; see also Gouldner 
1960:172). Exceptional payments in the form of loans on the other hand 
essentially have reciprocity built in to them, because, in the words of both sets of 
administrators, clients and customers will be 'paying it back'. 
These perceptions and meanings attached to grants and loans are moreover 
inextricably bound in the administrative frame of reference with the nature of the 
needy: notions of responsible/irresponsible (Knegt 1987) and hence deserving 
and undeserving applicants. To a greater or lesser extent, depending on the 
social assistance configuration, administrative concerns and decision making on 
deservingness centred on whether applicants for an exceptional payment were 
thought to be 'genuinely ill, genuinely seeking work, (or) genuinely supporting 
1 Social Fund Officers frequently reported that their 'mantra' was 'the right money to the right 
people at the right time'. 
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children on their own' (Townsend 1979:823). As Townsend (1979:823) argues, to 
give an exceptional payment (especially by way of a grant) without assurance of 
the latter factors would come into conflict with other values upon which many 
societies are built, and it might be argued with which both sets of administrators 
comply: that incomes are earned from work, and that men living with women 
should support them. 
'They don't have to pay it back': awarding payment as a grant 
Administrative justifications for 'who gets a grant and why' are firmly situated in 
the paternalistic and managerial organisational contexts and constraints in which 
they work. Essentially, Dutch activity fare administrators were keen and, unlike 
their British counterparts, able to reward the behaviour of those clients who made 
their job easier: 'motivated' beneficiaries who were thought to want to get out of 
social assistance. The latter clients were seen to be reciprocating by, as Van 
Oorschot (2000:36) argues, actively looking for a job or showing willingness to 
participate in a re-insertion programme. Subsequently, the perception that clients 
were trying to do something back for the administrator, often overrode issues 
associated with the 'control' (Cook 1979; Golding and Middleton 1982; Van 
Oorschot 2000; De Swaan 1998) that the able-bodied beneficiary could have 
exercised over the need presented to both consulents and case-managers, and 
saw them considered for a grant, rather than a loan from Bijzondere Bijstand. 
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'I think it will be a gift': the Netherlands 
Such concerns are clearly explicated in the administrative responses to vignette 
scenario 1 (see Appendix 3). For the consulents, who as outlined in chapter 3, 
had to work closer to the municipal guidelines than the case-managers, this 
scenario represented what many of them termed 'a difficult decision' because of 
the explicit acknowledgement that items of clothing and footwear are included in 
the general social assistance scale rates in the Netherlands (Ministry for Social 
Affairs 1990:95). Thus, such applicants could be considered responsible for their 
plight in that normal benefit rates allow for saving for the items now requested by 
way of an exceptional payment. 
It's very difficult. He's not working and he has a normal 
income of 500 guilders and this payment is meant for rent, 
food and clothes. (Points to vignette) he's asking for shoes 
and a suit. He has to save (for those items) from his normal 
income (NL.01.01.M). 
However, while these costs should be met by normal benefit, the vignette 
scenario suggests, and the majority of consulents subsequently considered, that 
the applicant was very close to the labour market, was fulfilling his obligations for 
the receipt of social assistance, and that such a payment might get him 'out of 
social assistance', to work and self-sufficiency. Being able to assure themselves 
that the client was indeed looking for work (by the means and methods for 
separating the deserving from the undeserving poor outlined in the previous 
chapter), consulents were disposed to actively search for information that would 
individualise the payment to the client's specific and 'special' circumstances. 
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The most common reason offered, or constructed by the consulent for the 
applicant not to have been able to save from his normal income for the items 
requested, was that he had previously had some kind of a problem. For instance, 
a former addiction would have meant that budgeting from his monthly benefit to 
buy clothes would not have been one of the applicant's major concerns. 
He gets money every month [and] there is a part of it to save 
up for clothes and for shoes, that sorts of things. [So in] just 
a standard case - normal people - we will not give it. The 
case that I know that it does happen was someone who had 
been in em, well, how do you say that. He was in the past a 
heavy drinker, an alcoholist. Now he was clean and this was 
his first chance to get a job. But, he had never bought new 
clothes for years because he was heavily drinking, and then 
we said 'if he goes there (to the interview) in these clothes, 
he will surely, not get the job'. So we said 'we have to give 
that man a chance'. So then it happened. (NL.01.06.M). 
The importance of reciprocity as a good of equal worth for the activity fare 
administrator is further highlighted by the following participant's quote. 
Essentially, the following client need not have been considered for a payment 
from Bijzondere Bijstand at all, because the municipal guidelines suggest that, as 
chapter 3 outlined, social assistance beneficiaries with no debts be referred on to 
a social lending bank. However, the administrator is keen to reward what she 
perhaps considers to be the client's good behaviour with a grant. 
If they have no debts, they don't belong here, they must go 
to a bank for people with a low income. So, urn, if they have 
no debts they must go there, always. Uh, but now I'm busy 
with a man who pa(id) his debt for three years (to the social 
lending bank). (He) must now move (house) and asks for 
(flooring) and (redecoration) costs, and in that situation I 
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don't think it's fair, because he's (already paid) for three 
years to come out of his debt, and then uh 
Researcher: He would have to get another debt? 
Yes. So I think, and I write down (on the report) that he must 
get Bijzondere Bijstand as a gift (as a grant). And I must 
motivate why I think that: because he lived three years 
(already) on a low level, he pays his debts, he is starting 
again, uh making something of his life. He's young and he's 
had many problems but now I think he must have help by us. 
So we have that option, but you must always motivate. 
Researcher: so, because he's starting to get his life together? 
Yes, he is in a traject, and that goes very well. I have the 
report of it, and I don't think it's fair that we give him a loan 
again. So that's why I motivate to give him Bijzondere 
Bijstand (NL.01.07.W). 
Case-managers however, not being concerned to work as closely to the 
municipal guidelines as consu/ents, were not troubled with what 'should be'. 
Instead, they were concerned with what 'could be': which in this instance was 
getting a motivated social assistance beneficiary into the labour market. Rather 
than being concerned with issues of control or with constructing clients' 
circumstances as in some way special, case-managers explicitly considered and 
voiced issues of reciprocity in their decision-making. 
First I will see how hard he worked about uh education, 
experience in work eh? Maybe volunteers work, or whatever 
he was doing. When he really can show me (that) he was 
really active and, and yeah, and really already, really 
working on it.. (NL.01.12.W). 
As the latter quote highlights, a unilateral payment of a grant can be given by the 
paternalistic administrator as a reward for reciprocal behaviour rendered by a 
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client in the past, which many further considered would serve only to increase the 
client's motivation to look for work, by reinforcing the client's good behaviour. 
if we have him on a traject, and it's about to end, and the 
ending is to go to work, well, then almost every time we 
would do this for him to show that we do something extra to 
help him. It motivates quite a lot for people, and (shows him 
that) he has been taken serious if we do this and then he will 
be very serious about the solicitation (search for work). This 
is an example of how to motivate people, yeah (NL.01.02.M). 
Unlike their British counterparts therefore, the Dutch administrators stated that a 
grant could and would be given to those who were deemed to be motivated and 
'really looking for work'. Perhaps more surprisingly, the case-managers (but not 
the consulents) would also be able, and inclined, to award those they perceived 
as 'not motivated to work' a grant for exceptional items requested, in order to try 
and elicit feelings of obligation from those they perceived as undeserving able-
bodied beneficiaries in the future. As outlined in chapter 3, under the new case-
management system in the main municipality of research, the social assistance 
beneficiary would be required to sign a written and binding contract detailing the 
mutual contractual obligations of both parties: cash assistance (and in the 
context of the present research any exceptional needs) and employment 
preparation in return for conscientious participation. As Handler and Hasenfeld 
(1991 :221) state, in the context of welfare to work, contracts are 'supposed to 
change values', and thus the attitudes, motivations and behaviour of the poor. 
Those piloting the new system in part talked of removing barriers to the labour 
market, as the clients themselves perceived them. 
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We are going to give everybody a contract. And what we 
want to try to do is ask: what do you need, what do you think 
you need to get back to work? (NL.01.03.W) 
Nonetheless, essentially such a flexible system of carrots or economic incentives 
(giving clients 'what they think they need' to get them to the labour market) came 
with ever-tighter strings for the social assistance beneficiary, in an attempt to, as 
Higgins (1980:5/6) argues, achieve a greater level of social control by changing 
the behaviour of the poor. 
I can imagine that you (will) say 'well we are giving you this, 
this and this. But in the contract it also (states that) within a 
year you have to work. So it's not giving without. 
Researcher: getting something back? 
Yeah (NL.01.03.W). 
As seen, with able-bodied beneficiaries, one of the activity fare administrator's 
primary concerns when considering a payment from Bijzondere Bijstand was with 
the applicant's perceived level of motivation, which was perceived as a good in 
kind for the payment of a grant. Dutch administrators were just as concerned 
however, with getting something they perceived to be of equal worth from the 
impotent beneficiary in return for a grant. Essentially, not only should such 
applicants have little control over their situation, they also had to display 
responsible spending patterns and be, by the paternalistic administrator's 
standards, 'really (visibly) poor'. 
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As the theoretical literature on the deserving and undeserving poor suggests 
(Cook 1979; Golding and Middleton 1982; Van Oorschot 2000; De Swaan 1998), 
the Dutch administrators considered that impotent applicants (not yet able to, or 
expected to work) with a relatively high degree of need (e.g. those with children, 
and those who had spent long periods on benefit) were prima facie 'deserving' of 
a grant. That said, applications for exceptional payments were not be taken on 
face value, and administrators were concerned with ascertaining the nature of 
the needy. For example, those perceived to have little control over their need 
(see vignette scenarios 2 and 4 in Appendix 3) simultaneously elicited a great 
deal of sympathy, alongside notions or concerns about fraudulent behaviour, 
from. administrators. 
In order to ascertain if applicants were 'undeniably sick' (Hill 1969) the vast 
majority of the Dutch administrators voiced that, as there were 'no doctors or 
nurses here!' (NL.01.01.M) they would send them to the (independent doctor 
situated in the) GGd. Administrators reasoned that, such applicants might 
actually be benefit 'malingerers', out to top up their earnings from the informal 
labour market 
I always see if they use their health or if it's really health 
complaints. 
Researcher: some people use their health as a .. ? 
Yahh, there are many. They, first they start with a pain in 
their arm and when they see you are not convinced they 
2 Gemeentelijke Gezondheids Dienst: municipal health service 
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cannot work then they have an arm and a shoulder, and then 
they find a way to go. Then they have a knee and a, and 
then they have a, whatever they have. Just more and more. 
We have now a man from Turkey, 27 years (old), three 
children. At first he um, uh, had a little back problem, and 
now this was not enough. Now he has bronchitis from there, 
and now he's asthmatic; bronchitis and now he is getting 
mental problems. And every time when he sees, when we 
say '27 and a little pain in the back. Come on, and ok we 
huh? We take it that you can do uh, something, slight work, 
we have a light job'. (He says) 'ah, no light job'. He's getting 
stress. (holds her hands up to her head) so every time he's 
building it up. So, by the time he's thirty then his wife (will be) 
coming to wheel him in! it's really pitiful. 
Researcher: [ ] I wonder why they. Why do they? 
Ah, well with this person we think he is working black3 for it 
huh? So we think. Crazy people (NL.01.12.W). 
In order to be eligible for a grant however, those judged by the GGff to be sick, 
and thus to have little control over their need or situation, also had to be by the 
paternalistic administrator's standards visibly, or undeniably poor. Ascertaining 
the latter was done by house visits, which, as a surveillance technique, served a 
number of purposes for administrators. House visits allowed the administrator to 
check the existence/condition of the item requested, and could also be used to 
check 'if people are cheating' (Piven and Cloward 1971 :172). For instance an 
alert administrator on a house visit could pick up signs of fraudulent behaviour: 
indications of an undeclared source of income from the informal labour market 
perhaps, or of cohabitation from a supposedly single applicant. 
3 This was a term used by the Dutch administrators to denote working in the informal economy. 
4 Gemeentelijke Gezondheids Dienst municipal health service 
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If the whole house is very sober, you know they don't have 
much money and they really need (the item requested). But, 
if there are all new goods uh, you can suspect something 
else (that) could have consequences for the assistance (they 
are receiving). So we have a (fraud bureau) - so you always 
have to be very aware (NL.01.1 O.W) 
One of the most salient concerns of the administrators was to use the house visit 
not only to see that the item requested was actually 'needed', but to check that 
the applicant was, what they termed, 'really poor', and thus deserving of a grant. 
To be judged as deserving in the latter respect, the impotent applicant's home 
should show no signs of what administrators considered to be 'luxury' items like 
'big televisions, lots of stereo equipment and very nice carpets' (NL.02.02.W). 
Such items Signalled to the administrator that clients engaged in irresponsible 
spending behaviour, squandered their money on 'luxury' items and then asked 
the Socia/e Dienst to supply the necessities of life (for instance cookers and 
washing machines). 
(Discussing a recent decision to give a woman a grant for a 
washing machine) urn, I went for a house visit to see what's 
in the house, so if they (would) have (had) a big stereo or 
television that size (motions with hands) .... But it was very 
poor. Uh, her machine was already broke for two weeks so, 
and she has a child, so she has everything (to wash) by 
hand, and she has complained about (motions to forearms) 
(pain) here and here, urn, and the furniture in the house was 
very old (lowers voice) and sad, so uh, that was, yeah [ ] 
house visits give you a good idea of how somebody is, how 
they live and what kind of person (they are) (NL.01.14.W). 
Those impotent beneficiaries thought to be behaving themselves therefore: 
'really poor', truthful, and with a lack of control over the need they now request 
payment for, were likely to be given a grant rather than a loan. 
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(Discussing scenario 4) I think in this sort of case we can say 
em, maybe yeah, because huh? It is most(ly) a fault of the 
ex-partner, so maybe it is not fair to get the money back 
(from her). So, I think this is a good example where we say, 
although maybe it should be a loan, we can give it to her (as 
a grant) because there are very special circumstances 
(NL.01.06.M). 
(Discussing scenario 2) Because they are nineteen years on 
(social assistance), and they are not going to work because 
of their problems, and they have two daughters in the 
puberty, and they couldn't save any money because they 
(have been on benefit) for nineteen years, so yeah (they will 
receive the money in the form of a grant) (NL.01.05.W). 
In sum, grants are used by the paternalistic activity fare administrators as a 
system of rewards and incentives. The payments therefore operated as a 
relatively flexible implementation method that helped them to do their job: get 
able-bodied applicants out of social assistance, and socially activate those 
perceived as not able to work. In Britain in contrast, as the following section of 
the chapter highlights, the factors affecting decision making concerning the 
award of a grant have as much to do with the Social Fund Officer's managerial 
concern of controlling the budget as with policing or influencing the behaviour of 
applicants. 
'Think about the budget': grants in Britain 
Unlike their Dutch counterparts, British Social Fund administrators were not 
concerned with awarding payment in order to get social assistance beneficiaries 
to comply with their reciprocal obligations for the receipt of social assistance. As 
outlined in the previous chapter, effectively Social Fund Officers perceived that 
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they were 'not allowed' to reward the behaviour of able-bodied deserving 
customers looking for work with grants. 
Deserving, or as staff termed them, 'genuine' people in this configuration of 
welfare for a non-repayable grant are primarily non-'regular' customers with little 
control over the need presented. Community Care Grants were, in the officer's 
frame of reference, used for relatively narrow purposes: to keep people out of 
care; resettle people leaving care into the community; and to ease 'exceptional 
pressure' that families might face. Like their Dutch counterparts, Social Fund 
Officers considered whether or not the applicant could have exercised control 
over the need presented for payment an important issue, and were just as 
reticent not to award a grant to 'benefit malingerers'. In keeping with the principle 
of less eligibility, Social Fund Officers perceived that those supposedly impotent, 
but untruthful applicants who might actually have a deal of control over the need 
they presented for payment were 
aggravating for the normal man in the street, who's working 
in a factory, or, doing just a normal, no high flying executive. 
And he sees (people 'signing sick' that) he's maybe been at 
school (with): can still go to the bookies, and can still smoke, 
and is walking with a stick, and not a thing wrong with them. 
Next thing you see them on the golf course. You know, that, 
that is annoying (B.01.DM1.W). 
Determining the existence of illness, and hence the deservingness of the 
apparently impotent however, could not be done with a high degree of certainty. 
Unlike their Dutch counterparts, British officers, primarily reliant on documentary 
procedures, did not have the opportunity of sending the applicant to an 
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independent doctor to check the existence of any stated illness they had 
documented on their claim form. Instead staff relied on the DSS computer 
system to indicate the customer's receipt of any 'extra benefits' such as Disability 
Living Allowance (DLA), the absence of which they reasoned signalled that 
supposedly impotent applicants 'can't be that bad' (B.02.DM1.W). Whilst the 
existence of any stated illness ultimately had to be taken 'on face value' 
(B.01.DMS.M) by staff, receipt of these benefits effectively served as an 
indication of deservingness: by providing administrators with an inkling that the 
customer may be under 'exceptional pressure', or that someone might face a 
'threat of care' 
(Discussing scenario 3) If the DLA care came up on the 
computer [ ] I would replace the cooker (with a grant). I 
would give them the cooker but I would say no to the beds 
(B.02.DM1.W). 
However, the computer system could give no such inklings about the 
genuineness of beneficiaries whose need did not engender any 'extra benefits'. 
Ascertaining whether, for example, someone had been the victim of domestic 
abuse and therefore had little control over the need presented, was subsequently 
very difficult. Because of the client-customer relationship inherent in case-
management, the Dutch administrators conversely, might have had a deal of 
contact with women in such situations (see scenario 4, Appendix 3), and thus 
know whether or not to trust their accounts. Social Fund Officers however, 
relatively devoid of face to face contact with applicants, were more disposed to 
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take the word of other agencies who might be involved with the woman, in order 
to 
satisfy ourselves that her partner was violent. 
Researcher: so how do you do that? 
Social work department. Contact the customer: 'were the 
police involved? [] Have you been to see a lawyer? [ ] if 
you're saying that you've left your violent relationship, eh, 
we'd like you to prove that to us please'. Because people 
could be telling us something that's not true (B.01.DM3.M). 
Indeed, in the main office of research in Britain trust and rapport established 
between the reviewing officer and a representative of an outside agency who 
might be familiar with the customer's situation, rather than between the customer 
and the Social Fund Officer was frequently seen as an important factor in 
identifying the deserving, or truthful applicant 
At the review stage (the woman) would come in with a 
woman's refuge (worker), they always come in with a 
woman's refuge worker, in this area anyway, and that's 
where I get all my information, all the background. [ ] .. I wait 
'till they come in and we can chat face to face, because em, 
we've got a good rapport. And I know that they're not going 
to tell me a lie, and they know where I sit, and how I'm going 
to look at things, um and just the mere fact that (the refuge 
worker is) sitting there, that I can do something, because 
they're not going to bring these people in if they know that 
they're (lying) yep (B.01.DM2.W). 
As seen, similar issues surrounding the truthfulness of impotent applicants (and 
hence control over need presented for payment) were also important to the 
Dutch administrators, but these were combined with a concern to ascertain 
whether or not the applicant was 'really poor'. Conversely, in Britain's 
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configuration of social assistance, where administrators can rarely get such 
certainty from house visits, the latter concern is replaced with whether or not the 
customer is a 'regular', or has had a grant in the past. 
As outlined in the previous chapter, Social Fund Officers were reluctant to award 
a grant to the heterogeneous group of customers they perceived to be, and had 
informally labelled, the 'regulars'. Such customers were thought to be persistently 
out to 'milk or screw' the system, or to 'top up their benefit', rather than being 
someone who, until now, had hidden their misery and asked for nothing (van 
Oorschot 2000). As Howe (1985:69) similarly argued, 'greedy and grasping' 
claimants were thought to hoard resources often at the expense of the 'genuine 
claimants' which, in the context of the present study, only served to compound 
the difficulty in managing an inadequate CCG budget, where need often went 
unmet by a grant. 
The same group of people who know how to work one 
system, or milk one system, will milk another system. And it 
makes it harder for us 'cos we're now budget controlled, 
we've got to space it out [ ] there's sometimes ones where 
you feel 'God, I wish I could give you this'. But we just don't 
have the money (B.01.DM1.W). 
Whilst dealing with, refusing and deterring applications from such customers was 
a daily part of their job, Social Fund Officers felt that they could not always refuse 
a 'regular' claimant a CCG, because such applicants had come to 'know what to 
put down to get themselves a grant' (B.03.DM2.W). Ideally however, customers 
fitting the directions for a Community Care Grant (or a discretionary Crisis Loan) 
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should 'get one go at it' (B.02.DM2.W) and be granted payment once or as rarely 
as possible. In order to manage the budget then, behavioural concerns in this 
configuration of social assistance, where staff were concerned with processing a 
large number of exceptional need applications in relation to a small budget, 
include the customer's claiming 'history', the less applications they have made, 
the more deserving they are considered 
(Discussing scenario 2) We tend to look at the history, 
although it's probably not strictly (allowed). I would tend to, 
on this one, check when they had last received beds. [ ] it 
depends on the circumstances: if they'd had beds in the last 
few years, you wouldn't expect these beds to be. 
Researcher: gone 
Within that time. So that would reduce the priority. Obviously 
beds are a high priority, but if there had been another few 
applications [ ] we can't say 'you're lying'. We can say 'it's 
unlikely that the items are needed' (B.03.DM1.W). 
(Discussing scenario 4) Unless she's got a previous history, 
you've got to. I mean if she did it twice, I would be. [ ] we 
would look in the computer system 'oh, she got a grant in 
such and such, I wonder what that was for?' we could 
probably check it that way (B.01.DM1.W). 
A further strategy used to ration scarce resources when administering grants was 
to give customers the minimum amount of grant they felt able to 'get away with' 
(B.01.DM6.W). Much of their day was thus spent eking out the grants budget 
over a large number of claims. In their daily struggle to manage the Community 
Care Grants budget, British administrators were frequently aware that they were 
affecting peoples' quality of life. Much of their time was spent (often in 
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consultation with their colleagues) making what they termed 'judgement calls', as 
previous research also found (Huby and Dix 1992), and agonising over relatively 
small amounts of money. 
A disabled pensioner visiting her daughter in hospital, uh, 
she's asking for uh, visits twice per day, seven days per 
week. Our budget can't stand that. So, yes, you can see it's 
essential. Uh, would you pay that? No you wouldn't. Pick 
brains about that. 'How does twice a week sound instead of 
fourteen times a week?' Ok. On the back of that, can we 
sustain uh, the cost of a woman visiting, and her husband or 
partner, visiting a new-born kiddie, seriously ill in (a 
children's hospital) (B.01.DM4.M). 
In effect, these organisational constraints often necessitated that Social Fund 
Officers consider grants and loans for the deserving simultaneously, in an 
attempt to mix and match the forms of payment available to them to meet the 
applicant's need in full. 
(Discussing scenario 3) A grant for a bed, and the offer of a 
Budgeting Loan for a cooker (B.01.DM1.W). 
(Discussing scenario 3) I would be looking at the cooker (as 
a grant) urn, to relieve any exceptional pressures depending 
on the budget. But if not, the cooker and the other two beds I 
would be considering either under a Crisis Loan for items, or 
looking at the Budgeting Loan first to see if they could get a 
Budgeting Loan for them to claim that (B.01.DM2.W). 
Thus in the context of a budget limited fund, whether the applicant is deserving/ 
faultless of blame, is only one of the administrator's concerns. Often, Social Fund 
administrator's responses to the vignette scenarios of potentially deserving 
applicants included 'it depends on the state of the budget' (B.01.DM5.M). Thus, 
where the Dutch administrators considered washing machines a necessity for 
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'deserving' applicants, in Britain they were seen to represent a drain on the 
budget, and were only considered when applicants had 'health problems'. 
A washing machine, I don't know, you know. I mean we're 
pretty hard, if the children are eight and twelve ok. But a 
washing machine: everybody's got one I know that. But, but 
if she can wash in a sink or hand wash. I know that's pretty 
basic, but if she's no health problems then whatever, and 
we've got to think about the budget, all the time, you know 
(B.01.DM3.M). 
As the last participant's quote demonstrates, Social Fund Officers frequently 
referred to themselves as 'hard' and more often 'cynical', which constitutes a 
striking contrast. Essentially, the fictional characters in vignette scenarios 2 and 4 
elicited a great deal of sympathy from the Dutch administrators. Both were 
constructed as faultless of blame, and in the case of scenario 2, were thought to 
have endured nineteen years on the social minimum, be 'really poor', and have 
many health problems along with a child with an eating disorder: they would thus 
get everything they had asked for. 
In Britain, conversely, whilst such applicants were constructed by Social Fund 
Officers as being under 'exceptional pressure' or 'at risk of care', sympathy for 
the families was tempered by a sense of cynicism and the use of what staff 
termed as 'black humour'. In effect perhaps these constituted organisational 
coping strategies (Sims et al 1993), and allowed staff to (mostly, but as chapter 8 
will highlight, by no means always) disengage their emotions. In the context of 
the budget-limited fund, staff perceived that it simply was not possible to meet all 
of the need presented to them. The use of 'black humour' and disengagement 
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were further encouraged perhaps by the documentary procedures of the Social 
Fund, which facilitate little human contact between staff and customers. Thus 
staff spoke of continually processing, or dealing constantly with what they 
informally termed 'hard luck stories'; of being 'fed up' reading all day about 
'exploding cookers everywhere', so much so that one participant reasoned that 
'there should be Boom! Boom! Going off all round the country - because they 
never just stop working: cookers, they always blow up', (B.02.DM2.W) and 
'people peeing in every bed they had'. 
The latter part of the chapter illustrated the divergence in the administration of 
grants. Both sets of exceptional need administrators were concerned to control, 
but with more emphasis on either budgets or the behaviour of applicants. Free 
from budgetary concerns, the Dutch administrator was able to use this form of 
payment as an implementation method to do their 'people-changing' job: 
reinforce or attempt to influence the behaviour of social assistance beneficiaries. 
In Britain conversely, where managing the budget is an essential part of the 
Social Fund Officer's job, the administration of grants becomes a complex mix of 
controlling money and morals. On the ground, these factors influenced who got 
a grant and why. 
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'They have to pay it back'. The administration of loans 
The administration of exceptional payments by way of a loan highlights further 
differences in the two countries under study. There were clear differences for 
example in the amount of administrative discretion or control over such awards. 
In the Netherlands, administrators had more discretion in deciding whether a 
client should be awarded payment via Bijzondere Bijstand or not; as a grant or a 
loan. In Britain conversely, Budgeting Loans were perceived by Social Fund 
Officers to be for 'anyone' to get; assessed on 'objective' criteria by the computer 
system (length of time on a qualifying benefit; amount of outstanding debt), and 
not by way of the administrator's discretion. In other words, administrators in 
Britain perceived that they were unable to deny an applicant a Budgeting Loan. 
That said, administrators in both countries perceived loans as enforcing 
obligations because clients and customers had to pay the money back. In 
contrast to grants, loans were primarily perceived as 'individualised punishments' 
(Dean 1991); as 'sticks' to chastise the undeserving able-bodied unemployed, 
who 'should be working', and as a 'safe bet' in instances where administrators 
perceived that it was, or would be, difficult to get certainty over the supposedly 
impotent, but possibly fraudulent, applicant's exceptional need. 
This form of exceptional payment was used in both countries to enforce a degree 
of 'responsibility' in the irresponsible able bodied poor, who were thought to have 
a deal of control over their situation, and who administrators perceived blatantly 
flouted the widely held value 'that incomes are earned from work' (Townsend 
1979:823). Administrators reasoned that ultimately they were unable, (and in the 
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case of the British officers formally unconcerned) to force such applicants to the 
labour market. They perceived that awarding, or offering them a loan 'which they 
had to pay back' rather than a grant at least did not make it any more attractive 
for them to remain on social assistance. That said, there were some subtle cross-
national differences. In the Netherlands loans were effectively used to 'chastise' 
those who were not seen to be complying with their obligations for the receipt of 
social assistance, whilst in Britain conversely, Social Fund Officers were often 
keen to enforce a less eligibility status on undeserving applicants. 
Loans in the Netherlands: Chastisement 
In the Netherlands a salient theme elicited from the paternalistic administrators 
was that to give (especially a grant) to someone who was failing to fulfil their 
reciprocal obligations, i.e. was able to work, but was perceived not to want to, 
would do nothing for their motivation. Giving claimants money would do little to 
encourage them to get out of social assistance and attain self-sufficiency 
because all of their needs were being met by social assistance. In the activity 
fare context therefore, reciprocity can function as a 'principle of exclusion' 
(Komter 1996:299) for those who were not considered to be fulfilling their mutual 
obligations. A minority of administrators for example considered that unmotivated 
applicants should be given nothing from Bijzondere Bijstand. 
(Discussing scenario 3) I want to know why he's in 
unemployment? Why is he unemployed? This kind of. 42 
years old is very young, so I would. No. I would say 'you can 
go to any factory and you can go and work'. So I wouldn't 
give him it, this, because, yeah, he's young, he can work, 
and why hasn't he (NL.01.07.W). 
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More often however, as the last chapter outlined, activity fare administrators were 
confronted with the moral ambiguity inherent in trying to meet the needs of the 
able-bodied, and assumed to be, unmotivated beneficiary, whilst also seeking to 
activate or maintain/instillabour discipline (Handler and Hasenfeld 1991 :37). 
Ultimately, generosity, i.e. giving a grant to those who lack an attitude of 
responsibility and reciprocity is constrained by the need for labour discipline. In 
their quest to 'people-change', the Dutch administrators considered that 
subsidies alone were no solutions, rather, what was needed here was 
'behavioural change' (Anderson 1991 :9). As the administrators saw it, they had 
to 'break' the client's cultural acceptance of a life in long-term unemployment. 
Such clients were perceived by some administrators as having 
created their own image about their life and about their 
world, and you have to break that before you can make them 
see that, that they're able to do a lot more than just sit in that 
little world. You have to break that image he has first; (get 
him to see) that he is not worthless and he can do a lot. 
There is more ways for him, or that there is work for him; the 
situation can be changed, he has to see that for himself [ ] it 
doesn't just change with me giving them the money. It 
means they have to change their lifestyle, and they have to 
change the way they do their finances (NL.01.04.W). 
It is thus with such clients, as Handler and Hasenfeld (1991 :38) argue, that the 
contradictions in welfare provision, i.e. symbolic clashes between generosity and 
the symbols of work, responsibility and proper family and personal behaviour are 
manifest. The concern for the Dutch administrators then becomes to 'grant relief 
whilst preserving the work ethic, controlling deviance and maintaining labour 
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discipline'. As seen, whilst case-managers might be inclined to use a grant as a 
'carrot' to the labour market for such applicants (provided they signed a contract 
promising to 'got to work'), the primary source of control that the consulates 
could exercise was to award payment in the form of a loan rather than a grant, in 
order to provide a spur back to the labour market. 
I don't think it's a (grant) but it will be a loan by us. So I 
wouldn't give it to, I wouldn't give (grant) him this because, 
yeah, he's young, he can work, and why hasn't he? (If he 
were to get payment as a grant) he's then not motivated (to 
work) because he gets anything, everything from us 
(NL.01.07.W). 
I think that they could get a loan, but I wouldn't just give it to 
them because he's not that old and uh, one of these 
(applicants in scenario 3) can stay at home and the other 
(can work). [ ] it's not motivating to give everything, because 
it's too easy then (NL.01.11.W). 
In the Netherlands the administrator would not only give such applicants a loan, 
they would also give them what might be considered 'a good talking to'. 
Administrators perceive that what the male beneficiary in scenario 3, for 
example, really needs is a change of attitude and behaviour, to take 
responsibility for his family by working and providing for them. Ultimately, the 
applicant was seen to be asking for things that he in his role as a father and a 
husband, and not the state, should be providing. He was shirking his 
responsibility as breadwinner, and in the Dutch configuration of welfare, this is 
what he would be told. 
(discussing scenario 3) They don't get it all. Only maybe the 
bed for the child, maybe. And I think that's all, and uh, a very 
hard talk for responsibility, strong talk. 
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Researcher: to stress that? 
Well, 'you are making children, then you have to take the 
responsibility of being a family'. And as well for his wife 
because uh, she let it happen to have babies. 'You are both 
r~sponsible', yeah. Because of the rules we have (they are) 
eight years unemployed, uh, they should get things easier. 
But the responsibility of having your family is more important. 
Researcher: to bring up your family, to provide for them? 
Yeah, yeah (NL.01.12.W). 
(discussing scenario 3) 'you have two children, you have 
little money, you create a third child, and you just throw 
everything away from your previous child. And now you think 
you can just apply and we're going to give it'. Urn, I don't 
know what kind of a person he is, but if you see those 
people who are very long on, on welfare, or quite long on 
welfare and are creating children and children and children, 
they're making their own situation a lot tougher. Not that. 
You can not say to somebody: 'you can't have children'. But, 
it's, you know? It's a reality sense which they kind of lack. 
That already makes it clear why they're probably on welfare. 
If you are creating children when you have no money at your 
back, and, and the presumption that somebody else is going 
to solve it for you (NL.01.04.W). 
One issue not found with British administrators, was the 'proximity to us' (De 
Swaan 1988) as a condition of deservingness. Van Oorschot (2000:39) suggests 
for example that the typical characteristics of the most undeserving would 
incorporate a 'needy person who is able but not willing to get himself out of 
trouble, who has not contributed a great deal to the community from which they 
now ask for help, whose neediness is not that serious and who has an identity 
different from the potential helpers'. On the latter point a minority of 
administrators voiced that they 'saw this type of behaviour a lot' with Dutch 
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immigrants, who, as Spies and van Berkel (2001) point out are over represented 
in the social assistance population in the Netherlands. 
This is a case I often see with uh, foreign people. The man 
doesn't want to (work) or feels sick or ill, and the woman 
isn't, well, I may not say it, but she's not allowed to, from the 
husband in most cases. And, (they have) a lot of children. 
The women sometimes want to (work), but it's not in their 
culture and, it is in ours, but not in theirs (NL.01.11.W). 
Loans in Britain: enforcing less eligibility 
In Britain conversely, Social Fund Officers perceived that they were unable to 
deny an applicant a Budgeting Loan. This relative lack of control, served as a 
source of frustration at times because officers perceived that customers could 
effectively get loans for 'anything', including drink and drugs. The latter 
perception was especially riling in the context of a budget-limited grants fund, 
which officers perceived was vastly under funded by Government. 
Notwithstanding the latter point, Social Fund Officers, like their Dutch 
counterparts perceived that loans should be given to the irresponsible able-
bodied, as well as to the 'regulars'. As the latter were thought to be out to 'milk 
or abuse' the system, Social Fund Officers reasoned that refusing such 
applicants a grant and encouraging them to apply for/making them the offer of a 
loan, meant that such customers were 'not really screwing the system, because 
they have to pay it back' (B.01.DM6.W ). 
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As seen in the previous chapter, the Dutch administrators made recourse to 
'cultures of unemployment' (Engbersen 1989) in regard to who they perceived as 
the 'irresponsible' undeserving. Social Fund Officers, however, seemed more 
disposed to the perception that some rational and calculating beneficiaries were 
encouraged by the social security system to 'abandon all responsibility, because 
the social will provide' (B.03.DM2.W), and thus to remain, or become dependent 
on benefit instead of taking (low-paid) work. The applicants in scenario 3, for 
example, are primarily constructed as being out to 'top up' (what the officers 
perceive as) their already generous benefit level due to them being one of the 
'client groups that have five, six children, while on social security' (B.01. DM5.M) 
which they are then able to get extra premiums for. 
(Reads scenario 3) ... mhm, typical, having all their children 
while on benefit. There was one the other day, this chap, 
and he had a, he did have a disabled child, and you feel 
sorry [ ] I think they had three or four children, and it was 
causing a lot of distress, which it must do. And then he 
cheerfully says 'my wife's pregnant again'. Pfft, and I 
thought, 'in this day and age', when, em, unless they had 
some strong beliefs about birth control. Which they're far and 
few between these days (B.02.DM1.W). 
Therefore British administrators perceive that the family, devoid of any moral 
excuse from paid labour, are already more eligible than many independent 
labourers (including, incidentally, themselves as Civil Servants) and thus get 
'more money than the majority of people that are working' (B.02.DM1.W) from 
remaining on the 'passport' benefit of social assistance 
There's no incentive for them to go out and work. Its. The 
system's all wrong. It makes it too easy for them: there's no 
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incentive. I mean not for the single person. I wouldn't like to 
live off of fifty-three quid a week. No way. But the people 
who've got families, and kids, it's all these hidden benefits 
they're getting (B.02.DM1.W). 
Whilst not formally responsible for the calculation or administration of the 
beneficiary's income support levels, Social Fund Officers are concerned about 
them, and reasoned that such customers could never 'earn' as much through 
their own efforts as they were able to receive in benefit payments. 
(Reads scenario 3) see? There you go. He's been 
unemployed for eight years, and they've got three kids. (The 
participant had earlier been relaying a conversation between 
staff concerning people who apply to the Social Fund to 'milk 
the system'). I think they're looking at it: 'it's just a top up of 
benefit'. The same as having children: it's a top up of benefit. 
[ ] ... a bloke: he's got five kids, he's been on benefit since 
1990, his benefit rate is three hundred and something. He's 
got child benefit on top of that. He's not paying full rent; he'll 
not be paying council tax. They get free, free school dinners, 
which is what? £1.25 a day for possibly five children. Eh, 
they get access to interest free loan. They get everything 
that's going: that man couldn't earn that. No way. The 
system should be that you get paid for the amount of 
children you've got when you come on benefit, if you have 
any more that's up to you. [ ] why should they not pay poll 
tax, God. They're getting their dustbins, education, and God 
knows what else [ ] we all have to pay (S.01.DM1.W). 
In short, in both countries, those perceived as able-bodied irresponsible social 
assistance beneficiaries who (for whatever reason) remain on welfare rather than 
taking a job, are constructed by the administrators as undeserving of a grant, and 
instead are penalised with a loan. Whether the major theme is to chastise 
beneficiaries into 'working with them', or to make them 'less eligible' than the 
lowest independent labourer, such strategies can be considered as (either 
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explicit or implicit) attempts to enforce the value of work by giving the 
irresponsible able-bodied applicant the 'less attractive' form of exceptional need 
support (Higgins 1980:4). 
Loans were also given in both countries where the administrators perceived that 
it was, or would be difficult to get a high degree of certainty over the supposedly 
impotent applicant's exceptional need. Vignette scenario no 4 (see Appendix 3), 
a scenario of a woman and her children fleeing domestic violence, was a 
situation with which both sets of administrators seemed more than familiar, and 
which elicited the strongest concerns of 'fraudulent' claiming. The most salient 
themes in this respect were the administrators' suspicions that the woman had 
either entirely fabricated the account, or more often, that she would, or had 
resumed a relationship with her partner and the couple were now conspiring 
together to defraud the municipalityl'social' into giving them money. 
Furthermore, in both countries administrators were often reticent to award 
payment to the same women more than once, even when they recognised a 
cycle of abuse in situations of domestic violence. This was either because they 
seemed at a loss to understand why women in these situations repeatedly 
returned to their abusive partners, and/or (in Britain), because of the budget. 
Essentially, women who could not provide proof that they had been in a violent 
relationship or that they did not have the items they now requested for payment 
were suspected of fraud. If administrators could not satisfy themselves on the 
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latter issues from the (diverse) procedures available to them then they would be 
more inclined to award payment as a loan rather than a grant. 
The Dutch administrators perceived that deciding on a form of payment had a lot 
to do with whether or not they 'trusted' the woman who would be on their case-
load of clients, and who they may have met with a number of times. 
If you see this it's always, um, it has a lot to do with trust. 
And if this person uh, uh? You've seen her regularly, and if 
this person gives you the feeling that (her story is) upright 
and there's not, there's no side things, well I think, um yeah, 
I would try to give her the best. But it, it has, it's a tricky thing 
em because a lot of people can give you that feeling but, 
yes. 
Researcher: but what is going on? 
Yeah, well maybe she's back with him. This is a really 
difficult situation (NL.01.02.M). 
However, as the latter participant's quote illustrates, even with relatively frequent 
face-to-face meetings with such clients, administrators were always aware that 
they could in fact be being duped. In cases where there was doubt, and 
suspicions of fraudulent claiming from her (and her partner), administrators 
preferred to err on the side of caution and award a loan rather than a grant. One 
participant, in a quest to see if the items were 'really needed', had constructed 
what he thought to be a novel (and rather paradoxical) way to ascertain how 
truthful such clients were by their desperation for the items in question; which 
could be judged by their acquiescence or willingness to accept a loan rather than 
a grant. 
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Well in case of doubt, I think I would [] have to see if it 
would be a loan. 
Researcher: would it be a loan if you had any doubt? 
Yeah, yeah. Sometimes uh, I present it as a loan just to see 
how people react. When they say 'well, if it's a loan I don't 
want it'. sometimes .. well, some people don't want loans, 
but sometimes the answer is based on that it's not really 
necessary (laughs). If the washing machine really is broken, 
well, you can't live without it .. and then (the client should be 
thinking) 'I don't (care) if it's a loan or a grant, I just need the 
washing machine' (NL.01.09.M) 
It was not only women who they suspected of being fraudulent or untruthful that 
they would award a loan to in such circumstances. A victim of domestic violence 
or not, one of the primary concerns of the paternalistic administrator was that of 
enforcing responsible spending patterns amongst the poor. Should such 
applicants' home circumstances display any signs of what they considered to be 
'luxury' items therefore, they were considered undeserving, and would be given a 
loan, or nothing at all. 
I need to know what's happening there ... if there's a big 
television and that kind of thing. That's not uh (laughs) .. 
that's not the necessary things. A washing machine and two 
children, you need a washing machine with two children, 
three children. But if you have a television and a stereo and 
all kind of debts and no washing machine, I think ok. 
(laughs) .. You must learn the people also to get 
responsibility for their own actions huh? So um, 'ok you have 
money, you buy a television and you come here to get a 
washing machine?' .. if she says 'yeah I bought the 
television a month ago' huh? Then I say, 'ok well you can't 
get a washing machine from me' (NL.01.15.W). 
In Britain, as the following participant's quote highlights, the administrative 
concern was not just that the woman could be a 'regular' or 'back with him'. 
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Administrators perceived that there was a further possibility that the couple was 
actually involved in a conspiracy to fraud 'the social' and get a (council) house in 
another area. 
You'd have to look more into the background of that. Em, 
because you get people who go into the woman's refuge all 
the time. And they're in and out, and in and out. It may well 
be that she's done this before, and she's maybe had a 
Community Care Grant in the past, for setting up a home. It's 
not unusual, um, for them to have a history of leaving their 
husband; getting a house, going back to the husband; 
woman's refuge; getting a house. It goes on all the time. [ ] 
and a lot of people come. It's a way of getting a house. [ ] 
they're not averse to putting themselves in woman's aid, 
because they want out of the area that they're living in. 
Researcher: I never thought of that. 
And they go into woman's refuge, and they're willing to stay 
there for a month. It's quite nice in the woman's refuge I 
think. I've never been in there. It's apparently. You should 
arrange to go and have a look. And then they get allocated a 
house. Then the husband, then some of them reconcile with 
their husband, he comes back [] and they've a nice little 
house next to their (relatives) 
Researcher: I never thought of that. 
Mhm. They do that all, they do that quite a lot. [ ] em, so 
depending on what had happened in the past, it might well 
just be a Budgeting Loan, for a cooker and a washing 
machine. She might not be classed as under exceptional 
stress 'so what. You've done it five times before, you've had 
a grant for these items, you should really be trying to get 
them back' (B.01.CSM.W). 
Here again we see the Social Fund Officer's concern (not entirely absent from 
the Dutch responses in this scenario) with 'regular' applicants. However, this 
concern is not only because they perceive that regular applications may be a 
sign of fraudulent applications. Some officers recognised that there were 'bad 
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bastards out there' (B.01.DM5.M) whose partners were trapped in a 'cycle of 
abuse' (B.01.DM5.M). Even in such instances where administrators were 
prepared to accept that women had suffered repeated assaults however, working 
under a budget-limited grants fund saw them reticent to award to the same 
woman 'again' because of the budget. 
There are cases that we've had, where, there's been no 
doubt about it: domestic violence has happened, where 
they've had two payments. Because they've set up home 
one place [ ] they've got it all set up. And then the man's 
found them, destroyed the house again, and then they've 
moved on, and they've come into our area. So sometimes 
you go into the computer systems and you can see they've 
had it already. So initially, your thought is 'finish it. Boom. 
Nothing. You've had that. We can't sustain this'. But then 
you start to think, and find out that there's genuine reasons, 
you know (B.01.DM6.W). 
Having no budgetary constraints to worry about, the paternalistic administrators 
seemed more frustrated, or let down by women who returned to their abusive 
partners. 
most of the times it's happened (the beating/Violence) but 
then they go back (to him) and you have given all new things 
and, even with the violence (she still goes back to him) 
(NL.01.03.W). 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that making sure that the 'right people' got the right form 
of exceptional payment was very important to both sets of administrators, who 
thus acted, not with a 'dead bureaucratic hand' (Dean 1991 :3), but rather with 
meaning when they awarded payment as a loan or a grant. Moral categorisations 
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of clients by administrators always preceded organisational and legislative 
categorisations, even if they could not always determine who got what form of 
payment. 
Furthermore, the forms of payment at the disposal of the two sets of 
administrators were, as seen, tightly tied to their perceptions of deserving and 
undeserving applicants. Grants, were thus given by the Dutch 'paternalistic 
people changing' administrators as a reward or a carrot to good (reciprocal and 
responsible) behaviour. In Britain, where managing the eeG budget is part of 
their daily job, attempting to influence or reinforce behaviour for Social Fund 
Officers becomes more difficult. Grants were primarily for the impotent and non-
'regular' customers. Even then, 'depending on the state of the budget' loans often 
had to be simultaneously considered by the officers in an attempt to meet need. 
That said, the administrative meanings attributed to loans in both countries saw 
them primarily administered as metaphorical 'sticks' used to punish the behaviour 
of 'work-shirkers and fraudsters'. Thus, Townsend (1979:824) argues that those 
who defend the flexibility in meeting need which discretionary systems permit 
forget that the same flexibility exposes social assistance beneficiaries to 
unconscious, if not conscious manipulation by staff on behalf of society and its 
approved values. 
The present chapter has shown however, that those who actually seek to 
administer exceptional payments in accordance with 'society's values' have to 
work through their specific organisational contexts and constraints. These clearly 
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influence the degree to which administrators can explicitly regulate the behaviour 
of the poor by using grants and loans as disciplinary mechanisms or as a system 
of individualised rewards and punishments, to normalise or effect the substantive 
control of individual behaviour (Dean 1991 :31). 
Dutch 'activity fare' administrators are able to use loans and grants as an explicit 
form of social control, in that they seek to meet need whilst explicitly regulating 
behaviour in accordance with the values of work and personal and family 
responsibility and behaviour. British Social Fund Officers however do not have 
the time, resources or methods which would allow them to work on the 'habits 
and economies of the poor' (Dean 1991 :57) in the same way. Rather, they are 
impeded both by their concerns to manage the budget for Community Care 
Grants, and the perceived separation of the Social Fund from the wider welfare 
to work context. 
This chapter has begun to illuminate that, in both countries under study, the need 
of the applicant is only one consideration for those who administer exceptional 
payments. The nature of the needy is just as important. From a comparative 
perspective, such concerns have implications for theoretical conceptions of 
'human need' on which such systems are argued to be based, and to which the 
following chapter turns. 
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Chapter 8 Social Assistance Beneficiaries can't be Choosers: 
Administrative Notions of Needs and Wants 
This chapter is concerned with the concepts and theoretical models of the 
workers who are professionally engaged in the business of meeting (Smith 
1980:68) and hence 'interpreting' (Fraser 1989:154) need. Essentially, it 
highlights that administrators operate with a mega conception of 'normative' 
(Bradshaw 1972:640) need which contains conflicting elements rather than with a 
fixed and universal definition. Whilst, as we would expect from the theoretical 
literature, absolute and relative understandings (Doyal, and Gough 1991; 
Ignatieff 1984; Sen 1983) can be discerned in Britain and the Netherlands 
respectively, notions of need are essentially contextual and constructed in 
accordance with the perceived deservingness, rather than universal necessity of 
the applicant, in the social assistance contexts in which the two sets of 
administrators work. In sum, whether able to meet more or less of the absolute or 
relative needs of social assistance beneficiaries, administrators perceived that, 
(what they constructed as) 'wants' arising from the 'personal choices' of 
(irresponsible) social assistance beneficiaries were the province of, or the reward 
from, participation in the labour market, and should be curtailed in Sen's (1983) 
absolute sense. 
The first part of the chapter highlights that the two sets of workers did not 
consider the needs of humanity in general: they considered the (exceptional) 
needs of social assistance beneficiaries. The needs of applicants for 
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discretionary payments were interpreted in accordance with the principle of 
individual responsibility, exemplified by the finding that administrators perceived 
that social assistance beneficiaries should ideally strive to 'live within their 
means' (B.01.CO.W) without making recourse to exceptional payments. 
Notwithstanding this similarity in administrative perspectives however, generally 
speaking there was variation in the degree to which their specific social 
assistance organisational context allowed them to administer discretionary 
decisions about need in absolute or relative terms, explicated in the strategies 
they used to interpret need. The second part of the chapter thus illustrates that 
Social Fund Officers had to 'put their work hat on', and distance their needs as 
social beings from those of their customers, in order to interpret needs in terms of 
basic subsistence requirements (i.e. eating and sleeping). The Dutch 
administrators on the other hand, effectively devoid of any budgetary constraints, 
were found to make reference to relative notions of poverty and need. However, 
such judgements entailed an explicit focus on the relative social position (and 
social characteristics like class and gender) of the applicant. Compared with their 
British counterparts, the Dutch administrators were more concerned, not only 
with what people needed to survive, but also with what they were 'due' or what 
they deserved according to their merit and station in life (Ignatieff 1984:35). 
The third part of the chapter illustrates that in the discretionary schemes under 
study, both sets of administrators are compelled to differentiate between, and 
socially construct, the 'needs' and the 'wants' of applicants. The latter conceptual 
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distinction can be seen to be of crucial importance for administrators in giving 
beneficiaries what they perceive to be their just desserts. It is in this way that 'felt' 
needs, 'expressed' (Bradshaw 1972:641) by the perceived irresponsible 
beneficiary, are subsequently (re-)interpreted as 'wants' by the administrator. 
Working need out case by case, those initially deemed 'deserving' (in their 
respective social assistance contexts) were more likely to be constructed as 
being in 'need': paired, in the administrative frame of reference with the obligation 
to meet it with a grant where possible. 'Wants' conversely, carried no such 
obligations, and were often firmly married with what were perceived to be the 
'personal choices' of the (irresponsible) undeserving. The latter differentiation it is 
argued underlies a strong administrative link between consumption, the freedom 
to choose, and production (Engbersen 1989) and administrators effectively seek 
to constrain the consumer choices of those who have irresponsibly exerted 
'personal choice' by awarding such applicants a loan. 
'They must live within their means' 
The following section of the chapter highlights that in both countries under study, 
the exceptional needs of beneficiaries were not considered by administrators in 
isolation from the wider social assistance schemes in which they were situated. 
Such considerations included a recognition of the social assistance benefit levels 
in each country. Essentially, British administrators considered that it was just not 
possible for people to secure the 'basics of life' (B.01.DM5.M) when reliant on 
benefit for any length of time, especially if they were single (and able-bodied). 
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Because ~hat I've al~ays said is: no one who's playing the 
game straight, can lIVe for ten years on social security. 
There's no way. 
Researcher: because it's simply? 
The benefit levels are too low. [] No one, who's playing the 
game, could possibly live. I mean as a single person you're 
on what is it now, £53. I mean ok, [] they get their rent and 
council tax paid, but that's not cash in hand, £531 (laughs) 
you know. 
Researcher: you're not going to be doing a lot on that are you? 
Even for the basics of life. Ah, a social life or anything... [ ] 
First thing that tells you there's something wrong, is if you 
walk into somebody's house, who's been repeatedly on 
benefit for years and they have a well furnished home. It's 
just not possible. Absolutely not possible. Um, there's 
something not right there at all, and that tells you. 
(B.01.DM5.M). 
There was therefore a clear and strong administrative recognition that (even for 
the 'genuine people') because social assistance benefit levels were generally 
inadequate, many beneficiaries would have little option but to incur debt to meet 
their everyday living expenses. 
That thousand pound limit (on Social Fund Loans), has been 
a thousand pounds for a long, long time. And that to me 
nowadays, isn't realistic. It's not realistic. I mean, if you've 
got a man, woman and four kids, a thousand pounds is 
nothing, you know? [] To be honest with you, I don't know 
personally, how people survive on the money they get in the 
first place. Um, for us to then pay them a loan and then take 
that money off, over and above that: that just blows my mind, 
you know? Em, because when we see what people are 
paying out, the genuine ones, that have got all their 
commitments like, and get their money every week, and try 
to do it, you're just like ... 
Researcher: 'How do you do it'? 
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How do they do it? They get themselves into debt, that's how 
they do it (B.01.DM6.W) 
In the Netherlands conversely, administrators often voiced that, at least in the 
short term, benefit levels were specifically intended to cover the cost of clothing, 
and also included amounts for saving. 
When someone has an uitkering from this office, in the total 
amount of money there is also a little budget for saving 
(NL.02. 02.W). 
Nevertheless, despite these divergent perceptions of the adequacy of social 
assistance benefit levels, both sets of administrators seemed to consider that 
one of the most important links between social assistance and exceptional need 
payments was the regulatory function of enforcing individual responsibility. The 
concern that beneficiaries should endeavour to 'live within their means' is 
explicated clearly in administrative perceptions of immediate emergency 
payments in each country. That said, from a cross-national perspective there 
were country specific nuances, which are related to the perceptions of the 
adequacy of general benefit levels. 
For example administrators perceived that those who had alcohol or drug 
addictions, which would be difficult to fund from general benefit levels in both 
countries, requested immediate payments. In addition however, British 
administrators further perceived that (relatively speaking a high volume of) 
customers requested immediate payments in order to payoff debts or to attend 
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parties, rock concerts and football matches. In other words they perceived that 
payments were being used by some beneficiaries in order to subsidise or as they 
termed it, 'top up', their low levels of benefit in an attempt to engage in some 
form of social participation. 
We've really got to see this person in an emergency, em, as 
a consequence of a disaster, em if that's not happened, if 
they've placed themselves in that position, then 
unfortunately, then we're unable to consider a Crisis Loan. 
The need must have arisen in an emergency or as a 
consequence of a disaster. 
Researcher: so what kind of things would you consider that they 
would have placed themselves in that position? 
Em, mis-spending their benefit, em, yeah, that's what we. 
We tell them that we're not here to subsidise their benefit. 
That we understand it's not a great amount to live on, 
however, that's what they're going to get, and they must live 
within their means and they must budget their money, 
because we're not here em to, to subsidise them. Em, really 
just spent money, lost money as well. We pay for lost money 
the once, usually, em however, we may pay it a second or 
third time, em, but again it's the customer's own 
responsibility to keep their money safe (B.01.CO.W). 
The latter concern was also evident in the Netherlands. Social assistance 
beneficiaries were expected to do their utmost to manage on the amounts given 
without making recourse to Bijzondere Bijstand. As the following participant's 
quote highlights however, rather than needing to top up an inadequate general 
social assistance benefit level, here it was primarily perceived that the 
beneficiaries who most often asked for such payments were those who were 
addicted to either alcohol, gambling or (in the Dutch context) illegal and very 
expensive drugs. 
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When there really is a crisis, people can come immediately 
and we can do something for them - but always - (only) if it's 
necessary. So if someone em tells that he has lost his wallet, 
uh we want to have a report from the police that he has told 
them that he has lost his wallet. We want to uh see the last 
withdrawment from his bank account; and how much did he 
withdraw, um and if that's about 1500 guilders, where 
someone gets (only) 1500 guilders a month; and then puts it 
down his wallet and then loses his wallet, we. Yeah, we 
a/ways ask 'why in the hell did you take all your money in 
your wallet' and em. Yeah-well, if it shows that the people is 
reckless about his uh, his .. life or the way he wants to live, 
yeah-well, we often tell them that it's their own fault and their 
own uh, uh yeah responsibility, their own responsibility um 
and that it's not very clever when you have only 1500 
guilders to live from, to take it all out [ ] Quite often they're 
the people who are addicted to drugs, uh alcohol, uh 
gambling - because they need about 1500 guilders a day, 
so em, and that's a big problem of course if you only get 
1500 guilders a month .. Especially if they're on drugs [ ] 
although a lot of drugs are legalised in Holland, they're still 
expensive, and the people who are on the drugs that are not 
legalised: well they're really expensive (NL.01.02.M). 
As the latter participants' quotes suggest, rather than being concerned with the 
needs of a universal and abstract humanity, administrators, in their daily jobs 
were primarily concerned with the (exceptional) needs of social assistance 
beneficiaries, who, they considered, had a responsibility to try and get by without 
asking for more. 
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Perceptions of absolute and relative need 
That said, the following section highlights that the specific social assistance 
organisational contexts (outlined in chapter 6) in which the administrators worked 
influenced the degree to which poverty was conceptualised in absolute or relative 
terms. This is explicated here through the administrative processes by which the 
needs of beneficiaries were reasoned in the two countries. 
Essentially, in order to administer a budget-limited fund, British administrators 
had to distance their needs as social beings, and sometimes their absolute, or 
basic needs as humans, from those of their customers. In the Netherlands 
conversely, in the absence of budget limitations, the relative social status of the 
applicant can be seen to be of primary importance to the administrator in 
determining need. 
Britain: '/t's dreadful when you think about it' 
To a large extent Social Fund administrators perceived that their inadequate 
budget and the tight regulations for discretionary awards determined what could 
be classed as needs and what could not. As the previous chapters have 
highlighted, British administrators spoke continually about meeting only the most 
essential items of 'cookers, bed, bedding crockery and cutlery' with grants, which 
are entirely in keeping with absolute conceptualisations and definitions of poverty 
and related human needs for subsistence (i.e. sleeping and eating). Medium 
priority items, were essentially classed as non-essential: 
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'Fridge, washing machine, chest of drawers, wardrobes. Um, 
other kitchen utensils, uh such as well, an iron and ironing 
board, things like that are classed as non essential because 
at the end of the day if we went down to a Crisis Loan, would 
there be a risk to your health and safety - that's the bottom 
line - if your shirt was crumpled? (B.01.DM2.W) 
In order to administer liberal provision, in which (as seen in chapters 6 and 7) 
Social Fund Officers struggled to award payment for items associated with the 
most basic of human needs, staff attempted to distance their social, and often 
even their shared basic human needs, from those of their customers. This was a 
process which one of them referred to as 'putting (their) work hat on' 
(B.01.DM6.W). They often stated that, when they stopped to think about it, they 
found this separation not only emotionally difficult, but also hypocritical. 
For example, many of them felt that 
We've all got our own sort of standards, naturally everybody 
has a personal thing of 'oh, I couldn't live without such and 
such a thing' or whatever (B.01.DM2.W) 
However, due partly to budgetary constraints what they effectively had to say to 
customers was; 
We're not here to make your home a home: we're here to 
provide you with the basic necessities. Any of the niceties of 
life: you'll just have to wait for' ... I mean we're so st~app~d, 
even if I awarded curtains, I wouldn't award curtain ralls, 
because we'd say 'well, pin them up at night'. I mean it's 
things you wouldn't, you WOUldn't do yourself. You're, you're 
having to (pauses) you're having to divorce yourself from 
'this isn't me we're talking about here'. 
Researcher: not my needs, or? 
264 
Yeah 
Researcher: and that's because of the budget? 
Yeah (B.01. DM1.W). 
The way the budget is just now, you can sit on a bed, so you 
don't need a settee. I mean it's dreadful when you think 
about it. [ ] I think it's dreadful, you're having to say to 
somebody: 'you don't need a three piece suite, because you 
can go and sit on your bed'. I mean personally I would be 
insulted if somebody said to me 'you don't need a sofa, you 
can sit on your bed'. What, are you expected to drag your 
bed into the living room? But I mean, that's basically what 
we're saying to people. But I think it's wrong, but I mean 
that's just my personal. I think everybody, every human 
being has got a right to have at least, you know, standard 
and comfort in their own home (B.02.DM1.W). 
How can I turn round to somebody and say 'you don't need a 
washing machine, you can hand wash or you can use a 
launderette'. How can I say that? Because if my washing 
machine broke down, I'd have kittens. If I phoned the 
engineer and he said 'I can't be out 'till Wednesday' I was 
having kittens, because I couldn't use my washing machine. 
I have been in that situation, you know, lately: 'Wednesday! 
Wednesday! What am I supposed to do 'till Wednesday'? 
You know. And I can turn round to somebody with two small 
children and say 'you can hand wash, or you can use a 
launderette'. But we're having to look after the budget, 
which, believe me we are (B.03.DM2.W). 
The latter quotes imply that British administrators did not hold to such liberal 
understandings of poverty and human need in any 'normative' sense and 
previous research has similarly suggested that officers felt guilty at 'having to say 
no' (Huby and Dix 1992:93). In keeping perhaps with the 'minimal' public role of 
the state in a liberal welfare system, the hypocrisy that Social Fund Officers felt 
at telling people to do things they would not want to do themselves (,hand-wash 
265 
your clothes in the bath'; 'go to the shops everyday'1) was often forwarded as a 
'personal' opinion or feeling emanating from the 'private realm', rather than as a 
'public issue'. However, whilst Social Fund staff may have felt uncomfortable 
denying the absolute needs of beneficiaries, it is argued later in the chapter that 
their perceptions of need were wholly in line with those that we would expect 
from the principle of less eligibility, argued to be inherent in liberal welfare 
provision. 
The Netherlands: 'Why does he need a suit' 
In the Netherlands conversely unlike their British counterparts the Dutch 
administrators operated with no such blanket base line of essential items that 
could be met by way of a Community Care Grant or a Crisis Loan. From a 
comparative perspective then, this left more room for judging the needs of 
beneficiaries in relative terms, and as previous chapters have highlighted, 
administrators often spoke about any given beneficiary's needs for participation 
in SOCiety. However, this section of the chapter highlights that discretionary 
decisions made by administrators on relative terms can be quite conservative in 
nature. Essentially, the needs of applicants are judged by administrators in 
reference to what they perceive the applicant's current social position to be, and 
as Ignatieff (1984) notes, in a stratified society all social positions are not of equal 
worth or status. 
1 These were not prescriptions, rather they were suggestions made to customers who asked staff 
'what they were meant to do' without a washing machine or a fridge. 
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In this respect, whilst the Dutch administrators reasoned that a woman with 
children would 'need' a washing machine in order to fulfil her role as a 'mother' , 
they often viewed the request for a suit from the hypothetical able-bodied 
applicant in scenario 1 (see Appendix 3) with a deal of suspicion or incredulity. 
This might be related to their perceptions of his social position as a young and 
able-bodied proletariat: and their concern seemed to be whether a 'modern day 
hewer of wood and drawer of water' could really have secured a job interview 
that 'needed' a suit. 
I would advise a person not to put any clothes on that uh, 
are not him. Do you know what I mean? (NL.01.0B.M). 
As the Dutch administrators perceived it perhaps, such an applicant might 
essentially be trying to be something they considered he was not. For example, 
several of the paternalistic administrators voiced that they would want to meet 
with the applicant to check, or in effect, regulate his employment expectations. 
(would want to assess) how um, his idea of reality is, that 
he's applying on jobs that he's really able to get. You know 
he can solicitate to something he will never get 
(NL.01.04.W). 
I would want to know more about what kind of an interview. 
Does he really have a chance for that job; is it something 
that he can do; is it realistic that he um, that something good 
would come out of it (NL.01.11.W). 
These findings can be related to the theoretical position, which argues that 
activation in social assistance schemes is needed to facilitate the low paid, low 
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skilled sectors of a capitalist economy (Shragge 1997). A minority of 
administrators for example thought that a young able-bodied social assistance 
beneficiary should not be holding out, or waiting, for a job that required a suit. 
Why does he need new shoes and a suit? Because when 
you are unemployed for four years you have to uh, take all 
the work that's available. He (can) work in a factory for 
example 
Researcher: so, he doesn't really need to have a suit to? 
No, I don't think so (NL.01.1 O.W). 
He doesn't get it from me. He doesn't get it. Because he's 26 
years old, and uh he can go in a factory. So, I don't think uh 
.. shoes and a suit .. No. I don't think it's necessary, and 
that's my opinion (NL.01.07.W). 
A request for a suit for an interview did not seem to fit with administrative 
expectations of the type of jobs that 'someone like him' would be expected to 
apply for. 
What kind of work is he applying for? 
Researcher: would it depend on what kind of work it was or? 
Yes. 
Researcher: so if he was going for an office job? 
Then I think it's more necessary than when he will go for uh 
to work in a .. in a cleaning job (laughs) (NL.01.16.W). 
The shoes and the suit ., oh that's difficult. It would also 
depend on what kind of job it is, that he has to look nice. He 
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must (already) have something that he can. It doesn't really 
have to be a suit. I guess that when there's a good chance 
that he can get the job, then I would em, give him the travel. 
Researcher: but not the? 
The shoes and the suit? I doubt .. well, when it's .. when the 
job is for em, requires a suit, then maybe yes (NL.01.11.W). 
As previous chapters demonstrated however, the majority of the Dutch 
administrators were willing to give such an applicant the items requested. As the 
above quotes testify however, this was not exclusively because he was 
perceived to need the items in order to flourish as a human being. Rather the 
administrators perceived that the items he requested might essentially get him to 
the labour market and hence to self-sufficiency. 
Discretionary decisions on human need then are, in both schemes under study, 
contextually influenced by the goals of the organisation and the context in which 
the administrators work. Social Fund Officers' decisions on need are much 
constrained by the budget, which mostly decrees that only basic or absolute 
needs (primarily to eat and sleep) can be met by way of discretionary 
(Community Care Grants/Crisis Loan) awards. In the Netherlands conversely, 
budgets did not regulate decisions about relative need: the social position and 
the perceived deservingness of the applicant did. Comparatively speaking, these 
administrative processes of reasoning need highlight something of an irony or a 
paradox. There might well be more scope for equality in the administration of 
'liberal' and budget-limited systems based on the universal though absolute 
human needs to eat and sleep. The administrative room created by the lack of 
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budgetary constraints in the more generous Dutch system however, effectively 
leaves greater scope for inequality: discretionary decisions biased and 
constrained by the perceived social characteristics of the applicant. 
Constructing needs and wants 
The latter part of the chapter highlighted that comparatively speaking, the 
organisational contexts in which the two sets of administrators work constrained 
the degree to which they were able to conceptualise need in absolute and 
relative terms. Theoretically, these findings are what we might have expected in 
the administration of 'social democratic' and liberal income maintenance 
provision in the Netherlands and Britain respectively. 
The following part of the chapter argues however that notions of either absolute 
or relative need are not fixed and universal concepts in the administrative frame 
of reference. For the purposes of discretionary payments, administrators are 
concerned, in fact we may say that they are obliged2 to reason the social 
assistance beneficiary's exceptional application, and 'the demand that the poor 
give reasons (for their need) is the demand that they show themselves deserving' 
(lgnatieff 1984:34). Essentially, rather than being an objective administrative 
concept, need was used in a dynamic way by the two sets of workers and 
socially constructed in accordance with the applicant's perceived deservingness. 
As we saw in the previous chapters, clear patterns of country specific (depending 
on the social assistance configuration) 'deservingness' emerged in response to 
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the hypothetical scenarios presented to administrators. The nature of the needy: 
their perceived responsibility or control in the circumstances leading up to the 
request was one of the primary concerns of administrators when considering 
their discretionary decision. In the Netherlands, the most deserving of 
beneficiaries seen to be in need of a grant were those who acted in line with their 
responsibilities and obligations for the receipt of social assistance: either those 
who were motivated and actively looking for work, or those who could not work 
and who were 'visibly poor'. In Britain administrators perceived that they were 
'not allowed to help the responsible people' trying to get a job, and subsequently 
viewed grants as being for the 'non-regular' and apparently impotent applicants. 
The following part of the chapter illustrates that the existence of these patterns of 
discretionary decisions in the two countries under study hinge partly upon the 
administrative distinction between needs and wants. Administrators, like those 
who theorise need (Ignatieff 1984; Doyal and Gough 1991), pair the idea of a 
need with the idea of a duty or obligation to (try to, in the case of Social Fund 
Officers) meet it with a grant. Wants on the other hand carry no such obligations, 
rather, they are perceived as strictly the domain of the labour market. That 
'wants' are not the province of social assistance discretionary payments implies 
that both sets of administrators ultimately seek to curtail the consumer and 
lifestyle 'choices' of social assistance beneficiaries in Sen's (1983) absolute 
sense. 
2 Because they have to justify their discretionary decisions. 
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'If you haven't got the money: you can't have it' 
Bauman (1998:38) argues that 'the poor of a consumer sOciety are socially 
defined and self-defined first and foremost as [ ] inadequate consumers'. Both 
sets of administrators took more than a passing interest in the consumption 
patterns of social assistance beneficiaries. It is not inconsequential in this respect 
that, in both the systems under study, administrators seemed especially pre-
disposed towards the 'poor souls (found) sitting with absolutely nothing' 
(B.01.DM2.W), whose material position was obviously relatively miserable yet 
largely accepted by them (Van Oorschot 2000). 
Essentially however, the pity obviously evoked in such cases should not cloud 
the finding that administrators perceived it morally wrong for social assistance 
beneficiaries to aspire to any status other than that of an 'inadequate consumer'. 
Indeed, both sets of workers reserved some of their greatest scorn and criticism 
for those applicants who they perceived 'were not content to remain at the 
bottom of the consumer ladder' (Bauman 1998:31) and who wanted to enjoy 'the 
same joys of consumer life' whilst on social assistance, (like 'big televisions and 
lUxury carpets') as other people boast(ed) to have earned' (Bauman 1998:73). 
As the following quotes outline, in both systems under study, the right life for a 
social assistance beneficiary is thought to be a frugal one: not one in which they 
try to be a choosing (and 'borrowing') consumer and hence refuse to 'live within 
their means' . 
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Some people buy at five (shopping catalogues) and (have 
store card debts) and build up a debt for more than a 
thousand or maybe two thousand (guilders) or whatever .. 
someone who is very brutal and loves spending .. let it come 
let it go " But, then they have money problems, so when 
they need a washing machine, we have to give it to them 
because of the poverty rules. But, someone who is eating 
only meatloaf and counts his money (thinking) maybe yes, 
maybe no (participant pauses and strikes the desk) he has 
to buy his own and for that I feel it is not very good 
(NL.01.12.W). 
You've probably heard stories from the others too about 
grants: we have accepted there's severe risk and all the rest 
of it, and we've awarded what we consider high priorities, 
like bed, bedding, cooker, [] and they go and buy a 
television or a hi-fi. Or spend; get £20 a square yard carpet! 
[ ] They're the ones where you've got to say 'well, is this' [ ] 
I mean I empathise with them, that they've got a hard time. 
Coming up Christmas, kids are seeing this, that and the next 
thing on the telly. I accept they've got a hard time, saying no. 
[ ] people sign up for a (Budgeting) Loan, and then six 
months down the line they decide they can't afford it at the 
rate: because they've taken on other debts somewhere else. 
And this man's wanting (his Budgeting Loan repayments) 
reduced because he's taken on £40 a month [ ] payments for 
cable television. [ ] I thought 'yeah, get your priorities right'. 
Although in a certain sense I can sympathise that if you're 
long term sick or unemployed, what have you got to do but 
watch telly? But I can see it from their point of view too, but 
at the end of the day, if you haven't got the money: you can't 
have it. That's my opinion (B.01.07.W). 
Underlying these concerns is an administrative link between what Engbersen 
(1989:77) argues are two of the most important cultural goals in Western 
societies: consumption and work. Whilst Bauman (1998:24) argues that the norm 
society primarily holds up is that of playing the consumer rather than the producer, 
the present research suggests that the administrative concern lies primarily with 
'defective producers', whom they then seek to position as 'unfulfilled consumers'. 
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This is effectively done either by constructing a request from an 'undeserving' 
beneficiary as a 'want' rather than a need, or by limiting their consumer choices 
which, according to Bauman (1998:73) is the 'most painful of deprivations' in a 
consumer society. 
'You've chose this' 
In both countries under study the administrative responses to the hypothetical 
family in scenario 3 exemplify the twinning of personal 'choice' with wants, and 
the subsequent construction of the undeserving. As outlined in the previous 
chapters, the male applicant - and also his wife to a lesser extent - were largely 
perceived by both sets of administrators as irresponsibly raising their children 
whilst on social assistance. Identical reasoning processes, although more 
explicit in the Netherlands, were used to deny the applicant and his family a 
grant. Essentially administrators constructed the items requested not as 'needs', 
but as 'wants' that had arisen from an exercise in personal 'choice' to have more 
children and to move to a bigger house. 
For example, in regard to the carpet requested by the hypothetical family for the 
extra bedroom, the question of control over the items requested is explicitly 
related to the necessity of the house move. As one Dutch administrator 
explained 
When the moving is not necessary, we think that the other 
costs are also not necessary (NL.01.13.W). 
274 
Already deemed by administrators as having no moral excuse for not working the 
family's request is constructed as having arisen from an exercise in 'personal 
choice'. 
It's their free choice to move, that's uh their responsibility. 
Three children, well, pfhh, they can sleep together for our 
sake (NL.01.12.W). 
We think it's not necessary " the children can sleep together 
in one room. If they choose to live in a larger home, they 
may, but we don't pay .. (NL.01.16.W). 
Similarly, Social Fund Officers essentially refused to accept the family's 'need' to 
have moved. The items requested by the family, in the absence of health 
problems, or exceptional pressure, are therefore constructed as 'normal', or 'on-
going' ones. 
When the children are five, two and six months, they're little. 
A two year old and a six month can share, share a room. So 
if they had two or three bedrooms, I don't see the need to 
have moved (B.03.DM2.W). 
I would need to know the sex of the children, right? Because 
if they're all the same sex, they can sleep in the same 
bedroom [ ] I mean ages five, two and six month, I mean I, 
as far as I'm concerned children of that ages can sleep in the 
same bedroom, it doesn't matter what sex they are [ ] in this 
scenario, they're little (B.02.DM1.W). 
Similarly, for the cot and the pram in both countries it is the undeserving couple's 
'choice' to have another baby, rather than any objective need that the infant 
might have for the items that justifies the administrator's discretionary decision to 
withhold payment as a grant. 
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They've had a, a a or have got a baby, that doesn't mean it's 
desperate that you get that. I mean we didn't cause the 
situation, so possibly a loan [ ] he created the situation 
(B.01.DM3.M). 
(discussing what she would say to the couple should they 
ask for a review) (whispers and laughs) 'You've chose to 
have another child, um naturally it's needing a cot and it's 
needing a pram. If you've not got that, which I would assume 
you would have, um, and you didn't get it from your 
maternity grant, then it's a Budgeting Loan, because you've 
choose this' (B.01.DM2.W). 
Thus whilst in the theoretical literature (van Oorschot 2000) 'children' are often 
given as a criterion of deservingness, and thus a pre-requisite for being 
considered in need, the present study argues that it essentially depends on 
whose children they are. As the previous chapter illustrated, whilst the children 
of the perceived impotent and thus deserving couple in scenario 2 (see Appendix 
3) were often offered by administrators as reasons why the family should get a 
grant, the same was not true of the hypothetical couple's children in scenario 3. 
The implication of this of course, might be that administrators mostly perceive 
that able-bodied beneficiaries should be working before they make, what they 
. perceive to be the 'choice' to have children, or at the very least, beneficiaries 
should not be having children whilst on welfare. 
Decreeing the items requested as 'wants' rather than 'needs' was not the only 
strategy used by the two sets of administrators to try and constrain the consumer 
choices of those applicants they perceived to be (irresponsibly) exercising their 
personal choice. For example, some of the Dutch administrators, in an attempt 
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to deny the family one of the consumer pleasures of 'brand new things', 
laughingly commented that they would send the applicant and his family to the 
'second hand shop', 
For the new bed for the baby, I send them to (laughs) a 
second hand shop, yes, also for the kinderwagon (R.04.W). 
We have also a second hand store here. Um, I can .. imagine 
that I say ok, go and get there .. your .. 
Researcher: the things that you need? 
Yeah, because I have a job and I'm working and I have 
money but my uh, furniture is also second handed so .. 
yeah (NL.01.15.W) . 
The Social Fund staff voiced that they were unable to be prescriptive and tell 
people where to buy their goods. Nevertheless, they recognised the 'shame' in 
'having', rather than choosing to go to a second hand shop. 
Some of the younger ones that come in, 16, 17 years old, 
and you talk to them like your own son, which you shouldn't. 
You feel like saying to them, 'you've no chance, you can't 
get these things, you'll maybe have to go to second hand 
shops, you'll maybe have to go to car boot sales'. Although 
we'd be shot down in flames by the welfare rights folk, for 
telling folk to go and buy second hand (B.01.DM7.W). 
Far more salient in the British system however, indeed standard practise (in 
order to manage the budgets) in all of the Social Fund Offices researched, was to 
strictly limit 'consumer choice' to a small number of very specific and relatively 
inexpensive retail outlets. 
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for seventy five, eighty, reasonable, you can buy - it may not 
be your cup of tea, or mine, or someone else's - but the fact 
is, you can get a double bed for under a hundred pounds 
from (high street retailer) (B.01.DM4.M). 
As the following participant's quote highlights, however, awarding grants in line 
with the prices at these retail outlets was, in line with the principle of less 
eligibility, ultimately considered sufficient for social assistance beneficiaries. 
Indeed, those who asked for more expensive items above and beyond the 
reaches of the basic models from these specific stores were seen as 'wanting' 
things that the lowest independent labourer could not get from working for a 
living. 
(discussing a recent application, where, on health grounds a) 
letter comes in from the health visitor saying this couple 
must have a leather suite. They must have wood flooring 
because of the condition of this child. Now the first thing I 
said there was 'why must it be a leather suite'? You know? I 
mean, if I was in that set of circumstances and it was a 
choice between my child being ill or my child being better, I'd 
go out and buy plastic furniture, you know, if I had, was on a 
low income, me personally. And I would buy linoleum. I 
would take up all the carpets and I would put down cushion 
floor, linoleum or whatever I could get. Em, but this was the 
health visitor, applying her standards. Which is fair enough, 
because that's what she thought. Now that one, was 
refused, along all the lines. There was awards given, to 
enable the people to purchase, reasonable, form the (budget 
retail stores), right? And that went to review, and it was 
overturned. 
Researcher: and they got a leather suite? 
They got their wood floors, mhm. I don't think they got the 
leather suite but they got the wood floors. So, there comes a 
time where, you know you step back from it and say 'well 
look, this is a nonsense'. Because if this was a couple on a 
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low income (from work), they wouldn't be able to come to us 
and get all this. And if this was you and I. We would go for 
an alternative, and especially if your child's health's involved 
you'd go to the ends of the earth to get your alternative. Yo~ 
know, so (B.01.DM6.W). 
This link between work and consumption displays a certain amount of divergence 
in the two systems under study. Essentially, the undeserving's perceived 
reluctance to work can justify either giving them 'less' in the British 'safety net' 
system or giving them 'more' in the Dutch activation context. In Britain, the fact 
that they do not work justifies their 'less eligible' status; 
You can't have it as your kind of standards, because, when I 
was going on about that, somebody said 'but, your 
standards: you buy it yourself. So you can set your own 
standard, and you can set the standard that you consider to 
be a high priority, because you're buying it'. 
Researcher: 'you work'? 
'You work, you're buying it, you're in that position so you 
decide what you need. If it's a television the size of the room, 
that's your priority. But, when you're looking at somebody 
else's budget, when you were buying it for somebody else, 
it's not a priority', [ ] and I can see the sense in it. It's not a 
bottomless pit. But people are missing out, when they should 
be getting (B.03.02.W). 
In the Dutch configuration of social assistance, this link between consumption 
and production also takes an added form in case-management. In effect, 
consumer goods are used as a 'carrot' to get the client to the labour market, and 
self-sufficiency. As the following participant's quote highlights, if the beneficiary 
agrees to comply with their re-insertion plan then that is taken as payment for the 
in kind for the goods. As seen earlier (chapter 6) under the new case-
management system beneficiaries would be asked what they though they 
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needed to get to work The items are given, not because of any recognition of 
need on the part of the administrator - but rather as part of a 'contract', which is 
meant to change the applicant's behaviour. The choice being constrained here 
by the administrator is the choice to remain 'unmotivated' on benefits. 
If he says 'I need a computer to practise at home'. 'Ok, we 
get you a computer and you can practise your things at 
home, and that's the way your gonna to work'. Then you say 
'ok in three months we're gonna put you on the traject. [] 
Now, this is the school where you can get your computer 
education, and then we're gonna follow it'. And when he is 
going to work with us: he is active in it, well then we say-
every three months- 'ok, put a part of it off - a thousand 
guilders (of the price of the computer) is free now' 
(NL.01.12.W). 
The key to understanding the above administrative responses to, and 
constructions of, needs and wants between and within countries, is the attempt to 
enforce self-responsibility in beneficiaries. 
Conclusion 
Having explicated the contextual dimension of need, and the situated process of 
defining and meeting it (Smith 1980:68) this chapter has shown that, unlike need 
theorists and philosophers, those who administered exceptional payments did 
not consider or interpret the needs of an abstract humanity. Rather they 
considered the needs of social assistance beneficiaries. 
As seen, the process of defining and meeting need in the two countries under 
study was structured by the organisational context in which the two sets of 
administrators worked, which effectively informed the degree to which they could 
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administer payments according to absolute/liberal or relative/social democratic 
conceptualisations of poverty. Comparatively speaking, in Britain the budget 
determined that discretionary decisions be made in relation mostly to absolute 
conceptions of human need, whilst in the Netherlands it was the relative social 
position of the applicant that regulated and determined decisions on need. 
Paradoxically, the chapter highlighted that whilst there was more recourse to 
relative notions of need in the Dutch discretionary system, this potentially leaves 
space for greater inequality than can be found in the British liberal, and blanket 
basic need system. 
The chapter further illustrated that in a discretionary system, need must 
effectively be interpreted and socially constructed by administrators. Thus, it is 
argued that, rather than operating with objective or fixed and stable notions found 
in the conceptual and theoretical writings of absolute and relative need, in 
practise the social construction of need by administrators was dynamic and 
contingent. Essentially, need as an administrative concept is reserved for those 
who either have no choice but to be poor (impotent) or (in the Netherlands) those 
able-bodied who are perceived as trying to get themselves out of it. Those 
beneficiaries thought to be able to exercise control over their poverty and who 
were therefore perceived as exerting personal choice were firmly constructed by 
both sets of administrators as 'wanting' rather than needing something. As seen, 
the perception of administrators was that 'wants' and personal choice were the 
domain of the labour market. 
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Concomitantly, there was a strong relationship between work and consumption in 
the administrative frame of reference. Both sets of workers perceived that social 
assistance beneficiaries, by definition 'inadequate producers' had a responsibility 
to 'live within their means, to manage on what they got', and to accept the status 
position of an 'inadequate consumer' (Bauman 1998). Whether operating with 
more or less recourse to notions of absolute or relative conceptions of poverty, 
administrators sought to constrain the 'choices' of social assistance beneficiaries 
in Sen's (1983:161) absolute sense. 
We turn now to the final chapter, which is concerned with summarising the main 
findings and concluding the thesis. 
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Chapter 9 Summary and conclusion 
Essentially, this in-depth cross-national exploration of factors affecting the 
implementation of discretionary social assistance payments in Britain and the 
Netherlands has highlighted that broadly similar schemes for meeting the 
exceptional needs of beneficiaries in both countries serve diverse goals and 
objectives in their national and local contexts. This chapter summarises the 
comparative findings, notes the implications of the work for the wider research 
in which it is situated, and concludes the thesis with some suggestions for 
further research. 
Summary 
Primarily, the origins and development of nationally established income 
maintenance systems have led to those who administer discretionary 
payments being situated in different configurations of social assistance. 
Bijzondere Bijstand in the Netherlands is firmly situated in an 'activity fare' 
context whilst the Social Fund remains largely separated from 'welfare to 
work' policy in Britain. The empirical research conducted highlighted the 
cross-national diversity that followed from this. 
Reflecting different traditions of cash and care, and administrative structures 
of the local/national state in the implementation of policy in this area, empirical 
observation revealed that the two sets of workers were recruited into their 
respective organisations from quite different educational and occupational 
backgrounds. From a comparative perspective, such backgrounds would be 
expected to give the two sets of workers different labour market positions and 
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thus were associated with the degree to which routes to employment were 
perceived as being the outcome of choice. Both sets of workers regarded their 
locales as stigmatised. However, Dutch administrators with a professional 
qualification congruent to 'people changing' (for example, an HBO in social 
and legal studies or a teaching or social work qualification) actively chose 
their employment positions, whilst the (great majority of) their British 
counterparts spoke of 'ending up' in the Social Fund section. Having applied 
for what they perceived to be a secure job in the Civil Service, none of the 
British administrators had wanted to work in a local benefits office. These 
findings question Lipsky's (1980) assertion, or perhaps his assumption, that 
street level bureaucrats seek out their helping professions in order to perform 
a worthwhile role in society. The empirical analysis suggests that the 
backgrounds of the workers affected the degree to which they were motivated 
to apply for their employment positions in order to 'help people' or to secure 
themselves a 'good job'. Such differences might essentially have implications 
for their understandings of claimants. 
Specifically, different backgrounds affect perceptions about 'the poor' and 
poverty that the two sets of workers develop during their careers. Merged 
with their respective 'paternalist' and 'managerial' organisational contexts and 
constraints (outlined in chapter 6), such understandings affected their frame of 
reference for awarding payments and the extent to which staff thought they 
could, or could not, 'help people'. 
Organisational contexts generated conflicting goals for administrators. 
Specifically, the Dutch workers perceived themselves as having to meet 
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exceptional need whilst needing to activate beneficiaries, whilst Social Fund 
Officers struggled to meet exceptional need in the context of limited budgets 
and tight targets for clearing work. 
Such conflicting goals were relatively easier to overcome for the Dutch 
administrators. In line with their professional qualifications, the Dutch workers 
in their 'activity fare' context operated with quite sophisticated understandings 
of the dynamics of new or modern poverty and were mostly able to use 
Bijzondere Bijstand as a tool of implementation; to paternalistically affect the 
behaviour of social assistance beneficiaries and to try to facilitate paths out of 
social assistance. Because of their tight directions, targets for clearing work 
and inadequate budgets, British administrators conversely, perceived that 
they were prevented from helping those they considered as displaying some 
degree of responsible behaviour. Staff were thus constrained to operate a 
safety net for the most vulnerable with discretionary payments, rather than 
activating social assistance beneficiaries. Along with their educational and 
occupational backgrounds, these organisational constraints led to a concern 
with deterring long-term social assistance beneficiaries, informally labelled as 
'the regulars', who staff perceived as intent on subsidising their general (and 
often, but not always, low) benefit levels. 
Configurations of social assistance therefore affected the degree to which 
administrators exerted social control over beneficiaries, but not the meanings 
they associated to the forms of discretionary payments: loans and grants, at 
their disposal. Similar 'moral codes' that administrators shared however 
filtered through, and were often compounded by diverse contexts and 
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constraints. Thus non-repayable grants were used in the Dutch 'activity fare' 
context as a reward for, or incentive to, 'good' (reciprocal and responsible) 
behaviour. In Britain grants were ideally awarded to those impotent and 'non-
regular' customers. Loans, which by their nature entail a degree of 
reciprocity, were perceived as punishments to chastise or enforce a less 
eligibility status on irresponsible undeserving applicants. The Dutch 
administrators awarded loans to affect and chastise the behaviour of those 
suspected of fraud, those who would not work and, where their irresponsible 
consumption patterns warranted, those who could not work. Where possible, 
British officers sought to enforce a less eligibility status on those they 
considered did not want to work but were also constrained to award loans to 
those they perceived as deserving. 
These institutional contexts also implied differences in the degree to which 
both sets of workers administered exceptional provision along the continuum 
of absolute and relative notions of human need and poverty. As chapter 8 
illustrated, in order to administer a safety net provision, Social Fund staff 
attempted to separate their social and sometimes even their basic human 
needs from those of their customers. Dutch administrators, on the other 
hand, were shown to be more able to take the relative social position of the 
applicant into account and to give them what they perceived they deserved 
according to their merit (Ignatieff 1984). 
Notwithstanding this difference however, it was highlighted that in the 
discretionary payment schemes under study, administrators operated with a 
mega conception of need that contained conflicting elements rather than a 
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fixed or universal notion. Unlike social theorists, administrators did not 
consider the abstract needs of 'strangers' (Ignatieff 1984). Rather, they 
constructed need and wants in accordance with such typifications of 
applicants as 'motivated' or 'genuine'. Issues of control and responsibility as 
criteria of desert were paramount and often superseded those associated 
with, for example, 'existence of children'. 
Ultimately, and regardless of the relative generosity of benefit levels in each 
country, the construction of need and want was underpinned by an 
administrative connection between production and consumption. 
Administrators perceived that social assistance beneficiaries, by definition 
inadequate producers, had a responsibility to live within their means and to 
manage on what they got. The comparison of administrative techniques thus 
illustrated that administrators sought to constrain the 'irresponsible' lifestyle 
and consumption choices of social assistance beneficiaries in an absolute 
sense. Cross nationally this suggests that 'there is an irreducible absolutist 
core in the idea of poverty' (Sen 1983: 159) in administrative frames of 
reference. 
Implications 
The findings of this study allow comments on the interrelation between regime 
theory and typologies of social assistance. As seen, recent in-depth work in 
this area (L0demel 1997) highlighted a welfare paradox, in that social 
assistance provision in the social democratic Norwegian welfare state was 
more 'liberal' and bore a greater resemblance to its Poor Law predecessor 
than did its British counterpart. This was explained by the different historical 
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origins of cash/care and central/local social assistance regimes in Britain and 
Norway and their interrelationship with social insurance. 
Given the nature of L0demel's research, he acknowledges that he was less 
able to comment on the degree to which approaching the respective social 
assistance locales for help was perceived as stigmatising for clients 
(1997:269). The present research findings can not answer this question, but 
can perhaps forward some comment. Local offices in both the Netherlands 
and Britain were perceived by staff to be stigmatised. The (perceived) reasons 
for this tie in with L0demel's (1997) argument to some degree. In the 
Netherlands the Sociale Dienst is perceived as stigmatised because of the 
divisions within public welfare, the explicit separation between social 
assistance and social insurance provision. The municipality is the provider of 
'last resort' income maintenance and the clientele have less of an attachment 
to the labour market than social insurance beneficiaries. 
In Britain conversely, (indeed, in any liberal regime) it can be argued that the 
main welfare division is between public and private welfare rather than within 
public welfare. Thus L0demel argues that 'there is a much less socially 
divided public income maintenance in Britain' (L0demel 1997:257). That may 
be the case, however this research has highlighted that administrators 
distinguish between the deserving and the undeserving. What can not be 
stated with any confidence however is the degree to which customers' 
(assistance/insurance) benefit receipt rather than their behaviour (long term 
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receipt of benefits and/or causing disruption and making demands on 
resources and time) in the offices lead to this differentiation by staff. 
Tentatively therefore, it can be suggested that administratively perceived 
reasons for the stigma at local offices in the UK can partly be seen as the 
inverse of L0demel's argument: there is no separation of locale for social 
assistance and social insurance beneficiaries. Thus at least some of the 
'regulars' i.e. long-term social assistance beneficiaries make 'the social' 'not a 
very nice place to come to' (for example, for pensioners, those signing sick 
for the first time, those perceived as wanting to work, and perhaps the 
generally well behaved long term beneficiaries). 
The findings also highlight some further paradoxes in exceptional need 
provision within social assistance in the two welfare regimes. It can be 
suggested, for example, that there is more scope for equity - at least in the 
nature of the needs that can be met - in Britain's liberal exceptional payment 
scheme where (primarily) the budget restricts the basic needs of the able-
bodied applicant to those associated with sleeping and eating (for 
discretionary Crisis Loan and Community Care Grants at least). In the 
Netherlands conversely, the absence of budgetary constraints left more room 
to administer provision according to the relative social position of the applicant 
in question, which thus meant inequity in the nature of the needs that could be 
met. 
A further paradox emerges if we consider perceptions for the causes of 
poverty in the two countries. Social democratic regimes, as argued in chapter 
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2, operate more in accordance with assumptions of 'structural' causes of 
poverty, and indeed recourse was made by administrators to the dynamics of 
poverty in the Netherlands. Theory posits that liberal welfare regimes operate 
more with behavioural understandings of the causes of poverty. Yet, this 
research has demonstrated that in exceptional need provision, the 
configurations of social assistance deem that administrative practises are, 
again, almost the inverse. Whilst provision may be more generous in the 
Netherlands, implementation practises seek to tightly control the poor. The 
Dutch 'caring state' thus offers social protection for assistance beneficiaries 
perhaps on the basis that they 'do what they are told'. By contrast, while 
officers in Britain often had to refuse applications because of lack of funds, 
they did feel constrained in 'what they could say' to customers both by welfare 
rights' organisations and the Independent Review Service for the Social Fund. 
Britain thus provides more (formal) liberty for beneficiaries but less provision. 
Again, this can be related to and explained by the historical traditions of the 
relationship between cash and care provision. 
There is perhaps more political acceptance of the tight and explicit control of 
the behaviour of Sociale Dienst clients than in the British centralised system, 
where social assistance was intended, at least in the short term, for more than 
the residuum (L0demel 1997). Of course, any such differences may even 
themselves out if the Social Fund, in the extension of Jobcentre Plus offices, 
were to be incorporated into the administration of welfare to work in Britain. 
However, it still begs the question of the political acceptance of a customer, 
say requesting a washing machine being asked to sign a contract promising 
to find a job in return for it. 
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In part, the exploration of discretionary decision making on the exceptional 
needs of social assistance beneficiaries in both countries under study has 
provided a window through which the welfare values of those who administer 
provision may be observed. 
In the case of Britain, whilst the administrative notions of 'less eligibility' were 
strong (and perhaps related as much to the structure of the (low paid) labour 
market in Britain as the benefit system) administrators considered that it was 
unjust that 'genuine' or responsible people i.e. those not most in need, 'got 
nothing' from the system. In part, this is where their disdain for the 'regulars' 
comes from. Clientele that they have little control over 'hoard' the limited 
resources and thus are perceived as taking money away from the 'genuine 
people'. The major point to make here is that such findings primarily question 
whether those administering income maintenance in Britain believe that 
provision should be liberal in any normative sense. 
What these findings can be said to highlight is the importance of 
organisational contexts and controls on administrative behaviour. From a 
comparative perspective, Social Fund staff seemed more constrained than 
their Dutch counterparts to administer a system that was not in accordance 
with their values. Cross-national differences show that institutional settings 
are important for structuring and controlling administrative behaviour and 
outcomes, but not necessarily values. 
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Suggestions for further research 
This research has begun to explore the nature of exceptional need payments 
in different configurations of social assistance. In the context of different tiers 
of government responsibility for the implementation of discretionary payments 
within social assistance, a potentially interesting comparative analysis would 
be how, or if, higher-level policy makers feed the views and experience of 
street-level staff into policy formulation. For example, local policy makers in 
the Netherlands were often situated in the same building as administrators 
and staff often talked about 'going upstairs' to ask them questions. In Britain 
conversely, staff seemed much more isolated from 'those at the top' and 
referred to them in such terms as 'suits behind a desk in Westminster'. Such 
systems, and the lines of communication they engender, might essentially be 
expected to have an effect on the success of policy. 
Similarly, building on the findings from this research that question Lipsky's 
assertions, a potentially fruitful and larger scale comparison might be made of 
the motivations to welfare state employment, and the degree to which 
administrators seek out their helping positions. 
Given that one of the interesting findings to emerge from the research was the 
cultural and political acceptance of administrators explicitly controlling the 
behaviour of social assistance beneficiaries in the two systems a comparison 
of the aims and history of welfare rights organisations in both countries might 
further provide an insight into this divergence. Further, there is scope for 
comparing both how social assistance beneficiaries in (perhaps a number of 
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different systems) meet their exceptional needs in practise, and the 
perceptions of those on the receiving end of such decisions thus considering 
the impact of the different systems on those who rely on them. Research 
could also take forward the initial findings of 'stigmatised' locales in both 
countries, or indeed in countries with differing degrees of centralisation (e.g., 
the UK, the Netherlands and Norway) to explore the claimants' perspectives 
of accessing welfare in different configurations of social assistance. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Participants' job description and gender 
Britain: 
Male Female 
Local office 1 
Social Fund Manager 1 
Social Fund decision- 3 3 
makers (officers) 
Administrative officers 1 
Adm inistrative 1 
assistants 
Customer-service 1 (former social fund 
manager staff) 
Counter staff 2 (both former social 
fund staff) 
Local office 2 
Social Fund decision- 2 
makers 
Local office 3 
Social Fund decision- 2 
makers 
The Netherlands: 
Male Female 
Representative of the 1 
VNG 
Munic~al office 1 
Local policy makers 1 1 
Head of municipal 1 
administration 
Consulents 3 4 
Supervisory decision- 2 2 
makers 
Case-managers 5 
Munic~al office 2 
LocalJ~olicy makers 1 1 
Head of administration 1 
Consulents (income) 6 
Appendix 2 
Draft interview schedule 
1. (This will be used in part as a warm up question) what led to your 
employment in this position? 
Prompts: 
What did you do before, how did you get into this job? 
2. How do you describe to friends and family what you do for a living? 
Prompts: 
What do you say to your friends and family that you do in your job; what do you 
say you do in your work? 
(Use below as a check-list. At the end of the interview schedule you can use 
them to mop up what has not been addressed. Follow them up if not talked 
about. E.g., you haven't really talked about fraud prevention, is that something 
that you have to think about?) 
- Deal with claimants/applicants or completed application forms. 
- Meeting peoples' needs: everyday need/all financial needs of applicants, only 
exceptional need. 
- Making decisions: on discretionary payments/ deciding on priority of need/ 
whether the applicant has applied for the correct category of payment (e.g. 
loan or a grant). 
Fraud detection/prevention. 
- Getting people back to work! try and get people back to work! motivating 
claimants/ keeping people out of care. 
3. What kinds of responses do you get from them? 
4. How are applications/cases for exceptional need allocated to you to make a 
decision on? 
Prompts: 
By postal area.; Allocated on a random basis as they come into the office; By 
casework load (e.g. where the administrator may be responsible for a set number 
of clients). 
5. Do you meet face to face with applicants? 
6. How familiar are you with your clients? 
7.How does this help you make your decision? 
8.Are these procedures enough/sufficient for you to base your decision on? 
9. Do you have a list of needs for one-off payments that you refer to? 
10.Are they prioritised? 
11.How often do you refer to them? 
12. How difficult is it to stick to the rules - how do you manage that- can you give 
me an example? 
13.What/who do you consult in the office, to help you make a discretionary 
decision? 
Prompts: 
The manual/ list/directives/written guidelines; Personal judgement/discretion; 
Training; Colleagues; other sources. 
14.Do you often require information from other sources/agencies? 
15. How much of your work is done for you by the computer system? 
16.ls this helpful to you? 
Prompts: 
To ascertain claimant's history/eligibility/work status/ (in the Netherlands phase 
1234 status); To make the decision for you. 
17.00 you/how do you know when the budget is nearing its limit? 
18.00 you have a set limit as to what you as an administrator can spend or is it 
held centrally somewhere for you to look up? 
19.What happens if someone is a high priority and the budget is nearing an end, 
or empty? 
20.Has that ever happened to you? 
21. What does the training for your job entail/do you have any professional 
qualifications? 
Prompts: 
Classroom based induction; Shadowing others/on the job training. 
22. Is this training adequate? 
Appendix 3 
Case Scenarios 
1. Male applicant is 26 years old. He has been unemployed for four years. 
He requests a payment for travelling expenses, a new pair of shoes and a 
suit to attend interviews for employment. 
2. Female applicant (57) and her husband (61) have been claiming social 
assistance for 19 years. The couple have severe health problems and are 
unable to work. They have two teenage daughters (14 and 17) the 
youngest of whom has an eating disorder. The family is currently involved 
with social work agencies. Female applicant makes an application for 
three new beds (due to her sudden and severe problems with 
incontinence) and a cooker which recently blew up. 
3. Male applicant is 42 years old. He and his wife have three children (aged 
5, 2 and 6 months). They have been unemployed for eight years. The 
family has recently been re-housed by the local authority, as they needed 
an extra bedroom. Male applicant requests a payment for a new cot for the 
baby, a carpet for the extra bedroom and a new pram. 
4. Female applicant is 27 years old and has two children aged 8 and 12. Six 
months ago she left her violent partner to live in a woman's refuge with the 
children, during which time she has been claiming social assistance. She 
is now in the process of setting up home with the children. She requests a 
payment for a washing machine and a cooker, stating that her ex-partner 
has sold those items previously owned by her. 
